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ICT Information and communications technology
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Institute of Statistics
INEM National Employment Office
INVERCO Association of Collective Investment Institutions
and Pension Funds
LFA Liquid financial assets
LIFFE London International Financial Futures Exchange
MEFF Financial Futures and Options Market
MEFF RF Fixed-income derivatives market
MEFF RV Equity derivatives market
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MMFs Money market funds
MROs Main refinancing operations
NCBs National Central Banks
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SCLV Securities Clearing and Settlement Service
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
TARGET Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross
Settlement Express Transfer system
TFP Total factor productivity
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value added tax
Abbreviations of countries and currencies in ECB publications:
Countries
BE Belgium
DE Germany
GR Greece
ES Spain
FR France
IE Ireland
IT Italy
LU Luxembourg
NL Netherlands
AT Austria
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6The cut-off date for the information included in this report was 31 May 2002
Conventions used
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + deposits with an agreed maturity of up
to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money market instruments + debt securities issued
with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance of changes when expressed as rates of
growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
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CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
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I.1. THE CULMINATION OF ECONOMIC
AND MONETARY UNION
During the year to which this Annual Report re-
lates, developments in the Spanish economy were
influenced by two unrelated events of singular im-
portance: the culmination of Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU) with the changeover to the euro,
and the change in the international scenario
brought about by the US slowdown and the effects
of the terrorist attacks of 11th September.
During the opening months of the present year
the most visible phase of the process of Monetary
Union in Europe has been concluded. Euro bank-
notes and coins have been introduced and the cash
denominated in the former national currencies of
the 12 current euro-area countries has been with-
drawn. The changeover, an operation of enormous
logistical complexity, has been seen through at a
swifter pace than envisaged by the European au-
thorities and has been notably successful, as high-
lighted by the high degree of acceptance of the new
money. Three years after the start of Stage Three
of EMU, then, the euro is being used in all types of
transactions by 300 million citizens, and it has satis-
fied a significant part of the expectations created
with its introduction in 1999. A highly integrated
economic area comparable in size to the United
States and bigger than Japan has been formed in Eu-
rope, and its common currency has begun to play
an increasingly important role in the international
monetary system.
Above all, however, the euro area has become a
region of high macroeconomic stability, underpinned
by the monetary policy of the Eurosystem, and une-
quivocally geared to the maintenance of price stability.
The benefits of EMU will continue to be seen over
time as the advantages of growing integration are har-
nessed, as the region’s economies overcome the
structural shortcomings still restraining them and as
their growth possibilities firm. Nonetheless, among
the immediately perceptible effects is the ability the
area as a whole has shown to withstand, with fewer
macroeconomic or financial disturbances than in the
past, the bouts of international instability that have
occurred since January 1999.
Naturally, this did not prevent the euro area,
against an increasingly globalised economic back-
ground, being affected last year by the considerable
deterioration in economic activity in the main in-
dustrialised countries. Despite some remaining un-
certainty, this cyclical slowdown should have
touched bottom in the closing months of 2001.
For the Spanish economy, participation in Mon-
etary Union has meant the culmination of a long
process aimed at establishing a regime of macr-
oeconomic stability and it has spurred the adoption
of reforms to improve the workings of its markets
and institutions. The advantages of the new macro-
economic regime, accompanied by progress in eco-
nomic liberalisation, have allowed Spain to grow
sustainedly and to create employment at a faster
rate than the other countries in the area. The out-
come has been steady headway in real convergence
in terms of per capita income. The change in the
international scenario in 2001 impacted the Spanish
economy when it was still enjoying high growth,
underpinned by the sound position of households
and firms and by a notable improvement in public
finances. Yet signs of the expansion being in its late
stages had already emerged in the form of inflation
differentials with the euro area, an increase in the
trade deficit and greater private-sector indebted-
ness.
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
REAL CONVERGENCE INDICATORS (Spain/EU) (a): 
GDP per capita (b) 79.9   81.0   82.3   83.1   83.5   
Apparent labour productivity 93.4   92.8   92.5   91.9   91.7   
Employed as proportion of total population  83.9   85.6   87.3   88.7   89.2   
Population aged 16-64 / total population  101.9   102.0   101.9   101.9   102.0   
DEMAND AND OUTPUT AT CONSTANT PRICES (c): 
Private consumption 3.2   4.5   4.7   4.0   2.7   
Government consumption 2.9   3.7   4.2   4.0   3.1   
Gross capital formation 4.8   10.3   9.0   5.0   2.9   
Fixed capital in equipment 10.8   13.3   7.7   4.8   -2.2   
Fixed capital in construction 2.3   8.1   9.0   6.2   5.7   
Exports of goods and services 15.3   8.2   7.6   9.6   3.4   
Imports of goods and services 13.2   13.3   12.8   9.8   3.7   
Gross domestic product 4.0   4.3   4.1   4.1   2.8   
EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, COSTS AND PRICES (c):  
Total employment 3.1   3.8   3.7   3.1   2.4   
Compensation per employee 2.3   2.7   2.7   3.4   4.3   
Unit labour costs 3.1   4.2   4.0   3.8   1.9   
GDP deflator 2.3   2.4   2.9   3.4   3.9   
Consumer price index (12-month % change)  2.0   1.4   2.9   4.0   2.7   
Consumer price index (annual average) 2.0   1.8   2.3   3.4   3.6   
Consumer price differential with the euro area (HICP) (d) 0.2   0.6   1.1   1.2   1.0   
SAVING, INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL BALANCE (e):  
Resident sectors: saving (f)  23.7   23.7   23.4   23.1   23.6   
General government (f)  0.0   0.8   2.4   2.9   3.4   
Resident sectors: investment  22.1   23.2   24.5   25.6   25.5   
General government  3.2   3.3   3.5   3.3   3.5   
Resident sectors: domestic  
net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)  1.6   0.5   -1.1   -2.5   -1.9   
General government  -3.2   -2.6   -1.1   -0.3   0.0   
General government gross debt  66.5   64.5   63.1   60.4   57.8   
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS (g):  
ECB weekly intervention rate — — 2.7   4.0   4.3   
Ten-year government bond yield 6.4   4.8   4.7   5.5   5.1   
Synthetic bank lending rate  7.2   5.9   4.9   5.9   5.8   
Madrid Stock Exchange General Index 
(DEC 1985 = 100)  556.1   817.7   894.4   994.8   853.4   
Dollar/euro exchange rate (h)  1.1   1.1   1.1   0.9   0.9   
Nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (i)  100.7   100.4   98.7   95.8   96.3   
Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (j)  98.7   99.9   99.2   97.3   99.3   
Nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis euro area (i)  100.5   100.1   100.0   100.0   100.0   
Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis euro area (j)  97.9   99.6   100.5   101.9   103.7   
Cash and cash equivalents 9.9   10.3   14.4   8.5   3.9   
Liquid assets (k) 3.3   1.7   2.4   8.8   8.5   
Households: total financing 11.7   16.5   19.1   17.5   14.2   
Non-financial corporations: total financing 8.9   11.6   18.3   21.3   18.2   
   Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Intervención General del Estado and Banco de España.
   (a)   EU = 100.
   (b)   Calculated using series at constant 1995 prices and in EU PPPs.
   (c)   Rates of change.
   (d)   Differentials calculated using the Eurostat series with information to December 2001, before methodological changes were introduced.
   (e)   Levels as percentages of GDP. The saving and investment figures for 2001 are Banco de España estimates.
   (f)    Includes net capital transfers received.
   (g)   Annual average levels for interest rates and exchange rates and rates of change for financial assets and liabilities.
   (h)   Prior to 1999, dollar/ecu exchange rate.
   (i)    1999 H1 = 100.
   (j)    1999 H1 = 100. Measured with unit labour costs.
   (k)   Includes cash and cash equivalents, other bank liabilities and money-market funds. 
Main indicators of the Spanish economy
TABLE I.1
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The sharp turnaround in the international eco-
nomic situation had an appreciable bearing on the
course of the Spanish economy, with a deceleration
of economic activity that tended to abate in the first
few months of 2002. GDP growth in real year-on-
year terms stood at 2% in 2002 Q1 (according to
INE seasonally adjusted estimates), as against 3.2%
at the beginning of last year. The loss of buoyancy
was particularly intense in manufacturing and en-
tailed a heavy contraction in investment in capital
goods. Nonetheless, the cyclical correction has not
derailed the ongoing advance in real convergence,
thereby breaking with the pattern of past episodes
of deceleration. This new pattern reflects the
change induced in the functioning of the economy
as a result of its satisfactory integration into the
new economic and monetary area. It has helped dis-
engage the mechanisms which in the past, in the ab-
sence of sufficient macroeconomic stability, tended
to magnify cyclical swings, whereby periods of rapid
unbalanced growth would result in sharp correc-
tions via harsher recessions than in neighbouring
countries.
Let it not be thought, however, that the changes
wrought by EMU membership guarantee that recent
patterns will be maintained in the medium and long
term. Indeed, along with the significant structural
changes accompanying monetary integration, there
have been expansionary impulses of a temporary
nature. Hence convergence towards the interest
rate levels characteristic of an area of price stability
boosted the vigour of domestic demand. The adap-
tation by agents to this permanent but unrepeatable
change in the cost of financing was conducive to an
increase in indebtedness, consistent with the new
conditions. Nonetheless, once the adjustment is
over and the composition of households and firms’
balance sheets is as desired, spending decisions will
tend to move onto a normal footing, with the disap-
pearance of some of the factors that have been sus-
taining the greater relative robustness of the Span-
ish economy.
Following the transition, the levels of macroeco-
nomic stability in the euro area are conducive to
the sustainability of growth in the Spanish economy
and eliminate many of the sources of imbalance that
handicapped the continuity of buoyancy in the past.
But they do not ensure on their own headway in
real convergence. In the new circumstances this de-
pends on the final determinants of the economy’s
competitiveness. These are tied to the rise in and
efficient use of available resources by means of in-
creased productive capacity, the harnessing of tech-
nological innovations, the tailoring of employee
skills to productive processes and the flexible func-
tioning of the markets for goods, services and fac-
tors. Medium- and long-term challenges may arise in
this field and should be addressed sufficiently in ad-
vance, since they require reforms and economic
policy decisions whose implementation is not im-
mediate and whose effects occur with considerable
lags.
On the culmination of EMU, therefore, the key
features of developments in the Spanish economy
are being shaped by its reaction to the slowdown in
the world economy and to the challenges involved
in maintaining real convergence in the medium and
long term, now that the transition period has been
successfully concluded.
I.2. CYCLICAL TURNAROUND IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY
During 2001 the world economy underwent an
appreciable slowdown. To differing degrees, all geo-
graphical areas were affected. The US economy
dipped from growth of 4.1% in 2000 to 1.1% in 2001.
Likewise, in the euro area, the increase in GDP was
barely 1.5% last year compared with 3.4% in 2000. Ja-
pan was once again beset by a technical recession,
concluding a cycle of 10 years in which the annual av-
erage growth of GDP did not exceed 1%.
Generally, the emerging economies posted low-
er growth rates than a year earlier, but higher than
those of the developed economies, with China, In-
dia and Russia being notably robust. In particular,
the Latin American countries were most affected by
the economic slowdown in the United States and
the low level of the international price of the com-
modities that some of the countries in the region
export. The heightening of the recession in Argenti-
na highlighted the unsustainability of the exchange
rate regime in place and prompted the suspension
of payments on public debt. After floating the Ar-
gentine peso early this year, the country is undergo-
ing a phase of great uncertainty characterised by the
sluggishness of economic activity, the vulnerability
of the financial system, the fragility of the financial
situation of households and firms, and substantial
social, political and legal instability (see Box II.3).
That said, and contrary to the outcome of other re-
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cent bouts of instability on emerging markets, there
have been scarcely any significant contagion effects
in other countries, despite the seriousness of the
crisis. That generally denotes the application of bet-
ter economic policies and of more transparent in-
formation-disclosure practices, which has given in-
ternational investors better means with which to
assess the position of each individual economy, in
accordance with their specific conditions.
The coincidence of the recent cyclical downturn
in a large number of industrialised economies has in
part been related to the strengthening in recent
years of the international channels through which
economic fluctuations are transmitted, thereby pro-
viding for a greater synchrony of economic cycles.
Thus, although no significant increase in the degree
of openness of the major countries has been de-
tected recently, corporate interests along with
household and bank portfolios are evidently more
diversified across the globe. Such conditions are
conducive to a greater correlation of developments
in consumption and investment across the different
economies.
Nonetheless, the generalised slowdown in the
main economies last year was largely linked to the
contractionary effects of disturbances bearing simul-
taneously – albeit to differing degrees of intensity –
on all geographical areas. Hence, as was the case at
the onset of the eighties, the buoyancy of activity
has been dented by the strong growth of oil prices,
which increased threefold between early 1999 and
late 2000, and the subsequent adverse effect on the
production costs and disposable income of agents in
the oil-importing countries. Likewise, the crisis in
the ICT goods and services-producing sectors has
been felt throughout the world. Its effect, however,
has naturally been greater in the United States and
in certain northern European and south-east Asian
countries, whose economies are comparatively
more exposed to developments in the market for
technological products. Finally, the terrorist attacks
of 11th September 2001 in the United States and
the subsequent military conflict sharply impacted
certain industries (such as transport and insurance)
which account for a significant portion of value add-
ed in the advanced economies. These events led to
a generalised though transitory deterioration in in-
vestor and consumer confidence.
These successive widespread disturbances,
against the background of the globalisation of finan-
cial activity, have been instrumental not only in the
international synchronisation of the economic
downturn but also in the similar way in which the
slowdown has unfolded in different countries. Par-
ticularly telling is the fact that, in the United States
and the euro area alike, the marked reduction in
the growth rate of GDP from 2000 to 2001 should
have been the result of the loss of momentum of in-
vestment, whereas the growth rate of consumption
posted only moderate declines. The forceful slow-
down in exports was offset by the loss of vigour of
imports, meaning that in both areas the external
sector did not contribute significantly to the decline
in the growth rate of economic activity (see
Chart I.1).
In step with this lesser economic buoyancy and
the fall in energy commodity prices as from mid-
2001, inflation tended to decline during the year in
the United States and the euro area. In Europe,
however, inflation fluctuated significantly as a result
of the successive livestock farming crises that belea-
guered the region. In any event, the moderate rise
in labour costs, thanks to continuing high productiv-
ity growth in the United States and the relative con-
tainment of wage demands in Europe, contributed
to the firming of favourable expectations regarding
inflation over the medium term in both economies.
Consumer prices have admittedly risen in the euro
area in the opening months of the current year, es-
sentially due to weather-related factors and to the
increase in indirect taxes. But the inflation rate,
measured by the HICP, will foreseeably stand in the
near future below the reference rate of 2% adopted
by the ECB for its definition of price stability as long
as there is no further surge in oil prices.
Against this backdrop of slowing economic ac-
tivity and the favourable outlook for prices, mone-
tary policies in the main industrialised economies
adopted an appreciably looser stance during 2001
than the previous year. The US Federal Reserve cut
its target rate by more than four percentage points.
The ECB reduced the rate on its main refinancing
operations by 1.5 percentage points, whereby real
rates in the economies making up the euro area
stood at levels close to their historical lows over
recent decades. Following these adjustments, mone-
tary conditions on both sides of the Atlantic are in
place to encourage the growth of economic activity.
In the euro area this is, moreover, corroborated by
the high growth rate of the monetary and, to a less-
er extent, credit aggregates.
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Fiscal policies, too, adopted an expansionary
stance in most countries. This change was particu-
larly prominent in the United States as a result of
the tax-cut packages agreed by the new administra-
tion, the aid programmes to the industries most
susceptible to the crisis ensuing from the terrorist
attacks of 11th September, and the subsequent in-
crease in military spending. In the euro area, general
government financial balances were adversely affect-
ed by the operation of automatic stabilisers and, in
certain cases, by the adoption of expansionary dis-
cretionary measures that brought to a halt the on-
going reduction in the structural deficit of the area
as a whole which had been initiated early in the
nineties. In certain countries, the deterioration in
public finances has jeopardised compliance with the
public deficit ceilings established in the Stability and
Growth Pact.
Since the close of 2001 and the onset of the
current year, signs of a potential pick-up in global
economic activity in 2002 Q1 have begun to firm.
And the recovery may strengthen further in the
coming quarters. While these favourable signs are
apparent both in the US economy and in the euro
area, the conditions under which both areas face
the potential onset of a fresh expansionary cycle
are, however different. This might affect the intensi-
ty and duration in each area of the incipient phase
of more robust activity.
In this respect, the strong slowdown in the US
economy in 2001 calls into question the more opti-
mistic estimates of the effects of the new economy
on the magnitude of economic fluctuations. That
said, the new technologies do appear to have con-
tributed to improving inventory management and, in
this connection, to moderating the traditional am-
plifying impact of stockbuilding on business cycles.
In any event, the maintenance of productivity
growth rates far higher than those in previous cycli-
cal downturns is consistent with the continuity of
the pattern of growth, linked to innovation and
technological diffusion, that prevailed in the late
nineties. This pattern enabled the US economy to
post notable simultaneous increases in output, em-
ployment and productivity in the closing years of
the past decade in a context of moderate inflation
(see Box I.1).
During 2001 some of the imbalances that had
built up in the US economy during the expansion
years were partially corrected. In addition to the
progressive reduction in the surplus of accumulated
capital, technology-stock prices fell: in February this
year the Nasdaq index was more than 60% below
its end-1999 level.
Hence both the continuing buoyancy of produc-
tivity in the United States and the foreseeable pe-
tering out of the disinvestment phase (once the in-
stalled capital stock is adjusted) might be conducive
to the resumption in the near future of high growth
Sources: Eurostat and national statistics.
(a)   Seasonally adjusted series in the euro area and the United 
States, and trend-cycle series in Spain.
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rates. The resumption of the expansionary cycle
would initially be underpinned by a fresh period of
expansion of gross capital formation. This is be-
cause it is unlikely that consumption, which grew at
a year-on-year rate of 3.1% in 2001 Q4, will surge
significantly, and a marked increase in US export
markets in the coming months is not foreseeable.
Nonetheless, considerable uncertainty sur-
rounds this scenario of a progressive recovery in
US activity. In particular, the ongoing growth of pri-
vate-sector debt in the United States, despite the
slowdown in activity, might contribute to tempering
agents’ spending decisions. Rising indebtedness also
points to the greater vulnerability of households’
and firms’ financial position in the face of possible
unfavourable events affecting the value of their asset
holdings or their income expectations (see Box I.2).
The fact the household saving ratio is at an his-
torically low level and household debt is at levels
close to 100% of gross disposable income have ad-
mittedly contributed to restricting the scale of the
deceleration. But, in particular, they add a factor of
uncertainty to the prospects of the US economy
picking up, especially if the likely increase in the fi-
nancial burden of household debt in the near future
is taken into account. In fact, the downward trajec-
tory of nominal interest rates – which are already at
very low levels – may have run its course, while no
significant inflationary pressures are perceptible.
Consequently, the downward course of real inter-
est rates may have already come to an end. It
should further be borne in mind that, despite the
correction of equity prices, stock market indices re-
main at high levels in relation to corporate earnings.
Nor can a possible correction in real estate prices,
which have recently risen sharply, be ruled out. Un-
der these conditions, any disturbance that signifi-
cantly affects household income expectations, or
the value of wealth, might prompt sharp changes in
consumption and investment decisions, leading in
turn to a premature interruption of the upturn in
activity.
As in the US economy, the outlook for recovery
in the euro area depends essentially on its capacity
to expand gross capital formation, following the
stagnation of this variable in 2001. In principle, the
generosity of monetary and financial conditions, the
tailing off of the run-down in inventories, the im-
proved outlook for the property sector in Germany
(after the crisis of recent years) and the foreseeable
expansion of exports, if the pick-up in the US econ-
omy is confirmed, should all be propitious to
heightening the vigour of investment in the euro
area in the coming months. Indeed, the indicators
relating to the opening months of the current year
point in this direction.
The European economy faces this incipient re-
covery with somewhat sounder macro-financial fun-
damentals than those of the US economy. Thus, Eu-
ropean households have a higher saving ratio (de-
spite its decline in recent years) and lower debt (in
relation to their disposable income) than their US
counterparts; the current account in Europe is vir-
tually in balance, compared with the high US deficit;
and private-sector exposure to a potential equity
price correction is more moderate, as a result of
the lesser weight of stock market financing in cor-
porations’ liabilities and of equity instruments in
household portfolios, although this weight has in-
creased recently. That said, the marked growth of
corporate debt in recent years (see Box I.2), due in
part to the acquisition of third-generation telepho-
ny licences (UMTS) and the financing of mergers
and acquisitions, might exert an adverse effect on
companies’ readiness to undertake new investment
projects.
In any event, the limited duration and scope of
the previous expansionary phase and the relative in-
tensity of the subsequent slowdown might be indic-
ative not only of the nature of the disturbances that
have affected the European economy but also of
some of its structural shortcomings. In 2001, then,
labour productivity remained flat after growing very
modestly the previous year. This was partly the re-
sult of the decline in activity and, possibly, of great-
er employment-generating capacity, following the
reforms in certain countries in recent years. How-
ever, the scant growth of labour productivity in Eu-
rope, both in historical terms and compared with
the United States, reflects – in addition to the ef-
fects of cyclical factors and changes in the intensity
of use of this factor in productive processes – the
European economy’s difficulty in broadening and
modernising its productive apparatus at a satisfacto-
ry pace (see Box I.1).
The lower productivity of the European econo-
my has direct effects on citizens’ welfare. It ham-
pers the growth of per capita income, exacerbating
the effects of the modest level and growth of the la-
bour force on this variable. Further, it impairs the
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BOX I.1
Economic growth ad productivity in the United States, the euro area and Spain
In the nineties, the economic expansion in the United
States was notable for its intensity and, above all, for its pro-
longed duration. The euro area embarked on this upturn in
the second half of the decade, but with lower growth rates.
That prompted a debate on the reasons behind the lesser dy-
namism of the European economy.
In the first five years of the nineties, expanding GDP in
the United States was accompanied by increases in employ-
ment and productivity, in line with the usual pattern. In Eu-
rope, by contrast, comparatively lower growth was consist-
ent with a notable rise in labour productivity, brought on
largely by the abrupt employment destruction in this period,
giving rise to a well-known increase in the capital/labour ra-
tio (1).
In the second half of the decade, the US economy re-
mained resilient and also saw higher increases in productivity
and employment than in the previous period. Economic activ-
ity in the euro area quickened somewhat, albeit with modest
productivity growth due, in part, to the pronounced increase
in employment. Above all, this expansion in employment
reflects the effects of the policies pursued in recent years
– with differing degrees of resolve by the Member States – to
promote participation in and the flexibility of the labour mar-
ket. Nonetheless, this factor is insufficient to explain why
productivity is less robust in Europe than in the United
States.
Under certain assumptions, apparent labour productivi-
ty (AP) may be split into the contribution of the capital/la-
bour ratio (K/L) and that of total factor productivity (TFP) (2). The first component captures relative factor use and, therefore,
directly incorporates the effects of the labour market reforms. The changes in TFP, meanwhile, are an estimation of the true
productivity gains associated with technical change and with other factors bearing on the efficiency of productive processes (3). In
the case of the United States, although the capital/labour ratio increased somewhat in the second half of the decade, it is the rise
in TFP, due foreseeably to the introduction and spread of technological advances in IT and telecommunications, that has made for
the sustained expansion of productivity and employment and, therefore, of GDP potential. In Europe, the modest contribution of
the capital/labour ratio to productivity growth compared with the United States is the logical consequence of the increase in em-
ployment generation, while the absence of improvements in TFP suggest that structural difficulties hampering the efficient use of
productive factors remain in place.
In recent years the Spanish economy has seen higher growth in activity than the euro area. Moreover, the employment rate
has risen substantially as a result of the depth of the market reform measures undertaken in our country. However, the contribu-
tion of TFP to productivity growth has held stable over the past decade at significantly lower levels than those of the euro area,
denoting the presence of structural shortcomings.
Thus, if Europe intends to raise its growth capacity, the obstacles to the innovation and dissemination of new technologies
must be removed. In this respect, along with the specific measures to promote research and innovation and improve training, the
conditions must be set in place for the more flexible and competitive working of product and factor markets. In Spain, this task is
particularly important if a high growth rate is to be maintained and further headway in real convergence made.
(1) The comparison of productivity between the two areas is influenced by the way in which employment is accounted for: in terms of numbers
employed or of hours worked. As neither of these options is free of limitations, this box has taken the first, which poses fewer statistical problems.
(2) In accordance with the expression:
AP = (1 – s) (K / L) + TFP
where s is the labour share and  denotes growth.
(3) In any case, this variable must be interpreted with caution since, being estimated residually, it reflects the combined effect of many factors,
such as the effective efficiency gains associated with the diffusion and assimilation of technical progress, the characteristics of the institutional and
regulatory framework, and the quality of public and private infrastructure and of human capital, as well as possible measurement errors.
Source: European Commission.
(a)   Contribution of the capital/labour ratio and of total factor pro-
ductivity to the growth of apparent productivity.
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economy’s competitiveness and, therefore, hinders
sustained job creation. In this respect, the fact the
European economy has not in recent years posted
significant gains in export market shares, despite the
pronounced nominal and real depreciation of the
euro since 1999, is a cause for concern. It thus
seems logical that one of the European authorities’
first priorities should be to adopt new reforms
aimed at creating a framework conducive to the ro-
bust investment that fuels higher productivity in the
economy. This requires changing those aspects of
market workings that reduce the expected return
on investment and hamper the financing of innova-
tive projects. In this sense, the initiatives agreed at
the Barcelona European Council in March are par-
ticularly timely and promising.
In particular, with the aim of promoting business
activity, it has been decided to adopt by the end of
2002 a new legal framework allowing Community
competition rules to be modernised. Further, the
Council has reaffirmed its commitment to achieving
fully integrated securities and risk capital markets by
2003 and financial services markets by 2005. The
necessary action will also be taken to liberalise elec-
tricity and gas supply to companies in 2004 and, by
2005, the Member States are to have a level of elec-
tricity interconnections equivalent to at least 10%
of their installed production capacity. As regards
boosting technological innovation and education,
the Barcelona Summit entered into specific commit-
ments, including most notably increasing overall
spending on R&D to 3% of EU GDP in the year
2010, in such a way that two-thirds of this new in-
vestment comes from the private sector.
I.3. THE SLOWDOWN IN THE SPANISH
ECONOMY
The annual growth rate of the Spanish economy,
which was already at an advanced stage of the cycle,
gradually declined last year, in step with the deteri-
oration of the world economy. The collapse of in-
ternational markets passed through to exports and
the gloom overshadowing expectations bore on
corporate and, to a lesser extent, consumer spend-
ing plans.
On balance, the position of the Spanish econo-
my in 2001, following an expansion lasting over four
years, remained relatively favourable, against a back-
ground in which the monetary conditions prevailing
in the euro area continued to be relatively generous
for domestic requirements. Real GDP rose by 2.8%
and the rate of increase of employment was 2.4%
(in National Accounts equivalent jobs terms), pro-
viding for a further decline in the unemployment
rate. This performance was better than that in the
European Union (EU) as a whole, whereby the
Spanish economy has, as earlier stated, continued
to make headway in terms of real convergence with
the EU Member States. Growth was basically un-
derpinned by household spending (consumption and
house purchases) and by public-sector investment
in infrastructure. These variables held up through-
out the year, whereas the persistent weakness of
investment in capital goods and the growing loss of
momentum of exports (which were nevertheless far
more buoyant than imports) set the pace of the
economy’s deceleration. The decline in investment
and exports dragged industrial activity in its wake,
while construction and those services branches
more related to consumption posted high growth
rates.
The available data for the first few months of
2002 show, to some extent, an extension of these
trends. The rate of deceleration, as already men-
tioned, is tending to decline, and although there are
still no signs of recovery in capital investment and
exports (the two key variables that will set the tone
of the economy during the year), their notable loss
of momentum seems to be coming to an end. This
more subdued behaviour of activity has also affect-
ed the employment data and both the EPA and the
homogeneous Quarterly National Accounts figures
have shown a rate of job creation which, albeit pos-
itive, has moderated considerably, while unemploy-
ment has risen.
The slowdown in the Spanish economy has
therefore been marked by the maintenance of posi-
tive rates of growth, job creation and real conver-
gence. Headway has continued to be made in fiscal
consolidation, to the point that budget balance has
now been attained. And although the levels of in-
debtedness of the non-financial private sector have
risen rapidly (against a background of very low in-
terest rates), its ability to save is tending to recov-
er. This, together with the greater saving by general
government, has curbed the increase in the nation’s
net borrowing. As for the inflation rate, it rose
above 4% in mid-2001 and fell thereafter, partly
tracking the movement of oil prices on world mar-
kets as well as the prices of certain food products.
19
BOX I.2
Features and implications of private-sector indebtedness: an international comparison
In the second half of the 1990s, the debt of the non-fi-
nancial private sector grew at a consistently higher rate than
GDP in the United States, in the euro area and in Spain
(Chart A). This higher indebtedness, which is partly the result
of structural factors, may have important macroeconomic
consequences as well as implications for financial stability.
All three have been simultaneously affected by the eco-
nomic slowdown, yet their private-sector indebtedness has
not behaved in exactly the same way. In the United States,
the growth of private-sector debt seems higher than would
be expected at this stage of the cycle from the experience of
previous slowdowns. In the euro area, meanwhile, indebted-
ness has, with a certain lag, stabilised somewhat in line with
its historical pattern. In Spain, however, the deceleration of
indebtedness has been very muted following the high rates of
growth during the upswing.
Household debt has been expanding in all three econo-
mies since the beginning of the 1980s (Chart B). In the Unit-
ed States, the indebtedness of this sector is significantly high-
er, and its growth rate in recent years has been higher than
in the euro area, underpinned principally by the revaluation
of real and financial wealth and expectations of high income
growth. In the euro area, however, wealth plays a less impor-
tant role and the growth of household debt has been lower,
with a clear deceleration in 2001. Finally, in Spain, households
have traditionally had a lower propensity to borrow. In re-
cent years, however, their debt ratios have converged rapidly
towards the average levels in the euro area, as a result of
greater macroeconomic stability arising from participation in
monetary union, which has reduced the cost of borrowing
significantly, and of vigorous job-creation and the revaluation
of property assets.
In the case of non-financial corporations, indebtedness
(loans and fixed-income securities) has a more pronounced
cyclical profile, which is similar in all three areas (Chart C). In
the United States, corporations have a different financial
structure and their level of debt is lower. However, although
in historical terms the level of debt is not high, recent growth
has been considerable and is partly explained by the phenom-
enon of debt-financed share buy-backs, which have been used
as a way of remunerating shareholders. In the euro area,
where the debt ratio of corporations is higher, recent growth
in debt has been largely determined by mergers and acquisi-
tions and by the financing of UMTS licences. In the case of
Spain, the indebtedness of corporations has also displayed
convergence with average euro-area levels, primarily as a
consequence of their international expansion.
Accordingly, although private-sector indebtedness can-
not be considered excessive in any of the three areas ana-
lysed, insofar as they are the result of changes of a structural
nature, the current levels of debt have increased the financial
vulnerability of the sector to any unexpected rise in the cost
of refinancing, as well as to unfavourable developments that
might affect income expectations or the value of investments.
In this respect, the European economy seems to be in a
somewhat sounder financial position than the United States
economy, being less exposed to changes in financial asset prices. The viability of the strategic alliances and of the technological
projects that have given rise to the increase in corporate debt is perhaps the most important element of vulnerability in the Euro-
pean case. In Spain, where debt ratios are still relatively low, the increasing exposure of Spanish households to changes in house
prices is an element of risk.
In any case, it cannot be ruled out that the current levels of indebtedness may have some restraining effect on agents’ con-
sumption and investment decisions, which would inevitably tend to moderate the extent of the recovery that seems to have com-
menced in the both the US and the European economies.
Sources: ECB and other national central banks, Eurostat, Federal 
Reserve and Banco de España.
(a)  Information from annual Financial Accounts for 8 countries: 
extended with information from the ECB.
(b)   Includes the sector nonfarm nonfinancial  corporate business 
in the US financial accounts.
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As will be analysed below, in the first few months of
2002 there was a fresh surge in consumer prices,
which widened the inflation differential with the
euro area to more than one percentage point.
By assuming the stability standards of EMU
membership (in terms of lower inflation rates, low
interest rates and fiscal discipline) and adding to this
improvements in the workings of markets and in
the flexibility of the economy, a change has been
brought about to the Spanish economy’s pattern of
behaviour over the course of the cycle. It therefore
seems the need to correct the macroeconomic and
financial imbalances that usually arose during the
years of expansion with adjustments entailing slip-
page in real convergence has been left behind (see
Box I.3).
Employment growth has proven a pivotal factor
for sustaining household income and enabling
households to continue increasing – under favoura-
ble financial conditions – their spending on con-
sumption and housing investment. These two basic
pillars underpinned the growth of the economy last
year and, in a more qualified fashion, in the opening
months of 2002. Nonetheless, it is estimated that
the growth of real disposable income was, on aver-
age in 2001, less than in the previous year. In addi-
tion, the losses in the value of financial wealth and
the worsening of consumer expectations exerted a
contractionary effect on household consumption
decisions. This restricted the annual rate of growth
of this variable (2.7% against 4% the preceding year,
according to the INE estimate) and saw the saving
ratio begin to pick up from its low levels in 2000.
 The resilience of investment in housing, which
has only in recent months begun to shows signs of
contracting, has been underpinned by the advanta-
geous financing conditions in place. But it is also as-
sociated with the increase in the number of house-
holds and with the surge in second-home purchas-
es, partly by non-residents. Moreover, the demand
for property has grown, fuelled by the high relative
return on this form of investment, in a context of
low interest rates, by the ongoing rise in house
prices and, more recently, by capital losses on alter-
native financial investments.
The forceful expansion of household spending
(on consumption and on housing) has been notably
favoured by the accessibility of sizeable financial re-
sources under advantageous conditions. The strong
fall in interest rates as a result of the Spanish econ-
omy’s integration into the euro area, the wealth
gains built up in recent years and competition
among banks have all proven conducive to the ex-
pansion of credit. Nonetheless, although household
debt ratios have risen significantly, they are in line
with the European average and below those in the
United States. In any event, this process has sub-
stantially increased the exposure of the household
sector to changes in financial and real asset prices.
The other demand components that (more
modestly) helped sustain the real growth rate of the
economy were government consumption and in-
vestment. The slowdown in revenue from certain
taxes owing to the cyclical turnaround and the high-
er-than-scheduled increase in some expenditure
items meant that the State and Territorial Govern-
ment deficits both stood at 0.4%. In the latter case,
this figure far exceeded the initial forecast. As a re-
sult, the balanced public finances attained in 2001
were possible thanks to the substantial contribution
of the Social Security surplus, due to the buoyancy
of hiring and employment. The growing vigour of
public investment as the year unfolded played a pos-
itive role; without jeopardising the continuity of the
fiscal consolidation process (see Box I.4), it contrib-
uted to sustaining activity and gross capital forma-
tion, partly countering the notable slackness of pri-
vate investment in capital goods.
The slowdown in capital investment steepened
during 2001. Its real rate of change for the year on
average was –2.2%, with its rate of decline ap-
proaching 4% in the final quarter of the year. The
prevailing climate of uncertainty across the world
last year, the decline in capacity utilisation and the
diminished vigour of final demand in the economy
contributed to the negative behaviour of this varia-
ble.
Business investment showed signs of only mod-
erate dynamism throughout the recent cyclical up-
turn compared with its habitual behaviour in previ-
ous expansions. This fact, despite the significant re-
duction in the growth rate of the user cost of capi-
tal (essentially as a result of lower interest rates), is
a rather unsatisfactory feature of the Spanish econ-
omy in recent years, but one which the other Euro-
pean economies have shared in differing measures.
Such behaviour, at a time of far-reaching technologi-
cal changes that are transforming key areas of eco-
nomic activity, tends to weaken productivity
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BOX I.3
Employment over the latest cycle: a comparison with the previous cycle
There are significant differences between the behaviour
of employment in the current cycle and in that which com-
menced in the mid-1980s and finished well into 1993 with a
drastic reduction in output and employment. It is therefore a
worthwhile exercise to identify the relevant aspects of the
macroeconomic environment and of the workings of the la-
bour market that have contributed to the more favourable
performance of employment in the latest cycle. The adjoining
chart compares employment and activity in the market econ-
omy during the two cycles in question. The first two panels
show that the expansion in the 1990s, characterised by more
moderate and stable growth rates, saw relatively more vigor-
ous job-creation than the previous one. Following the peak of
the cycle, employment slowed in both cases, but in the cur-
rent cycle its rate of increase has tended to stabilise, as com-
pared with the ongoing loss of momentum in the previous
downswing.
Different factors have been involved in these two per-
formances, with the behaviour of real labour costs standing
out among them. In the previous cycle, real labour costs in-
creased at high rates (especially from 1989, against a back-
ground of rising inflation), which prevented greater job-crea-
tion and made a larger adjustment necessary when activity
began to fall. In the most recent cycle, costs displayed mod-
erate decreasing year-on-year rates of change until end-2000,
against a backdrop of low inflation expectations. Although
there was an upturn in real labour costs in 2001, the agree-
ment signed by the social agents to promote wage modera-
tion in 2002 (Acuerdo Interconfederal para la Negociación
Colectiva) has tended to offset its possible adverse conse-
quences for employment.
Certain factors relating to the labour market explain
other important changes in employment. In 1984, measures
were taken to stimulate temporary employment contracts,
which led to an intense process of adjustment towards a
much higher proportion of temporary employment. It can be
seen in the chart that permanent employment was already
falling at the beginning of the slowdown, while temporary
employment continued to rise at very high rates, but that
rates did not turn negative until the slowdown in activity in-
tensified. By contrast, between 1997 and 2001 various meas-
ures were taken to promote permanent employment. These
have led the two categories of employment to move in oppo-
site directions. Temporary employment began to fall at the
end of 2001, while permanent employment continued to rise.
This aggregate performance was the result of very differ-
ent patterns in industry and market services. The case of in-
dustry is similar to that of the market economy: employment
growth in the latest cycle has been more vigorous than in the
previous cycle. Real labour costs have played a pivotal role in
the favourable performance of industrial employment, having
trended moderately in recent years. In market services, on the
other hand, the pace of job creation is proving to be relatively
less favourable in this cycle. The downward trend in employ-
ment began when the rate of growth of real labour costs was
still negative, perhaps indicating the substitution of capital for
labour in technological activities. Moreover, in 2001 there was
a notable acceleration in real labour costs, which could make
the slowdown even more pronounced.
Market economy (a)
1.4
4.4
3.0
1991 Q4
1989 Q2
1986 Q4
4.6
2.5
4.4
2000 Q11997 Q3
2001 Q4
0
3
6
9
0
3
6
9% %
GROSS VALUE ADDED
   Sources: QNA and EPA.
   (a)   Year-on-year rate of change.
   (b)   Data on temporary workers not available until 1988 Q1.
-0.5
2.8
3.4
1991 Q4
1989 Q2
1986 Q4
1.7
4.1
3.1
2001 Q4
2000 Q1
1997 Q3
-2
0
2
4
6
-2
0
2
4
6
% %
EMPLOYMENT
4.0
0.1
0.0
1989 Q2
1986 Q4
1991 Q4
1.3
1.0
-0.3
2000 Q1
1997 Q3
2001 Q4
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
% %
REAL LABOUR COSTS
-3.3
-1.3
1991 Q41989 Q1
2.6
4.5
1997 Q3
2001 Q4
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
% %
PERMANENT-CONTRACT WAGE-EARNERS
27.1
4.9
1991 Q4
1989 Q1
4.1
-0.7
2001 Q4
1997 Q3
-10
0
10
20
30
-10
0
10
20
30
% %
TEMPORARY-CONTRACT WAGE-EARNERS (b)
22
growth. And it is this variable that is posting far
lower rates of increase in Europe than in the United
States (see Box I.1).
The contraction of business investment may
have been partly due to sizeable investment flows
being diverted abroad in search of greater diversifi-
cation and higher returns, given the significance and
ongoing liberalisation of numerous markets offering
new business opportunities. The strong increase in
investment abroad since the mid-nineties has seen
funds equivalent to approximately 50% of the value
of capital investment channelled towards such mar-
kets in the past five years.
Broadly speaking, Spanish firms are in a rela-
tively healthy position which, foreseeably, will al-
low them to increase their investment plans sus-
tainedly as the turnaround in expectations
augured by the latest data takes root. The high
debt levels of recent years are partly in response
to the financing of investment projects abroad un-
der most favourable conditions; indeed, the finan-
cial burden of companies is still at historically low
– albeit rising – levels.
The strong decline in world trade in 2001 has
had a marked influence on goods exports, the rate
of increase of which slowed appreciably as the year
unfolded. The deceleration was particularly acute in
the second half of year when European markets
were affected by the collapse of world trade, which
appears to have bottomed out in the opening
months of 2002. Tourism receipts held up better,
despite the concerns related to the events last Sep-
tember, and the fall in some incoming-visitor flows
was not across the board. Further, tourism prices
have continued to undergo considerable rises. Al-
though the growth rate of imports also fell notably
over the year as a whole, in line with capital invest-
ment and exports, they were generally more sus-
tained, in step with the behaviour of other demand
items. In these circumstances, the contribution of
net external demand to GDP growth during 2001
progressively worsened, standing at –0.3 percentage
points in the final quarter.
The partial data available at present show that
goods exports generally maintained their presence
in the different areas last year, with no significant
changes in market share in the major regions. What
is in principle a favourable fact should perhaps be
qualified; given the low share still characterising
Spanish export activity, continuous progress will be
necessary if full growth potential is to be developed.
The Spanish share in intra-Community trade scarce-
ly exceeds 6%, approximately half the figure for Ita-
ly, while the share of real Spanish exports in overall
EU imports has stabilised over the past three years
at a figure slightly below 4%. This followed gains of
around one percentage point in the mid-nineties, in
the wake of successive depreciations of the peseta.
Now that the exchange rate adjustment mechanism
has been lost, such a performance requires atten-
tion be focused on the problems that may arise if
current competitiveness levels are not strength-
ened.
On the usual indicators, the Spanish economy
broadly maintains favourable levels of competitive-
ness against most of the industrialised countries,
but persistent differences in the relative growth
rate of prices and costs may ultimately erode them
(see Chart I.2). In this respect, the information
available shows that, in recent years, Spanish unit la-
bour cost indices have been increasing, drawing
closer to those of the main EU economies (with
which we compete on markets abroad and at
home). This has essentially been due to the greater
increase in compensation per employee and, to a
lesser extent, to less robust productivity. But re-
gard should also be had to the growing presence on
the international stage of the newly industrialised
economies (some of which will become part of the
EU in the coming years), many of whose products
compete under very favourable cost conditions
with Spanish goods.
An overall analysis of developments in costs,
prices and margins reveals that the notable increase
in unit costs has been generalised. Against this back-
drop, the branches least exposed to competition
(construction and services) were able to pass
through these increases to their prices, thereby
continuing to increase their unit margins. Margins in
the industrial branches, meanwhile, were squeezed.
Such patterns are not sustainable in the medium
term, as they impair the competitiveness of Spanish
goods and services and lead ultimately – in the in-
dustries most exposed to competition, as indicated
above – to employment adjustments.
The duality between exposed and sheltered sec-
tors can be seen on analysing final prices. Generally,
the growth rate of industrial and export prices
tends to adapt to that of competitor countries,
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BOX I.4
Achieving budgetary stability
Achieving sound public finances has been central to
the economic policy strategy pursued in recent years, in
order to secure Spain’s participation in Stage Three of
EMU and, having achieved that goal, to ensure compliance
with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Fiscal adjust-
ment has been based mainly on cuts in current spending,
although (against a background of cyclical expansion) pub-
lic revenue has also increased and been restructured. The
interest burden, meanwhile, has fallen by more than two
percentage points of GDP since 1995, as a consequence
of the decline in interest rates since the end of that year
and the reduction in public debt. Finally, public investment
has been sustained at relatively high levels. This fiscal con-
solidation strategy has enabled the government to meet
its commitments, so that in 2001 general government fi-
nances were in balance and public debt stood below 60%
of GDP. Also, the structural budget deficit has been cut
during the period to reach, last year, a level consistent
with medium-term budgetary stability.
The benefits of fiscal discipline are numerous. Sound
public finances, along with a monetary policy geared to-
wards achieving appropriate inflation targets, are neces-
sary requirements for the achievement of macroeconom-
ic stability, and thus for establishing the conditions for
sustainable economic growth. In this respect, the fiscal
consolidation carried out in Spain in recent years has had
a direct impact on inflation expectations and, by permit-
ting a more balanced policy mix, has helped reduce long-
term interest rates. The achievement of budgetary stabili-
ty has also enabled fiscal policy to re-assume its role as a
macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism. Recent experi-
ence, both in Spain and in the rest of the OECD, shows
that the fiscal imbalances recorded in the past made it
more difficult for fiscal policy to exert a stabilising influ-
ence and, at times, even made it necessary for pro-cycli-
cal policies to be implemented. Fiscal consolidation, with
a medium-term perspective, is in short an inescapable re-
quirement for planning effective public investment policies
to increase the economy’s stock of capital and factor pro-
ductivity, as well as to meet social protection commit-
ments.
In Spain, the entry into force on 1 January 2002 of
the budgetary stability laws has provided a further instru-
ment for fiscal discipline. These laws have introduced the
principle of budgetary stability, which is understood to mean that the various agents making up the Spanish public sector
are obliged to keep their annual accounts in balance or surplus. The application of this principle is particularly important in
the case of the regional (autonomous) governments, given the significant spending and revenue responsibilities they have
assumed and their delay in undertaking lasting correction of fiscal imbalances.
Maintaining budgetary stability will, however, require further reform of the Spanish public sector. In this respect, the
new budget law announced for the first half of 2002 should help reform budgetary procedures so as to improve the con-
trol, transparency and efficiency of public expenditure. In addition, the sustainability of public finances needs to be secured
in the medium term when population ageing, which will basically affect spending on pensions and health, becomes more
acute. Finally, it is necessary to press ahead with the development of strategies for public spending and revenue that im-
prove the Spanish economy’s growth fundamentals.
Sources: Ministerios de Economía y de Hacienda, and Banco de 
España.
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Spanish economy’s inflation rate to be measured
more accurately, correcting numerous biases which,
in most cases, had led to overestimation. The inclu-
sion in the new system of calculation of the sales
prices of numerous products involves an important
change in the seasonal pattern of the index, which
initially hampers the interpretation of the changes
observed in some of its components. In any event,
in the year to date there has been an acceleration
in the rate of change of consumer prices, which has
widened the differential with that of the euro area.
Part of this upward movement seems to be related
to the launch of euro banknotes and coins, since
the lack of familiarity with the new unit of account
has been conducive to rounding in certain sectors
of the economy. Although this effect is, by its very
nature, temporary and should not be incorporated
into agents’ inflation expectations, the widening of
the inflation differential with the euro area amounts
to a warning of the persistence of certain inflation-
ary biases in the economy, which should be eradi-
cated through improvements in market efficiency
and competition.
I.4. THE MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM
CHALLENGES FOR THE SPANISH
ECONOMY
 The Spanish economy’s growth prospects in
the short and medium term are favourable. They
are largely rooted in the benefits stemming from
the macroeconomic stability offered by membership
of the euro area. Forecasts point to a resumption
of dynamism during 2002, with the economy gradu-
ally picking up to growth rates close to those of po-
tential output. That said, the influence of other fac-
tors which temporarily exerted a positive influence
on national demand during the initial stages of EMU
will progressively dwindle. However, to ensure in
the long run that the Spanish economy continues to
grow at higher rates than those posted by the core
EU countries and that it obtains all the potential
benefits that participation in a monetary union may
offer, prices and costs must be prevented from sys-
tematically outgrowing those of their European
partners. The persistence of any such gap would
worsen Spain’s competitive position internationally
and jeopardise the possibilities of growth fulfilling its
potential. Economic policies should thus strengthen
their long-term perspective and act chiefly on the
supply side of the economy in order to boost pro-
ductivity growth.
Sources: INE,  ECB, OECD, IMF and Banco de España.
(a)   Spanish export shares in world and EU imports, in constant 
1995 dollars.
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while consumer prices retain a positive differential,
which is particularly persistent in services.
It has already been mentioned that the rate of
increase of the consumer price index (CPI) moder-
ated appreciably in the second half of 2001, al-
though the prices of non-energy industrial goods
and services held at relatively high rates of increase.
At the beginning of 2002 a new method of compil-
ing the CPI was introduced, which will enable the
25
Throughout the latest cyclical upturn, competi-
tiveness has been influenced by the low growth of
productivity. However, productivity is a difficult
variable to measure and furnishes insufficient infor-
mation on technical progress and gains in efficiency.
Accordingly, it is worth distinguishing between the
influence of primary productive resources (and, in
particular, the capital/labour mix) and that of other
factors (technological and non-technological alike)
which have a bearing on how innovations and tech-
nical progress are incorporated and, ultimately, on
the economy’s degree of efficiency. The contribu-
tion of these latter factors to growth can usually be
approximated through total factor productivity, al-
though the interpretation thereof is not free from
difficulty.
The moderate productivity growth observed in
the Spanish economy in recent years is the out-
come of a job-creation-intensive pattern of growth
which should be maintained so as to continue re-
ducing the gap in terms of economic welfare with
the more advanced EU countries. However, the
similarly weak growth of total factor productivity
points to potential shortcomings in the technology
incorporated which may restrict long-term growth
capacity.
This behaviour has come about, moreover, in a
setting in which significant technological advances
have been made in the information and communi-
cations sectors, requiring a considerable moderni-
sation drive by the most advanced economies. In
Spain, the use of capital goods related to the new
technologies has also increased recently but still
accounts for only a small portion of the total capi-
tal stock. However, their contribution to the
growth of productivity in the economy as a whole
has been significant, although it has not been able
to offset the low contribution of other productive
capital.
The differing performance of prices and costs in
Spain and the EU countries and the inertia of under-
lying inflation indicate that, despite the reforms un-
dertaken, certain markets for goods, services and
productive factors exhibit inefficiencies as a result
of an insufficient degree of competition. The per-
sistence of these inflationary biases might under-
mine growth potential not only through the distor-
tions to income and price formation processes but
also because the lack of a competitive environment
has a discouraging effect on innovation.
The assimilation of innovation is a fundamental
determinant of long-term productivity growth. Its
effects depend not only on the influence exerted on
the new-technology-intensive productive branches
but also, largely, on the capacity of business to in-
corporate advances in knowledge, to absorb techni-
cal progress and to adapt productive processes, hu-
man resource management and corporate strate-
gies.
Technological dynamism in the Spanish economy
resides mainly on the incorporation of innovations
generated mostly abroad and on the dissemination
of their effects to the whole of a productive struc-
ture specialising relatively in low-technology activi-
ties. Under these conditions, a flexible and competi-
tive environment is of particular importance to pro-
mote the incorporation of technological advances
through investment in fixed capital, the imparting of
skills to and ongoing training of employees and the
reorganisation of business activities.
Bolstering domestic innovation is also important
for increasing the capacity to assimilate new tech-
nologies. This requires an institutional framework
properly combining business incentives for invest-
ment in research and development with an efficient
channeling of the public funds earmarked for this
area (the level of which still clearly lags that in the
EU) to projects in which Spanish researchers have
proven their potential worth on the international
stage.
To obtain the long-term benefits of the new re-
gime of macroeconomic stability and prevent losses
in competitiveness arising, the liberalising reforms
undertaken in several areas and industries in the
economy must be furthered. Of particular impor-
tance are the reforms relating to the labour market,
the market for land, services and, in particular, the
network industries. The labour market has already
seen numerous reforms which, ultimately, have
contributed to increasing its capacity to generate
employment and – modestly – to reducing the de-
gree of duality. The reforms have, at the same time,
provided for wage moderation. Significantly, howev-
er, the ratio of temporary to permanent employees
remains high, higher in any event than the thresh-
olds deemed compatible with the efficient working
of the economy, since an excessive turnover in
temporary workers is an obstacle to them gaining
skills and to business productivity. The reforms
should remain geared to improving the mix of flexi-
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because the prices of property assets and rental
payments play a part in price and cost formation
processes (with a greater impact on certain tertiary
activities) and have a bearing on a crucial aspect for
the labour market, namely the degree of regional
mobility. Despite the fact the market for land use
has undergone some reform in recent years, the
present regulations remain insufficient since they
limit available supply and, ultimately, exert upward
pressure on prices and rentals. The need to reduce
this inflationary bias and eliminate the distortions
bearing directly on regional mobility advise pushing
through a reform of the regulations in the sector,
although to do this it will be necessary to revise in
parallel the financing mechanisms of the local tax
authorities.
The importance of speeding liberalising policies
in the network industries lies in the fact that these
activities supply basic inputs to the other produc-
tive sectors and provide a channel for a large por-
tion of technological advances, which gives them
great strategic importance. Consequently, changes
in the competitive environment in which they op-
erate give rise to far-reaching synergies allowing
for the spread of gains in efficiency and cost cuts to
the rest of the economy. The liberalisation of these
industries in Spain has already (to differing degrees,
depending on the stage at which liberalisation is in
each industry) increased the number of competi-
tors, improved the services on offer, widened con-
sumer choice and, ultimately, reduced prices.
There is still room, however, for further headway
here.
The opening up of the telephony market has re-
sulted in a larger number of operators (although the
former incumbent retains its dominant position in
all market segments) and an across-the-board de-
cline in the prices of various services. Notwith-
standing, the average cost of fixed telephony is still
higher in Spain than on average in the EU and com-
petition in the final network segment is advancing
slowly, owing to the difficulties the new operators
still face in gaining access to the subscriber loop.
Mobile telephony has also seen positive develop-
ments. These are manifest in a notable increase in
the degree of penetration and in a fall in prices. As
in other European countries, the launch of UMTS
technology has, however, been delayed, and the
granting of new licences is not envisaged for the
moment, a factor that may stifle competition in the
industry.
bility and stable working conditions, with the aim of
extending access to new forms of stable hiring and
narrowing the gap between the average severance
costs for permanent and temporary employment
contracts.
Significant headway has also been made in re-
ducing unemployment, long-term unemployment in
particular. However, the unemployment rate in cer-
tain groups (the lesser-skilled, mainly, and workers
aged over 45 whose skills have become obsolete)
remains high. Consequently, work must continue to
incorporate these groups into the labour market.
To resolve the mismatch between the skills offered
by these workers and those required by potential
employers, investment in training should be in-
creased. At the same time, it should be identified to
what extent the set of incentives resulting from the
interaction of unemployment benefits and redun-
dancy payments may discourage the unemployed
from accepting new jobs. Further, priority should
be given to training the unemployed and firming
their readiness to re-join the labour market. Lastly,
there is clearly room to further increase female
participation rates, which are still very low com-
pared with the core EU countries, and the same
holds for older people. Accordingly, the institution-
al and economic determinants underlying the deci-
sion to participate in the labour market, particularly
current early retirement arrangements and the
means of partial access to the job market, should be
revised.
The reform in recent years of the collective bar-
gaining system has been on a lesser scale and its
achievements, therefore, are more modest. Indeed,
the signing of the Inter-confederal Pact for Collec-
tive Bargaining by employers and trade unions last
December may be conducive to wage moderation
in the agreements negotiated this year. But it does
not eliminate the need to reform collective bargain-
ing, which remains notably centralised. The system
in place gives rise to high uniformity of wage settle-
ments, which are barely related to the specific posi-
tions of companies and particularly penalise small
and medium-sized firms. The reform should thus be
aimed at a greater decentralisation of collective bar-
gaining, allowing aspects such as wage conditions or
the length of the working day to take firms’ posi-
tions and employee characteristics into account.
The market for land is also an essential determi-
nant of the overall workings of the economy. This is
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In the electricity industry, rates have fallen con-
tinuously since 1997 (a sharper fall than in the EU
on average) and last year there was a relatively sig-
nificant increase in the number of consumers freely
negotiating prices. Nonetheless, the industry re-
mains highly concentrated, in both the production
and distribution and marketing segments, and the
vertical integration of the various activities is still
significant. Lastly, in the gas industry, the actual de-
gree of competition has continued increasing, albeit
more slowly, since the measures approved in June
2000 have been progressively adopted with some
delay, with some still to be applied.
In sum, reform in the network industries is al-
ready bearing fruit. In the future, the liberalising pol-
icy in these industries should be steered by how the
actual degree of competition evolves. That will not
depend solely on the increase in the number of op-
erators; sufficiently competitive conditions of entry
for new operators must also be ensured. In the en-
ergy sector, an assessment must be made of the
levels of concentration in production and in distri-
bution in response to the regulatory changes made
in recent years. In telecommunications, efforts
should be directed chiefly at improving competition
in the final segment of the network and at speeding
through the liberalisation of all factors that provide
for the swift spread of the new information and
communications technologies. Liberalisation in the
network industries will unfold more fluidly the
more transparent and stable the related regulatory
framework is.
The ongoing liberalising drive required by the
Spanish economy to enhance its competitive posi-
tion is all the more important in the light of the fall
in and ageing of the population that will more than
likely take place in the medium term if the demo-
graphic patterns of recent years – marked by a sus-
tained decline in the birth rate over the past 25
years and a continuous rise in life expectancy – do
not change drastically. These developments have
made for a slowdown in the growth rate of the
Spanish population and a far-reaching change in the
population structure, as shown by the current
shape of the population pyramid (see Chart I.3).
That said, the birth rate has picked up somewhat
recently and there has been a sharp increase in the
number of immigrants which has eased the slow-
down in the growth rate of the population. The
foregoing trends, which most of the EU countries
share, point to a decline in the proportion of the
population of working age and to a continuous in-
crease in that accounted for by the over-65s. That
will ultimately see an increase in the dependency ra-
tio which will be lagging to some extent what may
happen in Europe but, from a given time, will be on
a greater scale. These population trends might have
considerable effects on numerous areas of econom-
ic life, in particular on the potential growth of la-
bour supply and productivity and on public-sector
saving patterns (which will be highly influenced by
Sources: INE (for Spain) and UNO and INE (for EU).
(a)   Percentage points of growth of the dependency ratio, defined 
as the ratio of the population aged over 65 to the population aged 
15-64.
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changes in spending on pensions, health and care
for the aged). If measures to tackle the problems
that may build up over time are not addressed suffi-
ciently in advance, there is a risk that the Spanish
economy’s growth potential may decline in the long
run.
Naturally, maintaining a labour market that of-
fers incentives for inactivity or that makes for low
use of available resources will amplify the effects of
ageing on labour supply. The longer the required
changes to the current arrangements governing so-
cial insurance systems and the drive to rationalise
healthcare and lower social spending are left, the
greater the pressures on public finances will be. In
this context, the economic policy measures needed
to limit the impact of ageing are fully consistent
with those required to improve the workings of
the labour market and to boost productivity
growth.
CHAPTER II
THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE EURO AREA
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II.1. OVERVIEW
In 2001, world GDP grew by 2.5%, compared
with 4.7% the previous year. The fall in the rate of
growth, which had begun in 2000, took the form of
a progressive economic slowdown in the three
main areas, namely the United States, the European
Union and Japan. This coincidence of downturns in
all three areas had not occurred since the 1970s
(see Table II.1) and would seem to be evidence, on
one hand, of the commercial and financial interde-
pendence of the different economies and, on the
other, of the existence of a number of common
shocks, such as the crisis in the technology- and IT-
related sectors, the rise in oil prices in 1999 and
2000 and, subsequently, the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, which appreciably raised uncer-
tainty at the world level. Meanwhile, the emerging
economies as a whole were adversely affected by
the decline in the rate of activity in the main devel-
oped economies (see Chart II.1 and Table II.2). In
the latter months of 2001 and the opening months
of 2002 the signs of imminent recovery in the US
economy were becoming stronger and it is expect-
ed that during the year this recovery will extend, to
a greater or lesser extent, to other areas.
A particularly notable phenomenon last year was
the small reduction in world trade (1.5%), in marked
contrast to its 12.4% growth the previous year. It is
normal for world trade to have a very pronounced
cyclical pattern, especially when the cycles of the main
economies are highly synchronised, or when a large
number of countries are undergoing slowdowns or
recessions, as can be seen in Chart II.2. That said, one
has to go back to 1974 to find such a sharp change in
trade growth rates as that seen in 2001.
The fact that world output growth was skewed
last year towards large and relatively closed emerg-
ing economies (such as China, India and Russia) may
also help to explain how a given increase in output
has been achieved with a smaller expansion of
trade. Additional factors that help to explain the
singular sluggishness of world trade include: the dif-
ficulties besetting certain trade integration process-
es, such as Mercosur; the World Trade Organisa-
tion’s lack of headway in opening up certain mar-
kets with a very high growth potential (such as agri-
culture and textiles); the increase in trade-related
insurance costs in the wake of the attacks of 11
September, and the decline in flows of financing to
the most export oriented emerging markets. On
top of all this there was the crisis in the technologi-
cal sector and, in particular, in semiconductors. This
industry had sustained a high level of buoyancy in
previous years, but in 2001 its output, highly con-
centrated among a few countries, fell by 33% in
terms of export volume, after growing at annual av-
erage rates of 12% during the 1990s.
The global economic slowdown was accompanied
by a general reduction in inflationary pressures, while
the deflationary situation in Japan persisted. However,
underlying inflation tended to be higher than headline
rates, which is explained by the downward trend in
commodity prices and by the sharp fall in oil prices in
2001, which meant that by the end of the year they
stood almost 60% below their peak in 2000. None-
theless, approximately half of this fall was cancelled
out during the first few months of the current year
(see Chart II.3), so that oil prices represent a risk fac-
tor for the incipient world recovery
Consistent with the absence of inflationary pres-
sures and with the cyclical downturn, the economic
policies of the industrialised countries and of many
emerging countries tended to become, to a greater
or lesser extent, more expansionary, especially in
the United States. The monetary authorities re-
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duced interest rates substantially and the stance of
fiscal policies became more accommodating. In
Japan, however, the authorities were severely
constrained by the lack of any additional leeway to
pursue expansionary fiscal or monetary policies.
 In this global setting there was some correction
last year of the external imbalances of the three
major blocks, although whether it will continue is
uncertain. In the United States the current account
deficit narrowed from 4.5% of GDP in 2000 to
4.1%, basically due to the sharp slowdown in do-
mestic demand, although its effects were limited by
the strength of the dollar. In Japan the surplus was
reduced from 2.5% to 2.1% of GDP, while in the EU
the balance swung from –0.4% to 0.5%. Finally, the
decline in the imports of the developed countries
was reflected in a worsening external position for
the rest of the world, especially in those countries
most dependent on external demand (such as
south-east Asia) or on commodities exports.
As regards exchange rate developments, the
sustained strength of the dollar and, in the final part
2001
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UNITED STATES:
GDP (a) 4.4   4.3   4.1   4.1   1.2   2.5   1.2   0.5   0.5   
Private consumption (a) 3.6   4.8   5.0   4.8   3.1   3.5   3.2   2.4   3.1   
Private investment (a) 9.6   11.4   7.8   7.6   -2.0   3.4   -1.3   -3.4   -6.4   
External demand (b) -0.3   -1.3   -1.1   -0.9   -0.1   -0.4   -0.2   0.0   0.0   
General government financial balance (c) -1.3   -0.1   0.6   1.5   0.1   
CPI (a) 2.3   1.6   2.2   3.4   2.8   3.4   3.4   2.7   1.9   
Current-account balance (c) -1.7   -2.5   -3.5   -4.5   -4.1   -4.4   -4.2   -3.9   -3.9   
Unemployment rate (d) 4.9   4.5   4.2   4.0   4.8   4.2   4.5   4.8   5.6   
JAPAN:
GDP (a) 0.2   -1.0   0.7   2.2   -0.4   1.4   -0.6   -0.5   -1.9   
Consumption (a) -0.2   0.6   1.9   1.3   1.1   2.1   0.7   0.3   1.4   
Gross fixed capital formation (a) -1.1   -4.2   -0.7   3.2   -1.7   1.4   -0.9   0.9   -8.3   
External demand (b) 1.0   0.3   -0.1   0.5   -0.7   -0.5   -0.9   -0.8   -0.5   
General government financial balance (c) -3.7   -5.6   -7.6   -8.5   -8.5   
CPI (a) 1.7   0.6   -0.3   -0.7   -0.7   -0.4   -0.7   -0.8   -1.0   
Current-account balance (c) 2.2   3.0   2.5   2.5   2.1   2.7   2.3   2.7   3.1   
Unemployment rate (d) 3.4   4.1   4.7   4.7   5.0   4.7   4.9   5.1   5.4   
UNITED KINGDOM:
GDP (a) 3.4   3.0   2.1   3.0   2.2   2.9   2.4   2.0   1.6   
Consumption (a) 3.0   3.2   3.9   3.9   3.7   3.7   3.6   3.5   3.9   
Gross fixed capital formation (a) 7.1   13.2   0.9   3.9   0.1   4.0   1.9   -1.0   -4.0   
External demand (b) -0.5   -2.2   -1.4   -0.7   -0.8   -1.2   -0.8   -0.4   -0.6   
General government financial balance (c) (e) -1.5   0.3   1.5   2.0   0.4   
CPI (a) 3.1   3.4   1.6   4.4   1.8   2.5   1.9   1.8   1.0   
Current-account balance (c) -0.2   -0.6   -2.1   -1.8   -1.8   -0.9   -2.1   -1.0   -3.0   
Unemployment rate (d) 7.3   6.4   6.0   5.5   5.1   5.1   5.0   5.1   5.2   
 
  
20011997 1998 1999 2000
Main macroeconomic indicators of the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom
TABLE II.1
   Sources: IMF and national statistics.
   (a)   Annual rate. For the CPI, average annual percentage change. 
   (b)   Contribution to the increase in GDP.
   (c)   Percentage of GDP.
   (d)   Percentage of labour force. Average for each period.
   (e)   Excluding proceeds from sale of mobile telephone licences.
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of the year, the depreciation of the yen (see Chart
II.4) were notable. The movement of the yen is con-
sistent with the weak fundamentals of its economy,
although its course may also have been somewhat
influenced by the strategies of the Japanese authori-
ties. As regards the strength of the dollar against
the euro, its persistence over diverse cyclical condi-
tions, including a shock as severe as the attacks of
11 September, is notable. Meanwhile, the exchange
rates of the emerging economies held relatively
steady, the most notable exceptions being Turkey,
South Africa and certain Latin-American countries.
South-east Asian currencies appreciated in effective
terms, basically as a result of the weakness of the
yen in the latter part of the year.
International financial developments were domi-
nated by a continuation of the tendency for share
prices to fall during most of the year and by the rel-
ative stability of long-term interest rates. The fall in
stock markets, in step with the weak general eco-
nomic situation and the negative performance of
earnings, was exacerbated by the September at-
tacks. This situation was subsequently reversed, the
upward trend continuing into the first few months
of the present year, given the prospects for eco-
nomic recovery. As in 2000, technology share pric-
es fell furthest, although their divergence from the
general indices was less pronounced than in the
previous year. Emerging equity markets followed a
similar course to those of the developed econo-
mies, with a clear downward trend during the first
three quarters of the year (except in Russia and
China) followed by a recovery in Q4, which was
generally stronger than that seen on the markets of
the more developed countries.
Yield curves in the developed countries tended
to steepen significantly as a result of the large re-
duction in short-term interest rates. Long-term
rates held relatively steady, with a slight downward
trend over the year as a whole which was, howev-
er, practically cancelled out during the latter
months of 2001 and the early months of 2002. The
latest trends generally seem to incorporate the
prospects for economic recovery and, in the case of
the United States, a certain deterioration in the fis-
cal position. In Japan, the low long-term interest
rates remained notably steady in 2001, albeit dis-
playing a slight upward trend.
Risk premiums on private fixed-income markets
in the more developed countries, which had been
rising in previous years, showed signs of a certain
downturn in the first half of 2001. The attacks of 11
September led to a significant increase in these risk
premiums, the worse credit ratings showing the
largest increases. However, this increase was can-
celled out during the latter months of 2001 and first
few months of 2002 (see Chart II.5).
Most noteworthy on the emerging financial mar-
kets was the scant contagion caused by the Turkish
and Argentine crisis, in marked contrast to previous
crises, such as the south-east Asian one in 1997 and
the Russian one in 1998. This can largely be ex-
plained by improvements in diverse areas intro-
duced as a result of recent crises, such as the in-
crease in transparency, improved access to informa-
tion and more successful risk management by finan-
cial-market participants (who seem increasingly ca-
pable of discriminating better between some
emerging markets and others). The lower weight of
hedge funds in global financial markets and the
anticipation of the effects of the Argentine crisis
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GDP (a):
Asia
South Korea 8.9   6.7   5.0   -6.7   10.9   9.3   3.0   
China 10.5   9.6   8.8   7.8   7.1   8.0   7.3   
India 7.6   7.5   5.0   5.8   6.7   5.4   4.3   
Thailand 8.8   5.5   -0.4   -10.2   3.3   4.6   1.8   
Indonesia 8.2   7.8   4.7   -13.1   0.8   4.8   3.3   
Malaysia 9.8   10.0   7.3   -7.4   5.8   8.3   0.4   
EU accession candidates
Hungary 1.5   1.3   4.6   4.9   4.5   5.2   3.8   
Poland 7.0   6.0   6.8   4.8   4.1   4.1   1.1   
Czech Republic 5.9   4.3   -0.8   -1.2   -0.4   2.9   3.6   
Romania 7.1   3.9   -6.1   -4.8   -2.3   1.8   5.3   
Russia -4.2   -3.4   0.9   -4.9   3.2   9.0   5.0   
Latin America
Argentina -2.8   5.5   8.1   3.9   -3.4   -0.8   -3.7   
Brazil 4.2   2.7   3.3   0.2   0.8   4.4   1.5   
Mexico -6.2   5.2   6.8   4.9   3.8   6.6   -0.3   
INFLATION (b):
Asia
South Korea 4.5   4.9   4.4   7.5   0.8   2.3   4.1   
China 16.9   8.3   2.8   -0.8   -1.4   0.4   0.7   
India 10.2   9.0   7.2   13.2   4.7   4.0   3.8   
Thailand 5.8   5.8   5.6   8.1   0.3   1.6   1.7   
Indonesia 9.4   8.0   6.7   57.6   20.5   3.8   11.5   
Malaysia 3.5   3.5   2.7   5.3   2.7   1.6   1.4   
EU accession candidates
Hungary 28.3   23.5   18.3   14.1   10.0   9.8   9.2   
Poland 28.1   19.8   15.1   11.7   7.3   10.1   5.4   
Czech Republic 9.2   8.8   8.5   10.6   2.1   3.9   4.7   
Romania 32.2   38.8   154.8   59.1   45.8   45.7   34.5   
Russia 197.5   47.7   14.7   27.7   85.7   20.8   20.7   
Latin America
Argentina 3.4   0.2   0.5   0.9   -1.2   -0.9   -1.1   
Brazil 66.0   15.8   6.9   3.2   4.9   7.0   6.8   
Mexico 35.0   34.4   20.6   15.9   16.6   9.5   6.4   
GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL BALANCE (c):
Asia
South Korea 1.3   1.0   -0.9   -3.8   -2.7   2.5   3.2   
China -1.0   -0.8   -0.8   -1.2   -2.1   -2.8   ...
India -8.5   -8.1   -8.7   -8.5   -9.6   -11.2   -10.8   
Thailand 3.0   2.4   -2.1   -7.6   -10.5   -3.2   ...
Indonesia 2.2   1.2   -0.7   -2.7   -1.1   ... ...
Malaysia 2.2   1.1   2.5   -1.5   -4.1   -4.2   ...
EU accession candidates
Hungary -6.3   -3.1   -4.5   -6.3   -3.7   -3.4   -4.5   
Poland -2.6   -2.5   -1.3   -2.4   -2.0   -3.5   -3.9   
Czech Republic 0.5   0.9   -1.9   6.6   -1.6   -4.2   -7.0   
Romania -4.1   -4.9   -3.6   -2.8   -2.6   -3.8   -3.3   
Russia -5.2   -7.9   -7.0   -5.0   -1.7   4.3   2.0   
Latin America
Argentina -0.9   -2.5   -1.5   -1.4   -2.6   -2.4   -3.0   
Brazil -7.1   -5.9   -6.3   -7.9   -10.0   -4.6   -5.2   
Mexico -0.9   -0.3   -1.4   -1.2   -1.3   -1.1   -0.7   
CURRENT-ACCOUNT BALANCE (c):
Asia
South Korea -1.7   -4.4   -1.7   12.7   6.1   2.7   2.1   
China 0.2   0.9   4.1   3.3   1.6   1.9   1.7   
India -1.0   -1.7   -1.2   -1.4   -1.0   -0.9   0.0   
Thailand -8.1   -8.1   -0.9   12.7   10.2   7.6   5.4   
Indonesia -3.2   -3.4   -2.3   4.2   4.1   5.3   4.5   
Malaysia -9.5   -4.6   -4.8   12.9   15.9   9.4   8.2   
EU accession candidates
Hungary -5.6   -3.7   -2.1   -4.8   -4.4   -2.9   -2.4   
Poland 4.5   -1.0   -3.0   -4.3   -7.5   -6.3   -4.0   
Czech Republic -2.6   -8.1   -6.3   -2.3   -2.0   -5.6   -4.7   
Romania -5.0   -7.3   -6.3   -7.3   -3.8   -3.7   -5.9   
Russia 2.2   2.9   0.8   0.8   12.4   17.4   11.3   
Latin America
Argentina -1.9   -2.4   -4.1   -4.9   -4.3   -3.1   -2.1   
Brazil -2.6   -3.0   -4.2   -4.3   -4.7   -4.1   -4.6   
Mexico -0.6   -0.7   -1.9   -3.8   -3.0   -3.1   -2.8   
Emerging markets: main macroeconomic indicators
TABLE II.2
   Sources: IMF and national statistics.
   (a)   Annual percentage changes.
   (b)   Annual average percentage change in consumer prices.
   (c)   Percentage of GDP.
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also played a role. Fixed-income markets in the
emerging countries benefited for a large part of the year
from the shift of investment from shares to bonds,
in line with the global trend. However, this trend
appears to have been reversed recently as a result
of the prospects for economic recovery. Indices of
average yield on emerging fixed-income markets,
corrected for the Argentine effect, ended the year
up by around 20%.
Total external private-sector financing to the
emerging countries increased in 2001 with respect
to the previous year. This increase was concentrat-
ed in the direct investment component, where
flows rose by 10%, which more than offset the
sharp falls in portfolio investment and, especially, in
bank loans (see Chart II.6). The growth of direct in-
vestment was highly concentrated among a few
countries, including notably China, where capital in-
flows had as their counterpart heavy acquisition of
reserves. Official multilateral financing also grew
with respect to the previous year, from USD
14,000 to 46,000 million.
II.2. THE MAIN INDUSTRIALISED
ECONOMIES
II.2.1. United States
After nine years of uninterrupted expansion
the US economy entered a phase of rapid slow-
down. According to the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, on the basis of the wide range
of economic indicators it uses to determine the
cyclical position, this slowdown officially became
a recession in March 2001. However, recent re-
visions indicate that the technical requirement
usually used to define a recession, i.e. two con-
secutive quarters of negative output growth, was
not met. In any case, even if it is eventually ac-
cepted that there was a recession, it will have
been one of the mildest and shortest of recent
US economic history, which highlights the econo-
my’s flexibility and capacity to adjust to very se-
vere shocks (see Box II.1).
GDP growth fell from 4.1% in 2000 to 1.2% in
2001, while inflation, as measured by the CPI, de-
clined from 3.4% to 2.8%, in annual average
terms, as a consequence of the weakness of do-
mestic demand, excess capacity and the fall in en-
ergy prices.
Unlike in some recent cycles, the notable reduc-
tion in the rate of activity, which was particularly in-
tense in manufacturing, was mainly caused by the
sharp contraction in private investment, which fell
by 2% in 2001, along with the large downward ad-
justment in stocks, while private consumption con-
tinued to grow at unusually high rates of around 3%
(see Chart II.7). The sharp increase in private in-
vestment until mid-2000, especially in the telecom-
munications- and IT-related sectors, led to excess
capacity and notable growth of corporate debt,
which came on top of the high levels of household
debt. The subsequent fall in corporate earnings, and
the decline in share prices, in a climate of depressed
demand, showed up even more clearly the excess
capacity, especially in the telecommunications- and
IT-related sectors, while aggravating the problems
arising from high levels of debt. Another special
feature of this cycle was the unfavourable impact of
the attacks of 11 September in the latter part of the
Sources: IMF and Banco de España.
(a)   Number of countries in crisis (of the world's 30 largest expor-
ters).
(b)   Countries recording a fall in GDP in the year in question.
(c)   Countries recording a decline in the growth rate of GDP relati-
ve to the previous year of at least 2.5 percentage points.
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year, which drastically increased uncertainty and
prompted an even more resolute economic-policy
response to the fall in activity.
As mentioned above, despite the fall in share
prices and the consequent wealth effect on house-
holds, private consumption proved highly resilient.
This exceptional behaviour is primarily explained by
the low levels of unemployment in the US economy
at the beginning of the year, by the buoyancy of the
property sector and the increase in house prices
(fuelled by lower interest rates) and by the favoura-
ble financing conditions for purchases of durable
goods, such as cars, especially in the latter part of
the year.
In the labour market, the rate of unemployment,
which started at levels of around 4% at the begin-
ning of the year, gradually increased to reach 5.8%
in December, as a consequence of lay-offs, which
intensified following the September attacks. The
large wage settlements that had accompanied the
cyclical upturn moderated as the economy weak-
ened. Productivity growth was particularly notable
in such a weak economic setting (1.9% during the
year and 5.5% in Q4, in terms of the annualised
quarterly rate), in contrast to the much lower and
even negative levels seen in the same phase of pre-
vious cycles.
Amid high uncertainty as to the scope and dura-
tion of the economic slowdown, the attacks of 11th
September gave rise to additional doubts and a
sharp fall in confidence. As a consequence of the
economy’s underlying weakness, exacerbated by the
events of September, negative GDP growth of –
1.3% was recorded in Q3, in annualised quarterly
terms. However, the impact of the attacks was not
as strong or lasting as feared, as shown by the pick-
up in Q4 to 1.7%.
The response of monetary policy to the slow-
down was rapid and resolute from early in the year,
in the form of a reduction in the Federal Reserve’s
target rates from 6.5% in January to 3% in August.
The expansionary stance of monetary policy was
strengthened after 11 September when the Federal
Reserve initially injected a generous amount of li-
quidity and subsequently lowered official interest
rates to a forty-year low of 1.75%.
The Federal Reserve’s actions in this downward
part of the cycle contrast with its more gradualist
approach at similar times in the past, especially as
regards the speed with which interest rates were
reduced. Possible explanations for this more aggres-
sive behaviour by the monetary authorities could
include, initially, the fear of an excessive stock mar-
ket correction and its adverse impact on the deli-
cate financial position of corporations and house-
holds and thus, on economic activity and, subse-
quently, the risk of a collapse in confidence follow-
ing the attacks. All this occurred against a back-
ground of favourable trends in producer prices,
wages and unit labour costs which, by reflecting a
relatively reassuring situation on the inflation front,
was conducive to the expansionary stance of US
monetary policy last year.
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BOX II.1
Recent cyclical trends and the monetary policy response in the United States
The US National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
the institute responsible for dating US business cycles, an-
nounced that the US economy had entered recession in
March 2001. However, subsequent developments have
shown that the usual requirement of two consecutive quar-
ters of negative quarter-on-quarter growth was not met. It
seems clear that the duration of the recession, if it is eventu-
ally confirmed that there has been one, will be brief, and less
than the 11-month average calculated by the NBER for US
economic recessions since 1960. It will probably be more
similar to that of the 1990-1991 recession which lasted only
eight months, than to the 16-month recessions of 1973-1975
and 1981-1982. Moreover, in all US recessions to date there
has been at least one quarter in which GDP fell by more than
3% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms, while on this oc-
casion the fall was only 1.3% in Q3.
Although the decline in the rate of activity in 2001 cannot
be considered atypical (1), there are certain particular features
that distinguish it from similar episodes in the past. Private
consumption has been much more resilient, with average
growth of 3.1% in 2001 compared with –1.2% in the 1990-
1991 recession and –0.1% on average in the recessions be-
tween 1960 and 1991. Business investment fell less, by 3.2%, as
opposed to 4.8% in the 1990-1991 recession and by 6.1% on
average in the recessions between 1960 and 1991, while the
contribution of changes in inventories was more negative in
2001 than in 1990-1991(–1.2, compared with –0.8 percentage
points of GDP), although it did not reach the average of –1.6
points in the recessions of the period 1960-1991. The fall in
industrial output was milder, 3.7% in 2001, as against 7.5% on
average in the previous recessions and 4.4% in 1990-1991.
Finally, other distinctive signs in 2001 were the positive resi-
dential investment and productivity developments. The former
grew by 1.5% in 2001, compared with falls of 19% on average
in previous recessions and, in particular, the fall of 23.5% in
1990-1991. Productivity grew by 1.9% year-on-year, as against
an average decline of 0.6% in previous recessions and a similar
fall in 1990-1991.
The reaction of monetary policy to the economic slowdown has been rapid and resolute, especially as regards the rate at
which interest rates have been reduced, from 6.5% in January 2000 to 1.75% at the end of 2001. The same can be said of fiscal
policy, which, at first, introduced a stimulus through tax cuts and, following the attacks of 11 September, through higher spending
on defence and emergency assistance to the sectors most affected. This economic policy action is possibly one of the reasons for
the relative mildness and brevity of the US economic slowdown.
The resolution and speed with which monetary policy has reacted on this occasion is highlighted by comparison with the
events of the 1990-1991 recession (see adjoining table). Although the reduction in official interest rates was larger in 1990-1991,
on that occasion rates started from higher levels and the period of cuts was much longer. In addition, the monthly rate of reduc-
tion of official interest rates has been more than double that in the period 1990-1991; the largest one-month reduction has been
100 basis points, as against 50 basis points in 1990-1991; and the number of times rates have been reduced by 50 basis points has
been eight out of eleven, as opposed to three out of twenty-four in 1990-1991. The adjoining chart also shows that the policy of
the Federal Reserve has reacted extremely quickly in this cycle, since on previous occasions the reduction in rates was not so
closely synchronised with the slowdown in nominal GDP, but tended to follow it with a certain lag.
The factors that might explain the rapid action by the Federal Reserve in this cycle include initially, the threat represented by
the delicate financial position of corporations and households, which had been accumulating large amounts of debt for a number
of years, while share prices rose to very high levels. The risk was, thus, of a sharp fall in share prices exacerbating the imbalances
of corporations and households, with potentially severe repercussions for economic activity and banks. Subsequently, the events
of 11 September were a heavy blow to the confidence of agents, which led the Federal Reserve to increase the supply of liquidity
substantially and to lower interest rates by more than would have been necessary in normal circumstances.
The negative side of the mildness of the cyclical downturn in the United States is that the significant and persistent imbalanc-
es in the US economy have not been corrected. Thus, the current account deficit has only decreased from 4.5% to 4.1% of GDP,
which is relevant insofar as a recovery has never before commenced with such a large current-account deficit. At the same time,
the debt of households and corporations remains at historically very high levels, while the private saving ratio is still very low.
These are significant risk factors for the strengthening of economic recovery.
(1) See Chapter III “Recessions and Recoveries” of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (April 2002).
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Jun 1989-
Sep 1993
Jan-Dec
2002
Total reduction (bp) 675         475         
Path (%) 9.75 - 3 6.5 - 1.75
Number of cuts 24         11         
Of which 50 bp 3         8         
Monthly rate (bp) 15.69    39.58    
Max. one-month cut (bp) 50         100         
Reduction in official rates (a) (b)
   (a)   Federal funds target rate. 
   (b)   The whole period of rate cuts is taken in each case.
38
Some fiscal stimulation had already been imple-
mented before 11 September, based on the new
plans of the Bush administration, which were oriented
towards tax cuts, although certain increases in ex-
penditure were also envisaged. As a result of the at-
tacks this stance was strengthened, with emergency
assistance to the sectors most affected. The cyclical
effects of the recession on revenues and expenditure,
the emergency plan to overcome the most immediate
consequence of the attacks and the increase in mili-
tary spending in Afghanistan led to a substantial fall in
the budget surplus in 2001 to USD 127 billion, down
from the initially projected level of USD 275 billion
and from USD 236 billion the previous year.
Sources: Banco de España and Bloomberg.
(a)   The data on private bonds are for bonds issued by industrial 
corporations rated AAA by Standard & Poor's and an aggregate of 
10-year high-yield bonds rated B2.
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   Source: International Monetary Fund.
   (a)   Total net capital flows in billions of US dollars.
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As mentioned above, the preliminary data for
2001 Q4 and the indicators available in the first few
months of this year suggest that the fall in the rate
of activity has been milder than was at first predict-
ed and that economic recovery appears to be under
way, although its intensity and duration has yet
to be assessed. In particular, some caution seems
necessary when judging the strength of the recovery
since, beyond the initial stimulus linked to comple-
tion of stock adjustment, it will be necessary for the
main components of demand to contribute to its
momentum.
In this respect, it is doubtful whether consump-
tion will be able to drive significant output growth,
precisely because it has remained relatively high
during the downturn and because the likely increase
in the cost of borrowing for households this year
may limit the room for expansion. Thus, private in-
vestment, which was the key component in reduc-
ing the rate of activity, must also play a key role in
the recovery from the crisis. However, excess ca-
pacity and the uncertainty regarding the future
course of corporate earnings (worsened by the re-
cent problems of certain major corporations such
as Enron) may limit its strength. This means that the
behaviour of corporate earnings will be decisive for
the future growth of investment and, in conse-
quence, for the sustainability of the recovery.
II.2.2. Japan
In Japan, following the brief recovery of activity
in 2000, when GDP growth reached 2.2%, GDP fell
at a rate of 0.4% in 2001. In fact, the Japanese econ-
omy slipped back into a technical recession in 2001
Q3, for the second time in three years and the
third time in the last decade. This reflected deep
stagnation, with serious still unresolved structural
problems, particularly in the banking sector, and
with economic policies having proved to be incapa-
ble of stimulating recovery. The depressed activity
was accompanied by deflation, with average annual
consumer price falls of 0.7% in the last two years.
The relapse of the Japanese economy was basi-
cally a consequence of the weakness of external de-
mand, which particularly affected the products of
telecommunications- and IT-related sectors. This
led to the largest decline in industrial output since
the 1970s and, through the rise in unemployment,
had a very adverse impact on domestic demand. Ex-
ports of goods and services tumbled at a rate of –
6.6%, having grown by 12.4% in 2000, although at
the end of last year the rate of decline moderated
owing to the depreciation of the yen. Imports of
goods and services also declined progressively, al-
though less sharply than exports, with a reduction
of 0.6% as against an increase of 9.6% in 2000. As a
result, the trade surplus suffered its largest fall since
the 1970s.
Domestic demand, in the year as a whole, was
practically unchanged. Private consumption re-
mained stagnant, held down by the rise in unem-
ployment and the fall in disposable income, while
private investment was somewhat more dynamic,
although firmly constrained by the unfavourable
economic outlook and by the banking system’s diffi-
culties extending credit. The recession and the
progress in corporate restructuring led to a sus-
tained reduction of employment from the middle of
the year and an ongoing rise in the rate of unem-
ployment, which had reached 5.6% by the end of
the year, the highest figure recorded by the Japa-
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nese economy in the last four decades. As a result
of the economic deterioration and the fall in com-
modity prices, deflationary pressures intensified
from Q2, the growth rate of consumer prices
reaching –1.2% in December.
In this environment of deflation and recession,
the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policies was very
low, owing to the slim margin available for any loos-
ening, with short-term interest rates very close to
zero and public debt exceeding 140% of GDP, as a
result of the strongly expansionary fiscal policies
implemented over the last decade. The most stimu-
lating factor was the depreciation of the yen against
the dollar, which reached a cumulative total of 10%
in the latter months of the year.
Despite the small leeway available, the Bank of
Japan tried to increase the expansionary stance of
its monetary policy from March last year by means
of a strategy based on the establishment of expan-
sionary targets for bank reserves. However, this did
not succeed in boosting private credit or economic
activity, because the monetary policy transmission
mechanism was blocked as a result of the banking
system problems. At the same time, the high level
of public debt led the government to present a
more restrictive budget for the fiscal year 2002-
2003 than in previous years, with a public spending
cut of 1.7%. Nonetheless, the deficit is expected to
remain at levels of 8.7% of GDP, basically due to
declining revenues.
Finally, few details of the new administration’s
reform plans were known, except for the intention
to control medium-term public finances. The delay
in carrying out the necessary reform of the financial
system and, in particular, of the banks, has wors-
ened its delicate situation. The latter has been exac-
erbated by the fall in bank share prices, which have
not reacted to the recent improvement in the rest
of the Japanese stock market (see Chart II.8), and
by the increase in the default rate as a consequence
of the recession. All this has given rise to justified
concern over the potential systemic consequences
for the global financial sector that might arise from
any worsening of this situation.
II.2.3. Other developed economies
Among the EU countries outside the euro
area, the UK saw a gradual slowing of economic
activity during 2001. Growth fell from 3% in
2000 to 2.2% in 2001, but remained higher than
in most industrialised countries. The resilience
displayed by the British economy was basically a
consequence of private consumption, which grew
by 3.9% in 2001, a similar rate to that of the pre-
vious year, driven by the high wage gains of pre-
vious years, cuts in interest rates, sharp rises in
property prices and the low level of unemploy-
ment. The strength of private consumption partly
offset the sharp slowdown in investment, which
grew by 0.1% during the year, as against 3.9% in
2000, and the negative contribution from exter-
nal demand, stemming from the global slowdown
and the strength of sterling with respect to the
euro. The conjunction of a recession in manufac-
turing and a boom in the services sector led to a
widening of the trade deficit. Inflation held at
moderate levels during the year, although there
were slight rises around the middle of the year.
Subsequently, the further fall in energy prices and
a certain moderation of wage settlements caused
the inflation rate to edge down to 1.9% in De-
cember, although underlying inflation, excluding
food and energy, stood from the middle of the
year at above 2.5%.
The Bank of England cut the official interest
rate by 200 basis points to 4%. Over the period
January-August the rate was reduced by a cumula-
tive total of 100 points, owing to the increasingly
visible signs of economic slowdown, and subse-
quently by another 100 points following the attacks
of 11 September, amid widespread rate reductions
by other central banks. The public sector surplus
fell to 0.4% of GDP, from 4.4% in 2000, owing to
the increases in public spending and investment, to
improve infrastructure and public services, and to
the decline in revenues as a consequence of the
economic slowdown.
The other EU countries outside the euro area,
Sweden and Denmark, also suffered the conse-
quences of the global slowdown and their growth
rates fell in 2001 to 1.2% and 0.9%, from 3.6% and
3% in 2000, respectively. In both countries, not only
was external demand, dragged down largely by the
crisis in the new technology sector, the main factor
behind the slowdown, but also domestic demand
proved very weak. Despite the slight reduction in
the budget surpluses with respect to those in 2000,
their public finances remained sound (surpluses of
4.7% and 1.7% respectively). The inflation rate in
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Sweden stood at the end of the year above the
Riksbank’s target, boosted by the depreciation of
the krona.
II.3  THE EMERGING ECONOMIES
II.3.1. The EU candidate countries
The process of accession to the European Union
of Central and Eastern European countries received a
notable boost in 2001. The ECOFIN held in Gothen-
burg in June 2001 set an intended time frame under
which a group of 10 countries (made up of Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Malta and Cyprus) could
complete accession negotiations by the end of 2002,
and could therefore participate in elections to the Eu-
ropean Parliament in 2004. Later dates are envisaged
for Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.
The economies of these countries were affect-
ed by the global slowdown last year, although
their deceleration was milder than in other
emerging regions. Excluding Turkey, they grew by
an average of 3.1%, as against 1.5% in the euro
area. Almost all these countries stepped up their
structural reform processes, while making head-
way in reducing their inflation differentials with
respect to the euro area, assisted by the fall in
commodity prices. As a result, the inflation rate
had fallen on average to 6% (excluding Turkey) by
the end of 2001, while long-term interest rates
had also declined.
In many of the countries fiscal policy was ex-
pansionary in response to the slowdown in ex-
ternal demand, leading to larger and, in some
cases, worrying budget deficits. Most of the cur-
rencies of these countries appreciated against
the euro during the year or held steady in the
case of countries with fixed exchange rates. As
regards changes to exchange-rate regimes, Hun-
gary’s abandonment in October 2001 of the rela-
tively narrow crawling peg that it had maintained,
and its replacement by a central parity against
the euro with fluctuation bands of + 15%, with
similarities to ERM II, was notable. Also, in early
2002, Lithuania replaced its dollar currency
board with a euro one.
The profile of declining rates of economic ac-
tivity was more or less common to the more ad-
vanced countries of the region, with the notable
exception of Poland, the largest of all. Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia suf-
fered the impact of lower growth in the EU
countries, which adversely affected industrial
production, although domestic demand proved
resilient, buoyed by expansionary fiscal and mon-
etary policies. Output growth moderated with
respect to the previous year in most of the
countries, but still recorded rates of 3-4%. On
the negative side, budget and current account
deficits generally remained very large. In Poland,
Sources: national statistics.
(a)   Contribution to annual GDP growth.
(b)   Real effective exchange rate. An increase (decrease) denotes 
an appreciation (depreciation) of the currency.
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BOX II.2
The Argentine crisis in perspective
In late 2001, after more than ten years in place, Ar-
gentina suddenly abandoned its currency board and sus-
pended payments on its foreign debt. During a large
part of the decade the Argentine model, based on the
liberalisation of the economy, trade integration and
monetary and currency stability, had secured high eco-
nomic growth along with price stability. However, from
1999 the economy entered a deep recession. This led to
increasingly acute problems of fiscal unsustainability and
lack of credibility of the fixed exchange rate, which suc-
cessive government plans were unable to overcome. In
any case, the Argentine experience has shown that in
the long term maintenance of such a rigid monetary re-
gime requires a high degree of discipline in public financ-
es and flexibility of the economy, which the Argentine
economy failed to achieve.
In 1989, the effects of hyperinflation, stemming
from the monetary financing of burgeoning budget def-
icits, prepared the ground for a radical change of di-
rection in economic policy by the new administration.
In 1991, parity between the peso and the dollar was
established by law and backed by a currency board,
which required all money issued to be backed by for-
eign reserves. The surrender of autonomy in mone-
tary policy and the desire to finance fiscal imbalances
in an orthodox fashion were intended to give the new
economic strategy a credible anchor and to eliminate
inflationary expectations, goals that were initially
achieved. Moreover, the period 1991-94 was charac-
terised by the start of the privatisation programme,
partial deregulation of the economy and a boost to the
opening up of trade with the creation of MERCOSUR
in 1991, although progress was not made at the same
rate in the fiscal sphere and in certain structural re-
forms.
After several years of expansion, growth was tem-
porarily interrupted in 1995, owing to financial conta-
gion from the Mexican crisis. However, the banking li-
quidity crisis that occurred was successfully resolved de-
spite the absence (inherent to the currency board) of a
traditional lender of last resort. Eventually, the currency
board and the banking system emerged strengthened
from this episode. The recovery of inflows of foreign cap-
ital (especially direct investment), together with the boost
to foreign trade entailed by the Brazilian “Plan Real”
formed the pillars of the subsequent cyclical expansion.
The second half of the decade (1995-1999) commenced with a high rate of economic growth, accompanied
by abundant capital inflows and an improvement in foreign financing conditions. However, the relaxation of the
foreign constraint and large privatisation receipts were conducive to an excessive increase in government spend-
ing, at both the central and the provincial levels. Moreover, this favourable period was not taken advantage of to
introduce pending reforms (mainly fiscal and labour) to increase the flexibility of the economy and reduce its
vulnerability to adverse shocks, like those that arose in subsequent years. Along with fiscal laxity, the increase in
spreads arising from the crises in other emerging countries (south-east Asia and Russia) and the growing short-
term costs relating to the transition to a funded pension system contributed to a sharp rise in public debt be-
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BOX II.2
The Argentine crisis in perspective (continuation)
tween 1997 and 1999. As a result public debt was set on a dangerous course that only the robust output growth
in these years could offset.
In these circumstances, the large devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999 marked a decisive turning
point for Argentina. Until then the latent uncompetitiveness of the Argentine economy, resulting from the conjunc-
tion of the currency board, excessive labour market rigidity and insufficient corporate restructuring, had been con-
cealed in a way by the buoyancy of activity. However, the depreciation of the real, along with the worsening of the
terms of trade arising from the fall in commodity prices and the strength of the dollar, brought these competitive-
ness problems to the surface and tipped the economy into a deep recession, accompanied by price deflation. With
devaluation ruled out at the time, owing to the high costs which the authorities considered it would inflict on a
highly dollarised economy, the adjustment required a significant reduction in real wages. However the deflation ac-
companying the recession, in a context of nominal wage rigidity, hampered this mechanism enormously, while finan-
cial costs rose and the expected return on investment deteriorated.
In the midst of recession, Argentina’s underlying vulnerabilities began to surface and the problems of external
financing became apparent. Debt servicing costs represented a very high and growing part of fiscal revenues (given
the weak tax base) and of exports (given the low degree of openness). With the drying up of external financing,
increasing recourse was had to domestic agents to finance the state. At the end of 1999 the new coalition govern-
ment, with the backing of the IMF, attempted to implement significant fiscal adjustment.
Meanwhile, the provinces taking advantage of their strong political position continued their uncontrolled
spending. The fiscal restrictions, which focused more on increasing revenues than cutting expenditure, served to
aggravate the recession, although the strong expansion of external demand enabled its effects to be temporarily
mitigated. In the second half of 2000 the world upturn showed signs of faltering, there was a global flight to quality
on financial markets, which significantly harmed the emerging markets. As a result, economic activity in Argentina
contracted further, jeopardising its fiscal targets against a background in which external financial restriction was
increasingly apparent.
In this situation, a political crisis in the government, caused by the resignation of the vice-president in October
2000 opened the long process of economic backsliding which continued throughout 2001. After many financial diffi-
culties, the approval of a substantial package of aid by the IMF in January seemed to dispel the danger, but only two
months later problems resurfaced with the resignation of two economy ministers in the space of three weeks
which led to the closing off of access to foreign capital markets. Various changes of direction in economic policy
were attempted, with the emphasis either on reactivating the economy, or on fiscal discipline, in order at least to
preserve the currency board and to restore domestic and external confidence. However credibility continued to
decline, sovereign spreads carried on widening and the recession became ever more acute. Economic policy errors
and excessive meddling aggravated the situation and it became more and more apparent that the situation was un-
sustainable.
At the same time, the solid foundations on which the Argentine financial system was built were being erod-
ed. First, economic uncertainty generated an ongoing shift towards cash and dollar deposits which, under the
convertibility regime, led to a notable fall in reserves and, consequently, a strong contraction of liquidity. Second,
the attempts to provide liquidity to the system through the central bank undermined convertibility. Lastly, in-
creasingly frequent recourse to the domestic financial system to finance public net borrowing (through voluntary
debt swaps and other mechanisms) weakened its balance sheet. Following a fresh IMF package in September a
number of very restrictive, and to a certain extent desperate, measures were adopted, such as the zero deficit
law and a final swap of domestic debt in November. In the face of repeated failure to meet fiscal targets, the IMF
decision to suspend payments scheduled for December and the restriction on the withdrawal of deposits (the
“corralito”) to avoid financial panic precipitated events, which concluded with the resignation of two presidents,
abandonment of the currency regime and the suspension of external payments over Christmas 2001.
Convertibility put an end to the traditional hyperinflation in Argentina and, along with the process of liberalisa-
tion and reforms, laid the foundations for the high growth the country enjoyed in the first half of the 1990s. How-
ever, the insufficiency, lack of depth and discontinuity of the reforms, the absence of fiscal discipline, together with a
number of external shocks led to a deep recession. The loss of international confidence and the attempt to main-
tain convertibility over all other considerations ended up entailing the sacrifice of the financial system and the viola-
tion of property rights. The latter are two of the basic elements of a market economy and will require a long and
complex process of reconstruction.
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the mix of an expansionary fiscal policy with a
restrictive monetary policy was reflected in high
real interest rates, which affected private invest-
ment and employment and reduced GDP growth
to 1.1% in 2001, from 4.1% in 2000. Recently,
with greater fiscal discipline and a gradual decline
in interest rates, this situation is beginning to be
corrected. The three Baltic countries, along with
Bulgaria and Romania, recorded higher growth
rates than the others (over 4%), and in some cases
higher than in the previous year. Romania re-
corded growth of 5.3%, as against 1.8% in 2000,
thanks to the strength of its exports and its in-
dustrial output.
Turkey, following the financial crisis it suf-
fered in February last year, which forced it to let
its currency float, did not at first achieve the re-
sults expected, despite the financial assistance
granted by the IMF, the ambitious programme
drawn-up by the latter, which was adopted in
May, and the effort to adhere scrupulously to the
programme in terms of fiscal cuts and monetary
control. Turkey suffered its worst recession for
more than 50 years, its GDP falling by 7.4% in
2001, while inflation and interest rates rose to
over 65% and 75% respectively. In the latter
months of the year, with expectations of a fur-
ther package of aid from the IMF, the financial
variables improved considerably. Thus, the Turk-
ish lire, having lost 60% of its value during the
year to October, appreciated by more than 20%
between October and December. During the
same period the stock market recovered by 60%
and sovereign debt differentials narrowed by 200
basis points. At the beginning of February this
year the IMF approved a new loan for Turkey.
II.3.2. Latin America
Following the high economic growth in the
region in 2000 initial prospects for 2001 were for
a slight moderation in the rate of activity. How-
ever, this relative optimism was soon overshad-
owed by the force of the global slowdown, the
greater prudence shown by international financial
markets towards emerging countries (see Chart
II.9), negative commodity price developments
and the growing problems in Argentina. Conse-
quently growth in the region fell drastically in
2001, to 0.6%, from 4% in the preceding year. Al-
though this result was heavily skewed by the
deep recession in Argentina (already in its fourth
year with an estimated decline in GDP of 3.7% in
2001), other countries also recorded negative
growth rates. The case of Mexico is striking. Its
growth fell from 7% in 2000 to 0.3% in 2001,
dragged down by the US deceleration. However,
despite this, its perception on international finan-
cial markets improved considerably.
The weakness of external demand and the cor-
rection of commodity prices had negative effects on
trade flows in the region, which fell by 1% in value
terms. However, trade balances did not generally
deteriorate owing to the simultaneous slowdown in
imports. Accordingly, current account balances held
steady at around –3% of GDP.
The difficulties of the Argentine economy, de-
scribed in greater detail in Box II.2, became more
and more severe as the year elapsed. After numer-
ous failed attempts to restore confidence, with eco-
nomic plans of various types and successive debt
swaps to try to reduce the pressure on public
finances, a severe social, political and economic cri-
sis broke out towards the end of the year which fi-
nally forced the suspension of payments on external
debt and the abandonment of the fixed exchange
rate regime (convertibility) that had been in place
since 1991.
The effects of the Argentine crisis on the rest of
Latin America differed from country to country
and, in all cases, decreased as the year elapsed.
During the lengthy gestation of the crisis, in the lat-
ter months of 2000 and during 2001, it was clear
that the financial markets were discriminating be-
tween the main countries of the area. Thus, Mexico
was hardly affected, while Brazil’s, and to a lesser
extent Chile’s currencies, came under pressure as
the situation in Argentina worsened. In Brazil, debt
spreads were affected as well. In other smaller
countries of the region the impact varied and de-
clined as the year elapsed.
In Brazil, high external net borrowing, the sensi-
tivity of public finances to exchange rate develop-
ments (through the increase in debt interest pay-
ments) and a serious energy crisis gave rise to a
perception of vulnerability that put the economy in
a delicate position in the first half of the year. How-
ever, the resolute response by the authorities, who
adopted prudent monetary and fiscal policies geared
towards safeguarding macroeconomic stability,
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were conducive to the return of confidence in the
second half of the year. All this was reflected in an
appreciation of the exchange rate and a reduction
in debt spreads in the final months of the year.
The distinction increasingly drawn between the
situation in Latin America as a whole and that in Ar-
gentina is a sign that the international financial mar-
kets recognise the efforts made by most countries
of the region in recent years to set in place a frame-
work of stability favourable to sustainable growth. It
also reveals the greater ability of the participants on
these markets to discriminate. In any event, given
the long duration of the crisis, such participants had
time to cover their positions. Moreover, the back-
ing given by multilateral organisations to some of
these countries with sounder policies, such as Bra-
zil, also helped to restore confidence. This meant
that when the Argentine crisis entered its decisive
phase, in late 2001, the impact on the rest the re-
gion was fairly limited, with the exception of Uru-
guay, given its close trade and financial links with
Argentina. The recent social, political and economic
turmoil in Venezuela is attributable largely to do-
mestic problems. In the last quarter of 2001 and in
the first few months of 2002 external financing con-
ditions have been considerably relaxed for the rest
of the countries of the region.
The case of Mexico is striking. Despite having
been the country most seriously affected by the re-
cession in the US, it has received the backing of the
international financial markets. This backing enabled
the exchange rate of the Mexican peso to remain
strong and public debt spreads vis-à-vis the US to
narrow. In addition, this country has recently been
granted investment-grade status by the main credit
rating agencies, which has clearly improved its finan-
cial outlook.
Nonetheless, the reduced attractiveness of
the region as a whole to foreign investors for a
large part of the year resulted in modest net in-
flows of private capital, 40% lower than those of
the previous year. However, the gap was filled by
large inflows of official capital, so that total net
flows actually rose slightly. Flows of direct in-
vestment remained at acceptable levels (although
a significant part was attributable to a single op-
eration by a North American bank in Mexico),
but other private net flows, especially those re-
lated to international bank loans, posted a nega-
tive balance (see Chart II.6).
Sources: Banco de España, JP Morgan and Bloomberg.
(a)   January 1997 = 100. Weighted by GDP in PPP of the coun-
tries indicated.
(b)  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and 
Peru.
(c)   China, Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore and Taiwan.
(d)   Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia.
(e)   An increase in the index denotes a loss of competitiveness.
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In spite of the difficulties in Argentina, head-
way continued to be made in terms of macroeco-
nomic stability in the region as a whole. Thus, in-
flation in the area fell by more than one percent-
age point with respect to 2000, to stand at 5.8%,
and inflation targets were generally met. The
economic slowdown and the fall in commodity
prices helped to contain inflationary pressures
and, despite the significant depreciation of ex-
change rates in countries such as Chile and Co-
lombia, there was a very limited pass-through of
exchange rates to prices, so that interest rates
could be reduced. Only in Brazil, where the ap-
preciation of the real was especially acute in the
first half of the year, were the monetary authori-
ties forced to raise interest rates temporarily, al-
though the inflation target was still not met. In
any event, overall these results strengthened the
credibility of the monetary regimes adopted in
recent years by many countries in the region
based on direct inflation targets, while the
number of countries with fixed or semi-fixed ex-
change rate regimes decreased, with the aban-
donment of convertibility in Argentina and the
flotation of the Venezuelan bolivar in early 2002.
Such regimes now only remain in place in certain
relatively small economies that have generally
opted for dollarisation.
Budget deficits generally remained at reasona-
bly moderate levels, considering the cyclical de-
terioration, the increase in financing costs in
many countries and the fall in the price of oil,
which is a basic source of budget revenues for
countries such as Venezuela, Mexico and Ecua-
dor. The overall budget deficit of the region
stood at 3.2% of GDP, only half a percentage
point higher than in the previous year. Improve-
ments in revenue collection in countries such as
Brazil, Mexico and Colombia contributed to
these results. In spite of this, the maintenance of
fiscal discipline in the cyclical downturn hindered
the stabilising role of fiscal policy, its procyclicali-
ty being a characteristic feature of the region
(see Box II.3).
In sum, 2001 was negative in terms of eco-
nomic growth, although there are certain en-
couraging factors that should help put the proc-
ess of economic recovery on a more solid foot-
ing. On one hand, the cyclical pattern in coun-
tries such as Mexico and Chile increasingly re-
sembles the usual pattern in the developed coun-
tries, which is uncommon in Latin American
economies. Traditionally, the latter are prone to
suffering deep crises in circumstances such as
those seen in 2001. On the other hand, the lack
of contagion effects from the Argentine crisis on
financial markets should at least partly be inter-
preted as being the result of recognition by the
international markets of the prudent and sound
policies adopted in most countries of the region
in recent years. Finally, it is worth pointing out
that the prospects for recovery in 2002 have
been firming in step with the foreseeable im-
provement in the economic situation in the ad-
vanced countries. Nonetheless, elements of un-
certainty persist. Notable among these are the
extremely delicate situation in Argentina and the
doubts over the strength of the global recovery,
on which the incipient pick-up in commodity
prices (crucial to most of the countries of the re-
gion) depends.
II.3.3. South-east Asia and other emerging
areas
Most of the south-east Asian economies from
the beginning of the year showed great sensitivity
to the world economic slowdown and the conse-
quent fall in the demand for exports (especially of
technological products), which subsequently
spread through falls in confidence and employ-
ment to their domestic demand. The low levels of
inflation and the improvement in the economic
fundamentals of these countries following the
Asian crisis of 1997 enabled them to implement
counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies
which, along with a relatively comfortable ex-
change-rate position, following the adjustment in
previous years, helped to sustain domestic de-
mand in several countries. Some recent indica-
tors, such as the increases in prices and in semi-
conductor orders and the favourable outlook for
the US economy, point to recovery.
Economic activity in 2001 was much stronger in
countries such as India and China, which grew by
4.3% and 7.3% respectively. The prolonged buoyan-
cy of the Chinese economy is particularly striking.
The strength of domestic demand, and of public
investment in particular, and the vigour of foreign
direct investment, stimulated by the favourable
trade and growth expectations created by China’s
membership of the World Trade Organisation are
47
BOX II.3
The procyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin America
In the Latin American economies, the stabilising role of
fiscal policy has traditionally been obstructed by the lack of
public sector budgetary discipline, as reflected in the relaxation
of spending control during the expansionary phases of the cy-
cle. In turn, recessions have usually resulted in a widening of
both the budget deficit, owing to a shortage of revenues and
the downward rigidity of public spending, and a worsening of
the external imbalance, which has led to the adoption of se-
vere fiscal adjustment programmes which have tended to de-
press the level of activity even further. As a result, fiscal policy
in Latin America has traditionally been procyclical and has not
played an effective stabilising role (1). During the 1990s, the
reform and macroeconomic stabilisation plans included fiscal
reforms whose goals were to consolidate public finances by
strengthening tax systems and rationalising expenditure, to
ease access to international capital markets, thanks to the re-
duction in sovereign risk and, in short, to make the adoption
of stabilising fiscal policies possible.
In order to analyse whether the efforts made in the
budgetary sphere by the main Latin American economies
during the 1990s have resulted in stabilising fiscal policies,
the measure of Fiscal Impulse (FI), proposed by the IMF,
and in this case calculated on the basis of the primary bal-
ance, can be used as a qualitative indicator of the stance of
fiscal policy.
If the FI is negatively correlated with the cyclical posi-
tion of the economy, as represented by the output gap, the
stance of fiscal policy can be considered counter-cyclical. As
can be seen in the adjoining chart, the tone of fiscal policy in
the countries analysed during the period 1995-2001 has gen-
erally been in step with the business cycle, and therefore
does not appear to have helped stabilise the economy. In Ar-
gentina fiscal policy was expansionary until the crisis of re-
cent years led to a series of fiscal adjustments. In Brazil too,
fiscal policy has generally been procyclical, with the exception
of 1996, when it was contractionary owing to the application
of the stabilisation plan. Also in Mexico the physical impulse
has tended to move in step with the cycle, except in 2000,
when there was a large increase in oil revenues. In Chile, by
contrast, fiscal policy appears to have been more countercy-
clical in recent years, helped by the sound economic situa-
tion, including in the public sector.
The procyclicality of fiscal policy in most of the coun-
tries analysed shows the persistence of significant structural
deficiencies in the public accounts, aggravated by an insuffi-
cient degree of economic stability. The inefficiency of tax sys-
tems hampers the role of taxes as automatic stabilisers and
hinders consolidation of the financial position of the public
sector, burdened by the high level of debt. Also, the debt
burden is generally particularly sensitive to changes in inter-
est rates and the exchange rate. As a result, recessions may
relatively suddenly degenerate into dynamics of unsustainable
debt requiring severe budgetary adjustment, which is particu-
larly damaging to growth in a recession, as in Mexico in 1995
and in Argentina recently. Moreover, they run the risk of ag-
gravating the problems of sustainability of public finances.
In consequence, an appropriate programme of structural reforms (such as greater revenue-raising efficiency, more fiscal co-
responsibility with the regions and the introduction of fiscal systems with greater automatic stabilisers) plays an essential role, by
helping secure a gradual and sustained reduction of the perception of risk by agents. This process eventually enables the economic
authorities to implement stabilising macroeconomic policies.
(2) See Gavin, M. and R. Perotti, Fiscal Policy in Latin America, NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 11-71, 1999.
Sources: IMF, national statistics and Banco de España. 2001 data 
are preliminary estimates.
(a) A positive sign denotes an expansionary discretionary fiscal-
policy stance.
(b) Output gap: (GDP-GDP trend)/GDP (%). A Hodrick-Prescott fil-
ter with lambda equal to 10 has been used to calculate the GDP 
trend.
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some of the factors responsible for this positive
performance.
The region’s financial and currency markets
were relatively stable. Following the September at-
tacks equity prices recovered and debt spreads nar-
rowed, while hardly any contagion from the Turkish
and Argentine crisis has been observed. On the
currency markets, exchange rates held steady, al-
though the appreciation of the yen in late 2001 has
made the competitiveness situation of many of
these countries somewhat more complicated.
In Russia, GDP growth remained vigorous in
2001, driven by recent progress in structural re-
forms, although it moderated to 5%, from 9% the
previous year, as a consequence of the decline in oil
prices and the impact of the global slowdown. The
budget and current account surpluses were reduced
to 2% and 11.3% of GDP, respectively.
CHAPTER III
THE EURO AREA AND THE COMMON MONETARY
POLICY
51
III.1. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
IN THE EURO AREA
The economic slowdown that commenced in
mid-2000 in the euro area intensified last year, in
step with the deterioration of activity in the rest
of the world. Real GDP increased by 1.5%, two
percentage points down from the rate recorded a
year earlier, primarily as a result of the stagnation
of gross fixed capital formation, the fall in inven-
tories and the pronounced deceleration of ex-
ports, while both private and government con-
sumption were more subdued. The rate of crea-
tion of employment fell only moderately, so that
the decline in the rate of unemployment was able
to continue. Despite remaining above the 2% ref-
erence rate, inflation displayed a downward trend
in the second half of the year in step with the re-
duced economic buoyancy and with the decrease
in commodity prices. Against this background,
monetary and fiscal policies were relatively ac-
commodating, helping to curb the deterioration in
the confidence of agents and in the outlook for
economic growth. This was conducive to a recov-
ery in activity, which already began to be discerni-
ble in the first half of 2002.
III.1.1. Activity and employment
The slowdown in output in the euro area during
2001 was a consequence of various shocks that
were largely common to the rest of the world.
Thus, the buoyancy of activity was affected by the
strong growth in oil prices in the two previous
years, by the capacity adjustments in the informa-
tion and communication technologies sectors, by
the falling stock markets and by the sharp slow-
down in world trade. Finally, the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001 caused a general, albeit tempo-
rary, deterioration in the confidence of consumers
and employers (see Chart III.1). However, besides
the evident consequences that these factors have
had on the rate of growth of the economy, the per-
sistence of certain problems of a structural nature
may also have had unfavourable effects on econom-
ic developments in the euro area. These problems
relate to the rigidities still present in European mar-
kets, which damage the economy’s adjustment
mechanisms and discourage expansion and modern-
isation of the capital stock.
Half of the two-percentage-point slowdown in
the rate of economic growth in 2001 was attribut-
able to the sharp fall in fixed investment. On top
of the slackness already displayed by construction
investment came the decline in investment in capi-
tal goods, which having increased by 8% in year-
on-year terms at the end of 2000, fell by 5% in the
final quarter of 2001. The slowdown in final de-
mand, the climate of uncertainty that dominated
world events last year and the moderation of
corporate earnings contributed to the adverse be-
haviour of this variable. In addition, there is some
evidence (see Box III.1) that, despite lower bank
lending rates, the cost of the finance raised by cer-
tain large corporations may have risen, due to an
increase in risk premiums prompted by their high-
er level of indebtedness. The latter was partly
linked to the financing of large-scale projects, such
as the acquisition of mobile telephone licences and
mergers and acquisitions that have yet to generate
the results projected.
The weak growth of world trade had a pro-
nounced effect on exports, which decelerated
throughout the year, despite the relatively low euro
exchange rate. However, as the rate of growth of
imports fell to a greater extent than that of ex-
ports, in line with the trend in final demand, the
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contribution of external demand to output was
positive, and similar in size to the contribution in
2000. According to trade data that are still incom-
plete, the share of goods exports in the volume of
world trade held steady, which meant that the
process of gradual loss of export shares by the euro
area in previous years had come to a halt. The in-
crease in net exports, together with the improve-
ment in the terms of trade, enabled the current ac-
count to move into balance, having recorded a defi-
cit of 0.9% of GDP in 2000.
The increase in employment and the reduction in
the tax burden enabled household income to hold
steady, and this helped private consumption sustain
only a moderate fall last year (see Table III.1). Howev-
er, the fall in the value of financial wealth, the deterio-
ration of consumer expectations and, possibly, the
debt accumulated over previous years, had a dampen-
ing effect on household consumption decisions, so
that the annual rate of change in private consumption
was 1.7%, as against 2.5% the previous year. As a result
the household saving ratio picked up, to reach more
than 14% in terms of gross disposable income.
In 2001 all the euro-area countries suffered a
significant economic slowdown. However, there
were still substantial differences between them in
terms of GDP growth rates and the composition of
such growth. The central countries of the area
were less dynamic than others (such as Ireland,
Greece and Spain), but the gap was slightly less
acute than in previous years (see Chart III.3). These
differences are largely attributable to the prolonging
of the expansionary effects that joining the euro
area entailed for some of the less advanced coun-
tries of the area. They are conducive to, but do not
guarantee, real convergence (see Box III.2).
However the divergences in 2001 were also a
consequence of idiosyncratic factors and of the dif-
ferent responses of some economies to common
shocks. Thus, Germany recorded the lowest
growth rate in the area, partly as a result of the ad-
verse situation in its property sector, which was
closely linked to processes arising from reunifica-
tion. Meanwhile, Finland was particularly affected by
the international crisis in the IT and telecommunica-
tions industry, on account of the great relative im-
portance of this sector.
The rate of job creation moderated, although it
remained high, standing at 1.3 % in 2001, 0.8 per-
centage points down on the previous year. The rate
of unemployment fell from 8.8% in 2000 to 8.3% in
2001, although a slight upward trend was discerni-
ble in the latter months of last year. As explained in
Box III.3, the greater job-creation capacity per unit
of output in the euro area is linked, among other
factors, to the moderation of real wage costs and
to the measures introduced in the countries of the
area to make their labour-market structures more
Sources: Banco de España, ECB, European Commission and na-
tional statistics.
(a)   Annual percentage changes.
(b)   Percentage balances.
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BOX III.1
The role of financial conditions in the slowdown of productive investment in the euro area
During 2001 gross fixed capital formation declined sub-
stantially, primarily as a result of the loss of vigour in the cap-
ital-goods component (1). As can be seen in the upper panel
of the chart, investment in capital goods in the euro area
during 2001 was in line with the global slowdown in activity
and with the downward revision in business expectations.
The sluggishness of investment has coincided with an in-
crease in corporate debt and with a deterioration in financial
conditions for some corporations.
The weight of corporate debt in the euro area (approxi-
mated by bank lending to firms plus outstanding debt securities
issued by firms) stood at 49% of GDP in 2001, around eight per-
centage points higher than in 1997. Although the rate of growth
of corporate debt moderated over the course of 2001, it is still
expanding at high rates of around 8%. This phenomenon should
be seen in the context of declining corporate earnings (see the
profile of the indicator of stock-exchange earnings in the central
panel of the adjoining chart), which has meant that many firms,
despite having reduced their investment, have still had to resort
to significant levels of external finance.
The increase in indebtedness in a less dynamic econom-
ic setting has meant that some firms have had to face a cer-
tain hardening of financing conditions. Despite the decline in
bank lending rates (favoured by the progressive easing of the
monetary policy stance in the euro area), firms, especially
those with a less sound financial position, have had to face
higher risk premiums.
In this respect, the credit ratings of European firms issu-
ing private debt have had to be revised downwards, so that
the volume of debt issued by firms whose rating has worsened
has been much higher than the volume issued by corporations
whose rating has been revised upwards (see the central panel
of the adjoining chart). At the same time, there has been a
very significant increase in the spreads between private and
public debt, especially for those corporations with a lower
credit rating (see the lower panel of the chart) (2). Although
the relative importance of debt-security issuance for European
firms is less than in other areas (particularly the United States),
it should be noted that the funds obtained through the issu-
ance of such securities by European firms in the period 1999-
2001 were relatively large and, in fact, represented almost one
quarter of the flow of corporate debt in that period. Moreo-
ver, although disaggregated data are not available on the cost
of financing in the case of bank lending, it can be expected that
the asymmetric behaviour observed among corporations that
can raise finance on the capital markets will also be found
among firms that only have access to intermediated finance.
In short, the above evidence suggests that, amid high
levels of debt, the sharp slowdown in the rate of growth of
corporate earnings has entailed a deterioration in the terms
of access to external financing for the corporate sector,
which may have had a bearing on the slowdown in invest-
ment. This process may also limit the financing of future
projects, especially for higher risk firms and those whose fi-
nancial position is less sound, which may also be the most dy-
namic ones in terms of investment behaviour.
(1) Given the lack of statistics on private productive investment
for the euro area, its growth is approximated in this box by means of
gross fixed capital formation in capital goods, calculated in turn by ag-
gregating this component for the eight countries of the euro area that
have quarterly national accounting. The basic difference between
these two concepts lies in the fact that the former includes, in addi-
tion, business investment in non-residential construction.
(2) This information is only available from April 1998, basically
because the issuance of significant volumes of private debt is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon in the euro area.
Sources: Banco de España, CEPR, ECB, Eurostat, Datastream, 
Moody’s and Merrill Lynch.
(a)   CEPR indicator of the euro area business cycle.
(b)   Level of 3-month interbank interest rates less actual inflation.
(c)   Annual percentage changes.
(d)   Ratio of volumes of debt security issues of non-financial firms 
revised downwards to those revised upwards.
(e)  Calculated as the Morgan Stanley Composite Index divided 
by the relevant PER.
(f)    Includes credit and debt securities issued.
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flexible. However, the scant growth of labour pro-
ductivity in recent years may also reflect other fac-
tors that are obstructing the efficient use of pro-
ductive factors and, therefore, damaging medium-
term growth possibilities (see Box I. 1).
The economic outlook for the euro area has im-
proved in the first few months of this year. The
available activity indicators show a positive quarter-
on-quarter rate of change of GDP in 2000 Q1, fol-
lowing the decline in output in the previous quarter.
This recovery is consistent with the bottoming out
of the inventory run-down and with the accelera-
tion of exports, in line with the likely upturn in
world trade. The improved economic climate
should be conducive in the months ahead to a rise
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
 
DEMAND AND OPUTPUT:
Gross domestic product 2.7   3.5   1.5   2.5   1.6   1.3   0.3   
Domestic demand 3.4   3.0   0.8   1.8   1.1   0.7   -0.4   
Private consumption 3.3   2.5   1.7   1.9   1.7   1.8   1.5   
Government consumption 2.1   1.9   2.2   2.3   2.4   2.3   1.9   
Gross fixed capital formation 5.9   4.7   -0.5   1.6   0.2   -1.7   -2.2   
Exports 5.3   12.2   2.5   7.7   4.5   0.9   -2.8   
Final demand 3.9   5.4   1.3   3.4   2.1   0.7   -1.1   
Imports 7.4   10.9   0.8   6.1   3.2   -1.0   -4.8   
Contributions to GDP growth (b):
Domestic demand 3.3   2.9   0.8   1.8   1.1   0.6   -0.4   
Change in stocks -0.2   0.1   -0.5   -0.1   -0.4   -0.4   -1.1   
External demand -0.6   0.6   0.7   0.7   0.5   0.7   0.7   
PRICES AND COSTS:
Consumer prices (annual average) 1.1   2.3   2.5   2.3   3.1   2.5   2.2   
Consumer prices (Dec. annual rate) 1.7   2.6   2.0   ... ... ... ...
GDP deflator 1.8   1.2   2.3   2.0   2.3   2.2   2.7   
Unit labour costs 1.3   0.9   2.7   2.1   2.6   2.6   3.5   
Compensation per employee 2.2   2.4   2.7   2.5   2.7   2.7   2.9   
Labour productivity 0.9   1.4   0.1   0.5   0.2   0.1   -0.6   
GENERAL GOVERNMENT (c):
Total expenditure 49.0   48.2   48.0   
 Current expenditure 46.5   45.7   45.5   
Interest payments 4.3   4.1   3.9   
 Public investment 2.5   2.5   2.5   
Total receipts 47.7   47.3   46.7   
Primary deficit (-)/surplus (+) 3.0   3.2   2.6   
Deficit (-)/surplus (+) -1.3   -0.8   -1.3   
LABOUR MARKET:
Total employment 1.7   2.1   1.3    1.9   1.4   1.1   0.8   
Unemployment (d) 9.8   8.8   8.3     8.4   8.3   8.3   8.4   
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (c):
Current account -0.3   -0.9   0.0   -0.6   -0.6   0.4   0.9   
Capital account 0.2   0.2   0.1   0.2   0.2   0.1   0.1   
20011999 2000 2001
    Sources: ECB and European Commission.
   (a)   Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated.
   (b)   Percentage points of the percentage change in GDP.
   (c)   As a percentage of GDP. The receipts from the sale of third generation mobile telephone (UMTS) licences are excluded from 2000 and 2001.
   (d)   As a percentage of the labour force.
Euro area: main macroeconomic indicators (a)
TABLE III.1
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BOX III.2
Lending to the private sector by country and the relationship with its determinants
Since the start of Stage Three of EMU the financing ex-
tended to the private sector by euro area credit institutions
has been growing sharply. Over the three-year period 1999-
2001 the average rate of increase in bank lending to the pri-
vate sector was 9%, although it had decelerated by the end of
the period to an annual growth rate of around 6% in 2001. In
terms of GDP, outstanding bank credit has grown by nine
percentage points between 1998 and 2001, so that by the
end of the period it represented around 89% of GDP. The
empirical evidence available on the demand for bank credit in
the euro area as a whole confirms that this variable has gen-
erally moved in step with the cyclical expansion of the econ-
omy and with movements in interest rates, which reached
historical lows at the beginning of 2000.
There are, however, significant differences in the growth
of bank lending across the euro area countries. In order to
identify those countries in which the growth of lending has di-
verged furthest from the norm, the upper panel of the adjoin-
ing chart plots credit growth against nominal GDP for each
economy. This chart also includes a straight line whose slope
represents the elasticity of lending with respect to long-term
GDP, as recently estimated at the ECB. The countries situated
above this line are those in which lending has expanded by
more than would be explained by the nominal growth of their
GDP. Thus, the group of countries in which lending has clearly
been more expansionary are Ireland, Finland, Greece, Italy,
Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands.
For the first six countries mentioned, participation in
the Monetary Union has entailed a substantial change in the
economic environment in which domestic agents take their
borrowing decisions, since historically they had a lower de-
gree of macroeconomic stability. In this respect, as seen in
the middle panel of the chart, these countries generally had
below-average levels of outstanding bank credit prior to the
creation of the Monetary Union, so that the growth of lend-
ing to the private sector in recent years has brought their
levels of debt closer to those of the area as a whole.
Another of the features characterising the above-men-
tioned group is the sharp reduction in interest rates that ac-
companied their nominal convergence, where applicable, prior
to the start of Stage Three of EMU. The lower panel of the
chart shows that it is in this group of countries that the level of
interest rates fell most, compared to the previous situation,
e.g. in the first half of the 1990s. This fall (which, in the case of
short-term rates, ranged from 6 to 10 percentage points in
this group of countries) also helps to explain the recent buoy-
ancy of lending, insofar as it has meant that the higher level of
debt has not necessarily led to an increase in financial costs.
By contrast, in the more mature and traditionally more
stable economies (such as Germany and France), which started
from a relatively low level of interest rates, the creation of the
Monetary Union has not involved a substantial change in the
behaviour of agents and bank lending has in fact moved broadly
in line with its basic determinants. In these economies business
lending has determined the growth profile of the private sec-
tor as a whole.
Some countries do not follow the general patterns mentioned above. For example, in the Netherlands and Portugal lending has
continued to grow rapidly although levels of debt were relatively high at the start of Monetary Union. In the Netherlands, moreover,
Monetary Union has not entailed a significant change in the financial conditions that have traditionally faced the private sector. In
these two countries (and in others such as Ireland and Spain), the strong expansion of lending has been especially helped by the
buoyancy of house purchases by households. Moreover, the ongoing revaluation of this asset (whose prices have risen by much more
than the CPI) has, in turn, refuelled the demand for credit. In fact, mortgage financing in these countries grew at average rates of over
20% during the period 1999-2001.
In sum, in the first few years of Monetary Union, a large part of the disparity in the growth of lending to the private sector
across countries is explained by the changes that this Union has entailed for many countries. These differences can be expected to
narrow progressively as the expansionary effects of this change fade.
Source: Banco de España.
(a)   The slope of the line represents the elasticity of credit with 
respect to GDP according to the long-term relationship estimated for 
the area as a whole.
(b)   Three-month interbank interest rates on domestic markets.
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in the buoyancy of consumption and, especially, of
investment, which are also supported by favourable
monetary and financial conditions and the absence
of significant macroeconomic imbalances.
Accordingly, the euro-area economy is likely to
secure growth at close to its potential by the end of
2002. Among the main risks to this scenario are the
uncertain course of oil prices, against a background
of heightened international political tension, and the
possibility that financial imbalances in the United
States will prevent the economic recovery properly
taking off.
III.1.2. Prices and costs
Price developments in the euro area during
2001 were adversely affected by the delayed effects
of higher oil prices and of the depreciation of the
euro since its launch in 1999, as well as by the unfa-
vourable course of food prices, arising from health
problems in the meat sector. The final demand de-
flator decelerated in 2001, owing to the sharp re-
duction in the rate of increase of import prices as
the price of oil and the exchange rate stabilised.
Domestic prices, in contrast, as approximated by
the GDP deflator, increased by more than in 2000
as a result of the acceleration of unit labour costs,
which rose in 2001 by one percentage point more
than in the previous year. Net indirect taxes hardly
increased, while the gross operating surplus per
unit of output grew in line with the GDP deflator,
so that there were no significant changes in mar-
gins.
The unfavourable behaviour of unit labour costs,
in nominal terms, was attributable to the loss of
momentum of apparent labour productivity, since
compensation per employee continued to follow its
moderate course of previous years. In fact, although
inflation was higher than forecast in the first few
months of the year, wage settlements were not ex-
cessive, so that in 2001, for the second year run-
ning, the purchasing power of employees in the
euro area as a whole was unchanged (see Chart
III.2). Wage restraint was helped in 2001 by the
slowing of the decline in unemployment and by the
expectations of higher unemployment reflected in
confidence surveys.
The average rate of change in the harmonised
index of consumer prices (HICP) was 2.5% in 2001,
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and national statistics.
(a)   Annual percentage changes.
(b)   Difference between the changes in GDP and in employment.
(c)   Difference between the change in compensation per emplo-
yee and the GDP deflator.
(d)   Survey of professional forecasters.
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BOX III.3
Employment creation and labour-market performance in the euro area
In the latter years of the 1990s the pattern of growth in
the euro area was characterised by a high level of employ-
ment creation. In addition to boosting domestic demand, this
enabled the rate of unemployment to be reduced by more
than three percentage points between 1994 and 2001. In fact,
the ratio of the rate of growth of employment to that of
GDP reached 0.4 during this period, well above the average
level of the last 20 years, which was 0.2. However, as seen in
the upper panel of the adjoining chart, the rise in the ratio of
employment to GDP in recent years has varied significantly
across the euro area. Thus, there is a group of countries (the
Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, France and Finland) with a ratio
of around 0.5, while in the rest of the countries this variable
has stood at around 0.2. Although these data are skewed up-
wards in those countries in which part-time employment has
increased most, they may also be indicating the effectiveness
of other labour-market reforms.
Generally, the reform programmes implemented by the
euro area countries during the 1990s tended to promote la-
bour market flexibility, by boosting labour-force participa-
tion, reducing non-wage labour costs and, for the low-paid in
particular, increasing the range and flexibility of contracts and
working hours and the introduction of efficient collective-
bargaining mechanisms. Given the diversity and scope of the
basic lines of reform, it is complicated to try to summarise
them using a limited number of variables. Moreover, numer-
ous indicators of labour-market performance not only reflect
the effects of the measures implemented, but are also influ-
enced by a large number of other factors, which makes it
particularly difficult to draw conclusions regarding their sen-
sitivity to the reforms introduced.
Having made these qualifications, in order to assess the
effectiveness of the reforms introduced in the labour market
in terms of job creation, the changes in the participation rate
and in real compensation per employee (which incorporate
information on wages and non-wage costs) have been ana-
lysed by country.
Although part of the divergence in employment crea-
tion per unit of output is related to the different starting po-
sitions, it is generally observed that countries with higher
employment/GDP ratios tend, on average, to display favoura-
ble trends in the other variables. Thus, on the supply side,
countries showing higher job-creation in terms of GDP are,
on average, also those with higher levels and more significant
improvements in the participation rate during the second half
of the 1990s. Notable in this respect are the measures intro-
duced in recent years by the Netherlands, Ireland and Lux-
embourg, which tend to increase the participation rate of
lower-income groups by changing marginal income-tax rates,
increasing tax allowances or granting tax credits to these
groups. Also, the Netherlands has boosted the female partic-
ipation rate by making working hours more flexible.
Generally, those countries in which compensation per
employee has, in real terms, increased less are also those
that have recorded larger increases in employment in relation to GDP. Attempts to reduce the tax wedge (for example, by reduc-
ing employers’ social-security contributions) have been widespread in the euro area, those made by Italy, France and Spain being
particularly notable.
The information discussed shows a gradual improvement in the employment-generation capacity of the euro area econo-
mies. At the same time, the data suggest that the measures taken so far have generally been well targeted, although they may have
been insufficient, especially in certain countries. Accordingly, achievement of the targets of full employment and an employment
rate of 70% in the EU as a whole by 2010, established at the Lisbon Council, require an intensification of the reform process,
especially in those countries with the greatest labour market problems.
Source: European Commission.
(a)   The figure for Finland in the first period was -0.9. It has been 
omitted so as not to distort the chart.
(b)   Average growth of the labour force less average growth of the 
population of working age (15-64).
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0.2 percentage points up from 2000. The behaviour
of the HICP during the year was strongly influenced
by its more volatile components and showed two
contrasting trends: a continuous rise in annual rates,
until they reached 3.4% in May, as a consequence of
the crises in the food sector, and then a marked de-
cline from June, down to 2% in December, which
was mainly attributable to the reduction in energy
prices (see Chart III.2). By contrast, there was an
ongoing deterioration in the index which excludes
unprocessed food and energy, owing to the pro-
gressive pass-through of increases in import prices
in preceding periods to the prices of consumer
goods and services (see Box III.4). However, the
gradual incorporation of the higher prices of im-
ported inputs into more stable consumer-price
components may have been cushioned by the weak-
ness of demand.
In the opening months of 2002 there was a sig-
nificant rise in the HICP, which was largely attribut-
able to the performance of the less stable compo-
nents of the index and to the increase in certain ad-
ministered prices and in indirect taxes. Although
the overall effects on consumer prices of the cash
changeover from national currencies to the euro
are difficult to estimate, according to the available
studies this process does not seem to have had a
large impact on the course of the HICP in this peri-
od. In fact, although there are factors associated
with the cash changeover process that might tend
to have an upward influence on prices (such as the
pass-through to consumers of the costs of transi-
tion to the euro), there are other factors whose in-
fluence is uncertain (such as the setting of prices at-
tractive to the consumer) or, may even be down-
ward (such as the greater transparency in price-set-
ting and the intensification of competition between
firms at the European level). However, in some
services components of the HICP unusually high
price increases have been observed, which may be
attributable to the cash changeover.
In 2001, the dispersion of inflation rates across
countries was similar to 2000. Generally, those
countries with high growth tend to record higher
inflation rates (see Box III.3). This may sometimes
reflect relatively high productivity growth in those
countries undergoing real convergence. However,
they are often the result of the procyclical adjust-
ment of the relative margins of sectors sheltered
from competition in economies with higher demand
pressure. On the other hand, the inflation differen-
tials seen in recent years seem to correspond also
to the different exposure of the economies to
products originating from outside the euro area,
against a background of pronounced exchange-rate
depreciation (see Box III.4). Finally, in 2001, there
were adjustments to indirect taxes which largely
explain the positive inflation differentials in coun-
tries, like the Netherlands and Portugal, which did
not enjoy above-average GDP growth.
Although the HICP in 2001 exceeded the 2%
level contained in the definition of price stability
adopted by the ECB, medium-term inflation expec-
tations were contained, as shown by the main opin-
ion surveys and the course of the prices of indexed
bonds. Indeed, expected average inflation in 2002
was always below 2%, which indicates that econom-
ic agents perceived the rise in inflation in 2001 and
in the first half of 2002 as an eminently temporary
phenomenon (see the lower panel of Chart III.2). In
fact, it is likely that inflationary pressures will abate
during 2002, owing to the improved behaviour of
the more volatile components and to the tailing off
   Sources: Eurostat and national statistics. 
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BOX III.4
The pass-through of movements in the euro exchange rate to the costs and prices of the euro area
Since the start of Stage Three of EMU the euro has depreciated significantly, both against the dollar (with a cumulative de-
preciation to the beginning of 2002 of around 25%) and in nominal effective terms (by around 15%). Also, from the time of the
introduction of the euro, inflation in the euro area, as measured by the annual percentage change in consumer prices, underwent
a sustained rise, from rates of below 1% in January 1999 to a high of 3.4% in May 2001. The exchange rate depreciation was,
together with the rise in oil prices, one of the main determinants of the path of inflation, since it raised the cost of goods import-
ed from outside the euro area, which in 2000 accounted for around 14% of GDP. Insofar as the exposure of the various national
economies to the exchange rate is not identical within the euro area, the performance of the euro has borne differently on the
inflation rate observed in each member country.
In fact, as the red-coloured bars in panel A of the chart below show, the pass-through of a 10% depreciation of the exchange
rate against the dollar to input costs ranges from 0.8 percentage points in France, Italy and Spain to around 1.5 percentage points
in the Netherlands and Finland. The rate of pass-through to consumer prices (red bars in panel B) is smaller, partly as a conse-
quence of the larger weight of non-tradable goods in consumption than in production. In this case, a 10% depreciation of the
exchange rate has an impact on consumer prices ranging from 0.5 percentage points in the Netherlands to 0.2 in Italy.
The size of the pass-through of movements in the euro exchange rate to input costs and to the final consumer prices of each
country in the area depends on three factors. First, the size of the pass-through is a function of the degree to which movements in
the euro exchange rate are transmitted to the prices of each of the goods that each country imports. Second, the effect will depend
on the degree of openness, i.e. the weight that goods imported from outside the euro area have in the CPI basket or in total inter-
mediate consumption; and third, on the relative importance of each imported good in the CPI basket or in the basket of inputs.
In order to try to determine the relative importance of the three factors mentioned above, ten groups of goods have been
analysed. The results show, first, that for each group of imported goods, the degree of pass-through of exchange-rate movements
to prices is similar across all euro area countries. This means that the prices of a single group of imported products are equally
affected by the exchange rate depreciation in all countries. Nonetheless, this pass-through varies among the 10 types of goods
considered. Accordingly, the differences between countries in the aggregate rates of pass-through to input costs or to consumer
prices must be explained either by the different relative weight of imports (degree of openness), or else by the different composi-
tion of imports by product group.
The blue bars in the chart depict the rates of pass-through to the input costs (panel A) and to the consumer prices (panel B)
of the seven countries studied, when the average degree of openness of all the countries is taken to be the degree of openness of
each. The differences between the resulting pass-through rates can then only be due to discrepancies in the baskets of imports of
the various countries which, as can be seen, are very small. Accordingly, the degree of openness of each country to imports from
outside the euro area seems to be the main source of the differences in the rates of pass-through of exchange-rate movements to
prices and costs.
The above calculations assume that exchange-rate movements only affect the prices of those goods that come from outside
the euro area. However, given that these goods compete with those produced in the domestic territory and in the other euro
area countries, it seems reasonable to think that the prices of these products will also be affected by exchange-rate changes.
These effects have not been taken into account in the analysis. Moreover, the very creation of the Monetary Union may have led
to a reduction in the magnitude of the pass-through of exchange-rate movements to prices and costs. Two types of argument
would justify this change. First, to the extent that the creation of the Monetary Union has involved a reduction in medium- and
long-term inflation rates for a sub-group of the member countries, foreign exporters to these countries may prefer to hold their
prices unchanged in terms of the currency of the country to which they are exporting if they consider that both the magnitude
and the persistence of exchange-rate movements are going to be relatively limited. Second, the creation of the euro area, insofar
as it is a large economic area with a single currency, may have strengthened the market power of the European producers who
compete with importers, relative to the situation prior to Monetary Union.
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of the pass-through of previous increases in import
prices. However, a further rise in oil prices, a possi-
ble increase in labour costs, as a result of high wage
demands in certain sectors, and the possibility that
the impact on prices of the introduction of the euro
has yet to be fully felt are factors that may modify
the downward trend of inflation in the euro area.
III.2. ECONOMIC POLICIES
IN THE EURO AREA
III.2.1. Fiscal policy
The slowdown of the European economy took
place at a time when not all the countries had bal-
anced their budgets in accordance with the Stability
and Growth Pact, and when a significant number of
the Member States had been attempting to reconcile
the achievement or maintenance of a sound fiscal
position with a lower tax burden. Against this back-
ground, and as has been recognised in recent years,
with multilateral vigilance over fiscal policy matters
in Europe, it did not seem appropriate to resort to
additional expansionary discretionary measures to
combat the slowdown in activity. Owing to the lags
with which they operate, the impact of such meas-
ures may begin to emerge only when the cyclical
position has already begun to change, and experi-
ence shows that such measures often end up be-
coming permanent, thereby introducing an expan-
sionary bias into budgetary policy. These risks are
particularly significant when the public finances of
certain countries still display structural imbalances
and when there is an obvious need to build up a
sufficient buffer against the future budgetary conse-
quences of population ageing.
In consequence, public finances should normally
adapt to a slowdown in activity through the opera-
tion of the automatic stabilisers, provided that they
do not give rise to an excessive deficit, according to
the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact. As stat-
ed by the conclusions of the Barcelona European
Council, the stabilisers should play symmetrically,
so that during upturns they should lead to an im-
provement in public finances. This would enable
them to operate with sufficient strength in periods
of economic weakness, without the limits estab-
lished being breached. In Europe, the cyclical sensi-
tivity of automatic stabilisers (and, therefore, their
stabilising potential) is very much higher than in
other areas such as the United States, owing to the
higher tax burden and the larger expenditure on
unemployment protection.
Last year there was a moderate deterioration in
the aggregate budget balance of the euro area. The
budget deficit of the euro area as a whole stood at
1.3% of GDP, as against 0.8% a year earlier, the first
increase in the deficit since 1993. According to the
European Commission’s most recent calculations
the cyclically adjusted primary surplus (which ena-
bles the structural trend in public finances to be as-
sessed) fell by 0.3% of GDP last year, for the euro
area as a whole, although this figure is the result of
very different behaviour across the Member States.
In fact, in four countries the cyclically adjusted pri-
mary surplus increased. Among the rest, Germany,
Ireland and the Netherlands recorded the most sig-
nificant deterioration in this balance (see Chart
III.4).
The increase in the structural deficit in the euro
area as a whole (especially in Germany) was prima-
rily a consequence of the impact of tax reductions
that were not offset on the expenditure side, and
which were adopted at the beginning of the year
before the weakening of activity became apparent.
In most cases the tax cuts were part of a broader
economic policy strategy pursuing lower taxes on
employment in order to boost job creation. How-
ever, some countries with public finances in a
stronger structural position adopted discretionary
measures to combat the decline in growth, although
their amount was very limited.
As for the composition of the change in the bal-
ance, there was a fall in the weight of public spend-
ing in GDP of 0.2 percentage points, which corre-
sponded to a similar fall in interest payments. The
share of primary spending in output remained un-
changed. Revenues also declined, by 0.6% of GDP.
The unexpected strength of the economic slow-
down meant that only four countries of the euro
area (Spain, Austria, Finland and Luxembourg)
achieved the budgetary targets contained in the sta-
bility programmes presented at the end of 2000
(which is indicative of the commitment of these
countries to the stability of their public finances). In
the other countries there were deviations of vary-
ing importance, depending on the degree of weak-
ness of demand, the cyclical sensitivity of budget
balances and the expansionary measures, such as
tax cuts, decided upon in previous years. Overall,
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these deviations are largely explained by the fact
that the Member States presumed in their stability
programmes that the euro area as a whole would
grow by 3.2% in 2001, when the rate actually ob-
served was 1.7 percentage points lower.
In some countries the impact of the slowdown
in activity on public finances has highlighted the in-
sufficiency of the structural adjustment carried out
in recent years. The slowness of the consolidation
process had been partly concealed by the effect of
the cyclical upturn and the reduction in interest
payments. However, with the budgetary conse-
quences of low growth becoming apparent in 2001,
it became clear that some countries had not
achieved sufficiently sound budgetary positions,
which meant that the budget deficit in 2001 was
close to the limit of 3% of GDP contained in the
Stability and Growth Pact. Accordingly, in January
2002,the European Commission decided to pro-
pose that the ECOFIN Council should issue a rec-
ommendation warning Germany and Portugal of the
risk that the 3% deficit limit would be exceeded in
2002 (known as the early warning procedure). The
council did not formally adopt this recommenda-
tion, since the authorities of both countries publicly
undertook to comply with their obligations under
the Stability Pact, by ensuring that the budget deficit
will in no event exceed 3% of GDP, and in particu-
lar to respect the commitment made prior to the
current phase of lower growth to balance their
budgets in 2004.
III.2.2. Structural policies
Structural reform programmes received a strong
political boost at the March 2000 Lisbon Council
when some very ambitious targets were set for the
current decade, whose achievement required an
overall strategy and the improvement of co-ordina-
tion at all levels of the EU. The goal was to raise the
growth potential of the European economy to
around 3% from its current 2-2.5%, and to achieve
full employment by 2010. The Barcelona Council
has reviewed the progress made after two years,
renewing the momentum in certain areas. This re-
view was made all the more necessary by the fact
that during 2001 there was a loss of momentum in
the Lisbon reform process, possibly as a result of a
sudden change in the priorities of the economic au-
thorities at a time of cyclical weakness in economic
activity.
In the labour market, the targets for 2010 in-
cluded the achievement of full employment, with a
rate of employment of 70% for the economy as a
whole, 60% for females and 50% for the 55-64 age
group, which are significantly higher than the cur-
rent levels (see Table III.2). The slowdown in 2001
has increased the level of unemployment in certain
segments, such as the long-term unemployed. In or-
der to achieve these objectives, it was proposed at
the Barcelona council that the fiscal and unemploy-
ment benefit systems should be reviewed in order
to increase the supply of labour, and the need for
wage determination mechanisms to take into ac-
count productivity differences was stressed. In the
case of the female rate of employment, targets
were set to remove obstacles to women’s partici-
pation in the labour market. Finally, the EU coun-
tries agreed to raise the average retirement age by
five years by 2010. Among other things, this would
reduce the budgetary impact of population ageing.
Source: European Commission (spring 2002 forecasts).
(a)   A plus sign denotes a positive contribution to the adjustment, 
a minus sign the opposite.
(b)   Proceeds from the sale of third generation (UMTS) mobile te-
lephone licences are not considered.
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2000 2001 2000 2001
 
LABOUR MARKET:
Participation rate (15-64) 63.2         64.0         73.9         74.1         
Female 54.0         54.9         67.6         67.9         
Male 72.5         73.0         80.5         80.6         
Participation rate (55-64) 37.8         38.6         57.7         57.7         
Female 27.9         28.9         50.1         50.5         
Male 48.0         48.7         66.1         65.6         
Unemployment rate 9.4         8.4         4.0         4.8         
Female 11.0         9.9         4.1         4.7         
Male 8.2         7.3         3.9         4.8         
Long-term unemployment rate
(over 12 months in the euro area and
over 27 weeks in the US) 3.6         3.9         0.5         0.6         
Direct taxes and social contributions 38.6         37.8         29.0         27.7         
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY
R & D (% GDP) 1.9         1.9         2.7         2.8         
General government 0.7         0.7         0.7         0.7         
Other 1.3         1.2         2.0         2.1         
Percentage of homes with Internet
access (euro area) 28.4         37.7         30.0         46.7         
Patent applications per million inhabitants (a) 210.1         226.5         455.7         471.2         
Spending on IT and communications
as % GDP (a) 6.4         6.9         7.9         8.0         
IT 3.9         4.2         5.3         5.4         
Communications 2.5         2.7         2.6         2.6         
High-technology exports
as % total exports 19.8         19.9         30.0         
SECTORAL PRICES:
Telecommunications prices (euro/minute)
Local calls 0.041     0.041     0.013     0.013     
National calls 0.134     0.115     0.063     0.063     
Electricity prices (euro/kW)
Industrial users 0.064     0.063     
Domestic users 0.104     0.103     
Gas prices (euro/gigajoule)
Industrial users 5.01       6.12       
Domestic users 7.76       8.70       
FOREIGN TRADE AS % GDP (a) (b):
Intra-Community trade 17.8         17.6         
Total external trade 11.5         11.5         10.3         9.4         
FINANCIAL MARKETS:
Risk capital investment (% GDP) 0.14       0.23       0.50       0.89       
EU US
   Sources: European Commission, OECD, Bureau of Labor Statistics and US Department of Commerce.
   (a)   The data are for 1999 and 2000.
   (b)   The data are for 1999 and 2001.
Structural indicators
TABLE III.2
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As regards the liberalisation and integration of
network industries, significant progress has been
made in certain areas. However, there persist a
large number of structural rigidities that limit busi-
ness investment opportunities and the competitive
adjustment of prices and which therefore make it
difficult for the benefits of the single market to be
reaped. In the two basic spheres of action of the
network industries (liberalisation and interconnec-
tion) the progress has been uneven. In the first
case, there has been satisfactory progress in general
terms, although not at the same rate in all the coun-
tries of the area. The Barcelona council established
timetables for liberalisation in the electricity and gas
sectors for non-domestic consumers who are esti-
mated to represent around a 60% of the market. As
regards the interconnection of infrastructures,
progress in the energy and transport sectors is
slow, delaying the achievement of a single market
for energy in the EU and limiting commercial inte-
gration within the Community. In any event, the
commitment to achieve by 2005 a level of intercon-
nection between countries of at least 10% of the
electricity production capacity is encouraging. The
boost given in Barcelona to the Galileo project and,
in the area of transport, to the Single Sky pro-
gramme, to the second railway package and to cer-
tain projects designed to reduce bottlenecks in
transport through mountain areas, amounted to sig-
nificant progress. In the telecommunications mar-
ket, the target of full integration of the sector in
2001 is far from being achieved, although some
steps have been taken. Thus, at the end of 2001 a
new regulatory framework was introduced, which
establishes, inter alia, that the treatment of the dif-
ferent media for telecommunications services (fi-
bre-optics, cable, etc) must be uniform.
In the area of competition, sufficient progress
has not been made on matters such as state aids,
the transposition of directives, the opening up of
public procurement processes and the reduction of
administrative barriers to business activity, in partic-
ular for SMEs. There was also much room for im-
provement in relation to the information and
knowledge economy. Investment in R&D has been
significantly below the level in the United States and
was, moreover, stagnant in 2001 at well below 3%
of GDP, the target established in Barcelona for
2010. Thus, to meet the challenge set in Lisbon of
making the EU the world’s most dynamic economy
requires a redoubled effort to boost technological
innovation. The data available on registered patents,
net income from royalties and exports of high-tech-
nology goods highlights the inferiority of Europe
with respect to the United States in this area.
Finally, the absence of fully integrated markets
for securities, risk-capital and financial services in
general is hardly compatible with efficient allocation
of the savings available at the European level, and
thus limits the benefits of the single currency. The
lack of a completely uniform legal environment, the
insufficient homogenisation and interconnection of
clearing and settlement systems, the differences in
the tax treatment of savings and the incomplete
harmonisation of accounting standards are only ex-
amples of the barriers that prevent full advantage
being taken of the Monetary Union in the financial
sphere. However, following several months of dis-
cussions, an agreement has been reached between
the European Parliament and the European Com-
mission to apply the simplified and accelerated legis-
lative process proposed in the Lamfalussy report in
2001, which is a promising step. Accordingly, it is
expected that a large number of directives and reg-
ulations will be approved this year to enable the
commitment to achieve integrated securities mar-
kets in 2003 to be met and progress to be made to-
wards the goal of integration of all financial services
in 2005.
III.3. THE COMMON MONETARY
POLICY AND MONETARY
AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
IN THE EURO AREA
III.3.1. Monetary policy decisions
During 2001 monetary policy had to be adapted
to the progressive slowdown of economic activity in
the euro area and to the high degree of uncertainty
regarding the future course of the world economy,
especially following the events of 11 September in the
United States. Although, as mentioned, inflation stood
above 2% in 2001 as a consequence of various factors
of a temporary nature, the outlook for price behav-
iour at horizons relevant to monetary policy decision-
making remained generally benign. This enabled mon-
etary conditions to be favourable for economic activi-
ty and, therefore, helped to moderate the extent of
the cyclical slowdown.
During the first four months of the year, mone-
tary policy was governed by the assessment of the
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impact of the sudden slowdown in activity in the
United States on the euro area. There were signs
that the rate of expansion of economic activity was
moderating, but the available indicators did not
point to an unequivocal deceleration and reflected
continuation of the inflationary pressures that dom-
inated the second half of 2000. Meanwhile, the ex-
change rate of the euro, which had been recovering
in the second half of 2000, to reach a relative high
of 0.95 US dollars in January 2001, slipped back
again. This amounted to a risk factor for inflation
(see Chart III.5). Taking into account, also, the rela-
tive laxity of the financial conditions in the area, as
shown by the trend in the monetary (which it was
particularly difficult to interpret during the year)
and credit aggregates, the Governing Council of the
ECB decided to hold its main interest rate un-
changed during the first four months at 4.75%, the
level at which it had stood since October 2000, fol-
lowing an upward movement of 225 basis points
that began in November 1999.
During Q2 the worsening of the international
environment – basically of growth prospects in the
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United States (despite the fact that the Federal Re-
serve had been cutting interest rates sharply since
January) – and the intensification of the slowdown
in the main economies of the euro area became
more apparent. Despite the occasional rise in pric-
es, caused by farming crises, the increasing weak-
ness of activity reduced the risks on the prices
front, enabling the Governing Council of the ECB
to cut its official reference rate by 25 basis points
on 10 May 2001(see Chart III.6).
During the summer the deterioration in the
economic outlook was confirmed while the inflation
situation improved, both as a result of the very
weakness of demand and of the progressive fading
of the effect of the rise in oil prices and of the crisis
in the food sector. Against this background, the
ECB again reduced interest rates by 25 basis points
on 30 August.
The grave events of 11 September entailed a sig-
nificant increase in uncertainty over the economic
outlook and a striking worsening of agents’ confi-
dence. The world’s main central banks urgently
adopted measures to guarantee the operation of
payments systems and to minimise the impact on
the stability of the financial system. On 17 Septem-
ber the Governing Council of the ECB decided to
reduce its official rate by 50 basis points, in line with
a similar measure by the US Federal Reserve. The
fear of a prolonged phase of economic uncertainty
at a world level and a clear downward revision of
growth and inflation prospects in the area led the
monetary authorities to reduce their reference rate
by a further 50 basis points on 8 November to
3.25%. This has been the last cut in interest rates to
date and it brought the cumulative reduction in offi-
cial rates during 2001 to 150 basis points. In recent
months, the need for more information on the ex-
tent of the incipient recovery and inflation pros-
pects in line with the goal of price stability have led
the ECB to hold its monetary policy stance steady.
III.3.2. Monetary and financial conditions
in the euro area
During 2001, the monetary conditions of the
euro area were relatively lax, as a consequence of
the reductions in official interest rates (which led to
very low nominal and real rates, compared to those
of recent decades) and of the low level of the euro
exchange rate (see Chart III.7). Judging by the yield
curves, the markets were discounting a reduction in
official rates during 2001, albeit not as large as the
one actually made, in step with the progressive de-
terioration in the economic outlook for the euro
area over the course of the year (see Chart III.6).
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Towards the end of the year, as the signs of the end
of the slowdown began to be confirmed and the
general uncertainty in the wake of 11 September
declined, the interbank markets began to anticipate
a turnaround in the monetary policy stance. This
trend intensified in the early months of 2002, point-
ing to a gradual increase in official rates during
2002.
In line with the decline in expected inflation and
with the deterioration in growth prospects, long-
term interest rates stood approximately 50 basis
points below their 2000 levels. Moreover, this de-
cline in long-term interest rates (which, inter alia,
involved a reduction in the cost of servicing public
debt) was consistent with the financial shifts during
the year from equities to bonds, against a back-
ground of higher uncertainty. In the same way, the
recent increase in long-term rates may reflect mar-
ket expectations of a higher nominal economic
growth rate.
The transmission of monetary policy decisions
to the retail bank interest rates set by credit institu-
tions was practically immediate. As seen in Chart
III.9, the institutions adapted the yields of their as-
sets and liabilities in line with 3-month EURIBOR.
However, as mentioned in the previous section and
in Box III.1, this does not necessarily mean that the
cost of borrowing has fallen across the board, since
the risk premiums applied to those agents who have
significantly increased their indebtedness to finance
ambitious investment projects have been increased.
This factor, along with the fall in European and in-
ternational stock markets (see Chart III.8), offset to
some extent the laxity of monetary conditions in
the economy.
The monitoring and interpretation of monetary
aggregates during 2001 was especially difficult since
they were governed by diverse types of factor.
First, the ECB changed the composition of the ag-
gregate in order to remove non-residents’ holdings
of negotiable instruments. Second, the changeover
to the euro affected the demand for cash of agents
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resident and non-resident in the euro area. The
lower demand for cash (anticipating the imminent
euro cash changeover) was reflected in the higher
acquisition of other liquid instruments, such as sight
deposits and deposits redeemable at notice. In fact,
despite the sharp fall in the demand for cash (which
reached 32.5% in December 2001 year-on-year), all
the monetary aggregates accelerated in the second
half of the year.
Above all, however, the heightened uncertainty
prevailing led to substantial shifts in agents’ portfoli-
os, sharply increasing the demand for liquid assets,
so that M3 ended the year at an annual growth rate
of 8%, well above the reference value of 4.5% estab-
lished by the ECB (see Chart III.10). This phenome-
non (which does not necessarily involve a subse-
quent inflationary rise in spending) highlights the im-
portance, as stressed by the ECB, of avoiding me-
chanical interpretations of deviations by M3 from its
long-term reference value. In this respect, taking ad-
vantage of the flexibility inherent in the ECB’s mon-
etary policy strategy, the developments in M3 were
interpreted prudently and the behaviour of other
monetary and credit aggregates was also evaluated,
along with that of the rest of the real and financial
variables that are relevant to the assessment of the
outlook for future price developments.
Lending to the non-financial private sector by
euro area monetary financial institutions (MFIs)
grew at high rates in 2001, although there was a
progressive slowdown over the year. At year-end
the annual growth rate stood slightly below 7%, as
against above 10% a year earlier. The slowdown in
lending probably reflects a number of factors, in-
cluding the delayed effect of the rises in bank lend-
ing rates between mid-1999 and end-2000, the low-
er level of economic activity in the euro area and
the reduced importance of other factors, such as
mergers and acquisitions and the substantial exter-
nal investment that European firms had been mak-
ing, which had temporarily boosted the demand for
bank finance in previous years. An analysis of lend-
ing by sector shows that lending to households de-
celerated somewhat more sharply, especially due to
lower consumer credit.
As a result of the more moderate growth of lend-
ing and of the fact that the domestic funds of the MFIs
(obtained through the issuance of instruments includ-
ed in M3 and more long-term financial assets) in-
creased significantly, the net external indebtedness of
the sector was virtually nil in 2001, in contrast to the
cumulative increases of the last three years. Mean-
while, in the financial account of the balance of pay-
ments, a significant reduction was seen in the net out-
flows of capital in the form of direct and portfolio in-
vestment relative to the previous year. It should be
noted that, unlike in 2000, the flow of direct invest-
ment was negative, which suggests a lower relative
return on investment projects in the euro area than
in other more dynamic areas. However, the euro
area raised funds in net terms through portfolio in-
vestment, as a consequence of the lower acquisitions
of equities outside the euro area by residents and
higher sales of equities to non-residents, which may
be a sign that the shares of European firms are in-
creasingly being included in the portfolios of the ma-
jor international financial investors.
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1V.1. ECONOMIC POLICIES
1V.1.1. Monetary and financial conditions
Throughout 2001, and against a background of
slowing growth, Spanish monetary and financial con-
ditions showed a degree of generosity similar to the
previous year. This was because the reduction in
the inflation rate and the slight appreciation in the
euro exchange rate were offset by the lower inter-
est rates stemming from the easier single monetary
policy stance. These conditions remained looser
than in the rest of the euro area, although this dif-
ference lessened as the buoyancy of demand dimin-
ished and the inflation gap between Spain and the
euro area narrowed. The more liquid financial as-
sets and, to a greater extent, the credit aggregates
grew in Spain for the third year running at high
rates, higher indeed than those posted in the euro
area. That said, during the year and in 2002 to date,
signs of slowing have been observed.
Total financing to non-financial resident sectors
grew last year at a rate close to 11%, only one per-
centage point less than in 2000 and over five points
above the increase in this aggregate in the euro area
as a whole. Component by component, financing to
non-financial corporations and households decelerat-
ed, in contrast to the acceleration in financing to gen-
eral government (see Chart IV.1). However, the
growth of financing to non-financial corporations and
households stood at 14% year-on-year, with a fresh
rise in the debt ratios for the sector (of over four
percentage points of GDP in the case of corpora-
tions, and of two points in that of households), which
is discussed in detail in Chapter V of this Report.
The more liquid financial assets also saw a bigger
increase in Spain than in the euro area, although the
relative differences progressively narrowed. Means
of payment, the aggregate comprising cash and sight
and saving deposits, posted moderately rising
growth during the year, with its year-on-year rate
standing at 6.9% at end-2001, despite the substantial
contraction in currency in circulation (–21.3% in
December 2001). Cash has been influenced by the
switch from pesetas to euro at the onset of 2002;
the changeover appears to have led a sizable pro-
portion of Spanish households and firms to replace
cash by bank deposits. The same quickening trend
was seen in shares in collective investment under-
takings, which benefited from a new tax change in
June 2000, and in the Spanish component of M3,
which grew by 10.4% in 2001, compared with 8% in
the euro area as a whole. There was a significant
reduction only in the pace of deposits with an
agreed maturity.
So far in 2002, the credit and, more clearly,
monetary aggregates are posting more moderate
growth. That shows a degree (albeit insufficient) of
convergence towards rates more consistent with
the general situation of economic activity in Spain.
1V.1.2. Domestic macroeconomic policies
Fiscal policy in 2001 was geared to attaining a
balanced budget, as established under the State
Budget for the year. To achieve this goal a fall in
general government net borrowing of three-tenths
of a point of GDP was required, against a backdrop
in which output was expected to grow less and in-
flation to be lower than the previous year. Drawing
on the provisional year-end figures for 2000 availa-
ble at that time, the Budget estimated an improve-
ment in the fiscal balance for all agents that would
be manifest in a fresh cut in State borrowing of
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three-tenths of a point of GDP, in a decline of one-
tenth of a point in the territorial government deficit
(to zero) and, for the third year running, in a social
security surplus equivalent to 0.3% of GDP.
The target established for 2001 was part of the
fiscal consolidation drive that has been at the heart
of economic policy in recent years, in line with the
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. This
target has been updated successively in the Stability
Programme. In the update for the period 2000-
2004, which the Spanish government presented in
January 2001, it was stated that, following achieve-
ment of a balanced budget that year, public finances
would be in a surplus position that would hold until
the end of the period in question. For its part, the
public debt/GDP ratio, after standing at below 60%
in 2001, would continue falling to 49.6% in 2004. It
was expected this process would be accompanied
by a decline in the structural deficit and an increase
in the structural primary surplus.
As in prior years, the budget for 2001 had the
adjustment of borrowing requirements fall on pri-
mary current spending (in particular on employee
compensation) and on the decline in actual interest
payments. Concurrently, total revenue as a propor-
tion of GDP was maintained, underpinned by the in-
crease in certain extraordinary items of current
revenue. Among the measures included in this
Budget, mention might be made on the revenue
side of the increase in the charge for the use of the
radio spectrum (established after the award of the
UMTS licences) and the decision to give free play to
fiscal drag in connection with personal income tax,
which also had an expansionary effect on revenue.
On the expenditure side, the budgetary discipline
measures took the form of the extension, during
2001, of the restrictions on public-sector hiring, and
the exclusion of INSALUD (the Spanish public
health service) credits intended for payment of
pharmaceutical products from the list of budget ap-
propriations. At the same time, the increase in civil
servants’ wages and in pensions was set in line with
the official inflation target (2%). The application of
these measures should enable public investment to
be increased (this is a priority of the public spending
strategy, in the Stability Programme forecasting ho-
rizon) and certain expansionary spending policies to
be pursued, without jeopardising the balanced budg-
et. Notable among the latter measures are the ex-
tra payment to pensioners for their loss in purchas-
ing power the previous year, the concession of cer-
tain tax benefits to specific groups for the rise in
fuel prices in 2000, and the payment of rebates on
employers’ social security contributions for perma-
nent-contract hiring, which remained in force in
2001. Lastly, a provision of €541 million was set
aside for the pension reserve fund, without any im-
pact on total expenditure.
The fiscal policy defined on the basis of this set
of measures was intended to be of a moderately re-
strictive stance in keeping with an economic situa-
tion where, despite the moderate slowdown fore-
seen in activity and in inflation, final demand was ex-
pected to remain notably buoyant. The fiscal policy
stance was also in step with the fiscal recommenda-
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tions of the General Economic Policy Guidelines for
Spain, approved by the European Council in June
2001. These guidelines further suggested reforming
the public pension system and increasing provisions
to the reserve fund up to an amount equivalent to
1% of GDP in 2004. Under the conditions set by
the lower-than-assumed growth in the budgeted
macroeconomic scenario for the year 2001, the fis-
cal policy stance proved to be as programmed.
The fiscal policy strategy defined for 2002 focused
once again on maintaining budgetary equilibrium. The
State Budget approved for this year thus aimed to
keep public finances in balance. That goal would be
subsequently ratified in the Updated Stability Pro-
gramme for the period 2001-2005. Moreover, in De-
cember 2001, important legislative initiatives were ap-
proved to consolidate fiscal discipline in the medium
and long term, and to further the process of fiscal de-
centralisation towards the regional (autonomous)
governments. Firstly, mention should be made of the
budgetary stability laws (1), which came into force on
1 January this year. These lay down the principles of
stability and transparency for each of the agents mak-
ing up the public sector (State, Social Security, Re-
gional Governments, Local Governments and busi-
ness public sector). The implementation of budgetary
policy on the basis of the principle of stability is a nec-
essary requisite for establishing the conditions that
ensure sustained economic growth (see Box I.4). The
principle of transparency sets the mechanisms in place
to provide for the flow of information relating to the
definition of budgetary targets, their distribution
among agents and the attendant degree of compli-
ance, facilitating accountability and strengthening the
commitment to fiscal discipline. Secondly, the entry
into force of the new arrangements for regional gov-
ernment financing (2) should be highlighted. This is
considered to be a stable and uniform agreement for
all the ordinary-regime regional governments, which
integrates health-care financing into the overall re-
gional financing framework and which also raises the
degree of fiscal co-responsibility of the regional gov-
ernments.
Turning to pension systems, an agreement was
signed in April last year to improve and develop the
social protection system within the framework of
the recommendations of the Toledo Pact. Some of
the initiatives agreed would subsequently be reflect-
ed in the legislative measures accompanying the
Budget for 2002. The agreement stipulated the cre-
ation of the Social Security Agency (through which
the functions of registration, collection and manage-
ment of benefits will be integrated), the regulation
of the reserve fund and the adoption of certain
measures that will allow those aged over 65 to re-
main active in the labour force, following the regula-
tion of partial retirement and exoneration from the
payment of contributions. Nonetheless, the review
of the parameters defining the public pension sys-
tem was deferred until 2003, whereupon the chang-
es needed to improve the financial position of the
Social Security System in the medium term were
postponed, making the content of the reform less
ambitious than was recommended in the General
Economic Policy Guidelines.
Employment policies, for their part, influenced
the promotion of stable employment and employ-
ment for the groups with the highest unemploy-
ment rates: youths, women and the over-45s. The
attainment of this objective was structured around
Royal Legislative Decree 5/2001 on urgent labour
market reform measures. Hereunder, the groups
that can take up employment-promoting permanent
contracts and qualify for rebates on social security
contributions were widened, temporary hiring was
discouraged through the introduction of firing costs
(albeit of a small amount), and measures promoting
part-time work were established. This is in line with
the employment recommendations included in the
General Economic Policy Guidelines. Conversely,
the reform of the collective bargaining system, so
that agreed wages may take into account productiv-
ity and regional differences (also included in these
recommendations), was only addressed in a prelimi-
nary fashion. Indeed, the Inter-confederal Pact for
Collective Bargaining, which was signed at the end
of the year to take effect in 2002, is geared solely to
ensuring wage moderation during the current year
so that the slowdown in the economy should not
translate, as in previous downturns, into a sharp
employment adjustment. Under this agreement, col-
lective bargaining in 2002 will take as its reference
the inflation target set by the government, although
wage increases may include partially the productivi-
ty gains recorded. This is the only scope for wage
(1) General Budgetary Stability Law 18/2001 of 12 Decem-
ber 2001, and Organic Law 5/2001 of 13 December 2001 com-
plementing the former.
(2) These arrangements are laid down in Organic Law 7/
2001 of 27 December 2001, amending Organic Law 8/1980 of
22nd September 1980 on the financing of regional governments,
and in law 21/2001 of 27th December 2001 regulating the fiscal
and administrative measures of the new financing arrangements
for the ordinary-regime regional governments and the city-en-
claves with an autonomy statute.
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BOX IV.1
Implementation of the June 2000 liberalising measures (*)
Implementation and evaluation
The unbundling of ENAGAS has yet to be undertaken, al-
though following approval of Ministerial Order ECO/301/2002
of 15 February 2002, the steps have been taken for the related
evaluation, a pre-requisite for the diversification of the share-
holder base.
Carried out on 22 October 2001.
Royal Legislative Decree 949/2001 of 3 August 2001 approved
the new system for calculating charges and payments. Ministe-
rial Order ECO/301/2002 of 15 February 2002 specified remu-
neration for the regulated activities.
The number of big consumers opting to negotiate prices in-
creased appreciably in the second half of 2000.
The regulation enabling purchases from special-regime domes-
tic producers entered into force on 1 July 2001.
The application of this measure has limited the process of con-
centration.
Low- and medium-voltage prices have been lowered, and
those for high voltage frozen.
They were lowered by 4% in 2001 and have held unchanged in
2002.
Capacity payments were reduced on 1 July 2000. The new
price framework was introduced pursuant to Royal Decree
1164/2001 of 26 October 2001, and new prices were estab-
lished in Royal Decree 1483/2001 of 27 December 2001.
The shareholder base of CLH has begun to be diversified.
The CNE website offers information on network-access con-
tracts provided by network-owners.
There does not appear to have been a significant increase in
the number of service stations.
The effects of the measure are unclear, although in some cases
the closing of service stations can be seen to be accompanied
by the construction of new stations by the same operators.
This measure is being applied.
Measures
The holding by any group of companies of capital or voting
rights of ENAGAS is set at a ceiling of 35%.
The rights on gas imported from Algeria are divided.
The third-party access payments for reception, re-gasification,
storage and transport facilities shall be reduced by 8% within
one month and until the new distribution arrangements are
approved. Likewise, within six months a new cost-based sys-
tem of natural gas charges and payments applicable to the use
of infrastructure by new operators shall be approved. It will
come into effect as from 1 January 2001
The steps to acquire big-consumer status are simplified and
the threshold for consideration as a big electricity consumer is
lowered as from 1 July.
Electricity retailing companies are permitted to enter into
electricity purchase contracts with foreign suppliers and with
domestic special-regime producers.
Producers with more than a 40% share in generation are not
allowed to increase this share in the next five years. The peri-
od will be 3 years for producers with more than 20%.
Access charges to transport and distribution networks are re-
duced for big consumers.
Domestic consumer prices are lowered by, at most, 9% during
the period 2001-03.
Capacity payments are reduced and network access tariffs are
restructured before 1st January 2001.
A 25% CLH ownership stake ceiling is set for all individuals
and corporations. In addition, overall stakes in companies that
refine in Spain may not exceed 45%.
Owners of fixed oil storage and transport facilities shall inform
the CNE (National Energy Board) of the terms of their net-
work-access contracts. This information will be made public.
Those entities considered as large retail outlets will include at
least one service station to be supplied by a minimum of two
wholesale oil operators. The administrative requirements for
these cases are reduced and made more flexible for large re-
tail outlets that are currently operating and do not have a
service station.
Operators with a retail market share of over 30% are prohib-
ited from increasing the number of service stations over the
next five years. The period is limited to 3 years when the
share is over 15% and less than 30%.
Information on prices applied by service stations must be pro-
vided, and may be made public
NATURAL GAS
ELECTRICITY
LIQUID HYDROCARBONS
(*)  Excluding those measures which, back in June 2000, it was foreseen would be implemented after the current date.
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BOX IV.1
Implementation of the June 2000 liberalising measures (cont’d)
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
RETAIL TRADE
OWNERSHIP STAKES
Measures
As from 1 January 2001, fixed-telephony public network in-
cumbents shall provide unbundled access and shared access to
the local loop.
Before 15 November 2000, Telefónica shall provide for the
pre-selection of local calls.
On 1 November 2000 flat rates shall be introduced for Inter-
net and for voice and data services in local calls.
By 15 September 2000, the reference interconnection prices
for use of the Telefónica network shall be changed.
31 July is set as the deadline for fixed and mobile telephony
incumbent operators to submit their cost accounts for the
previous year.
Resolve to increase mobile telephony competition in the fu-
ture.
Shop opening hours are amended.
Ownership stakes of individuals or corporations in more than
one company considered to be a main operator in the elec-
tricity, hydrocarbon and telephony markets are limited.
Liberalisation of discounting on text books.
Wholesale tobacco distributors are not required to cover all
of national territory and they have full freedom to engage in
the distribution of various products. However, manufacturers
and importers are obliged to ensure that their products cover
the whole of Spanish territory, provided there is a demand for
them.
The promotion of developable land is opened to private initia-
tive. Further, administrative procedures are shortened, as the
tacit authorisation rule may be applied to approve develop-
ment planning if, within six months, or the period specified by
the regional legislation, no reply has been received.
Implementation and evaluation
The number of subscriber lines managed by companies other
than the former incumbent is limited.
The regulation on procedures for pre-selection was approved
on 30 November 2000, but it was not possible to use this
service until mid-February 2001. As at September 2001, a lim-
ited number of consumers had this facility.
As from this date, all companies offer flat rates for Internet.
Interconnection prices were changed in August 2001.
This measure is being applied.
Authorisations to sell on mobile services have been granted,
but the new operators have to negotiate network-use condi-
tions with the network-owning operators.
Only the Cantabria region, with 14 public holidays, and Ma-
drid, with 18, have lengthened hours beyond the minimum set
by the measure.
On 11 September 2001, the CNE specified the 5 main opera-
tors in the electricity, gaseous hydrocarbons and liquid hydro-
carbons industries. The incumbent telephony operators were
defined at an earlier date. The application of this measure is
leading to the revision of financial and non-financial corpora-
tions' investment strategies.
Discounts have been used particularly by large retail outlets.
As a result, hypermarkets and department stores had, by June
2001, seen their market share increase by two percentage
points on a year earlier.
Logista (entrusted since 1985 with wholesale distribution) is
permitted to distribute other goods along with tobacco. At
the same time, a significant obstacle to importers and small
manufacturers has been introduced.
The effect of this measure on available land supply is not
known. In any event, real asset prices have continued rising
strongly in 2001.
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differentiation that the agreement allows, with the
centralised nature of collective bargaining therefore
being maintained.
Lastly, the measures aimed at liberalising and
increasing competition in the markets for goods
and services, which were adopted during 2001,
focused essentially on the implementation of the
liberalisation package approved in June 2000 (3).
As will be recalled, these measures bore, inter
alia, on the conditions under which the network
industries operate, with certain delays in the
transposition of approved regulations (mainly in
the gas and telephony industries — see Box IV.1)
being detected. Measures were also taken to en-
courage research and the new information and
communications technologies. In connection with
the latter, a plan of action (Iniciativa Info XXI)
was adopted for the period 2001-2003. In the
field of scientific research, development and
technological innovation, the main measures
took the form of more extensive tax incentives
for R+D+i and financial assistance to be routed
through the programmes of the Spanish National
Plan for scientific research, development and
technological innovation.
1V.2. DEMAND
Against the background of the relatively gen-
erous monetary and financial conditions de-
scribed in the previous section, and of the slight-
ly restrictive fiscal policy stance adopted, con-
sumer and business spending in the Spanish econ-
omy held during 2001 on the mild slowing trend
on which it had embarked in 2000. Nonetheless,
some demand components, such as exports and
productive investment, were affected to a great-
er extent by the slowdown in the pace of growth
in the international economy and by the climate
of greater uncertainty brought on by the Septem-
ber attacks in the United States and by the Ar-
gentine crisis. As a result, final demand grew by
3% in 2001, against 5.4% the previous year, with
a decelerating profile that affected its various
(3) Royal Legislative Decree 7/ 2000 of 23 June 2000 on ur-
gent measures in the telecommunications sector; Royal Legisla-
tive Decree 4/ 2000 of 23 June 2000 on urgent liberalising meas-
ures in the real estate and transport sector; Royal Legislative De-
cree 3/2000 of 23 June 2000, which approved urgent fiscal meas-
ures to encourage household saving and small and medium-sized
enterprises.
Source: INE.   
(a)   Year-on-year rates of change based on trend-cycle series in 
real terms.
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components with differing intensity. The growth
rates of exports and, especially, investment in
capital goods were notably pared, while house-
hold spending (on consumer goods and on hous-
ing) and general government spending continued
to help prop up growth (see Chart IV.2).
The slowdown in household final consumption
expenditure that started in 2000 continued
throughout 2001, easing off in the closing months of
the year. On average in 2001, household spending
increased by 2.7% in real terms, below the average
growth for 2000 (4%). As Table IV.1 and Chart IV.3
show, the specific expression of the slowdown in
private consumption was the strong contractionary
behaviour of expenditure on durable goods. The
significant exception here was cars, which picked up
moderately thanks to the application of the “Plan
Prever” (a scheme aimed at renewing the Spanish
vehicle stock), the favourable trend of fuel prices
(following the strong increase in 2000) and, to
some unspecified extent, the bringing forward of
purchases before the introduction of the euro in
January 2002. Conversely, it is estimated that non-
durable consumption increased at similar rates to
the previous year.
Chart IV.3 shows that the lower growth of
spending in relation to the previous year was set
against the slight acceleration in real disposable in-
come, which provided for a moderate recovery in
the saving ratio after five years of continuous de-
clines. According to the initial figures released by
INE, the higher growth of household real disposable
income was essentially due to the greater contribu-
tion of the gross surplus and mixed incomes. The
contribution of income related to returns on saving
was small and similar to that for the year 2000, giv-
en that the greater contribution of dividends was
offset by a negative effect of net interest received,
against a backdrop of high growth in lending to
households. The increase in wage income net of so-
cial security contributions was similar to that in the
year 2000, since the rise in wages offset the lesser
pace of job creation. Lastly, mention may be made
of the lesser net contribution of general govern-
ment, arising from the notable growth in direct tax
takings. At the same time, the growth rate of social
benefits was cut.
Household spending decisions were also influ-
enced by losses in financial wealth during the year,
the result of the marked sluggishness of stock mar-
Sources: INE and Banco de España.   
(a)   Real rates of change.   
(b)   Employee compensation is net of social contributions.   
(c)   Includes social benefits and taxes on income and wealth.
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kets. Bourses hit a low in September and, despite
rallying in the following months, they closed the
year having posted substantial declines. This per-
formance, along with growing uncertainty about the
economic outlook, gave rise to an ongoing deterio-
ration in consumer confidence (see Chart IV.4).
Countering this, households’ non-financial wealth
increased significantly in 2001 as a result of the
higher number of house purchases and, above all, of
house price rises (15.4% for the year on average).
Overall, however, the losses in financial wealth, the
fact interest rate cuts have run their course and the
deterioration in confidence led to a slight recovery
in the saving ratio.
Although the growth rate of domestic residen-
tial investment eased significantly in real terms last
year, after expanding notably between 1998 and
2000 at a rate in excess of 8%, during 2001 it
reached a still-high rate of 4%. Among the determi-
nants of this sustained expansion in the past (and,
to a lesser extent, in 2001) were the rise in disposa-
ble income and interest rate cuts (see Chart IV.5).
Countering this, however, and acting as a deterrent
to households, was the rise in relative prices. More-
over, the year 2001 saw the continuation of the
trend, initiated in the mid-nineties, involving the
strong increase in the formation of new households,
against a backdrop of more favourable conditions
for mortgage financing and of brighter employment
prospects for young people.
The demand for housing as a means of placing
wealth also grew appreciably last year. This was due
to the favourable financial conditions and to the on-
going increases in house prices, which meant a high-
er relative return (see Chart IV.5). Residential in-
vestment was thus seen as an attractive asset, com-
pared with the losses in value incurred in financial
investment. In this context, the prospect of the
changeover to the euro at the start of 2002 might
also have fuelled additional placements of funds in
HOUSEHOLDS AND NPISHs:
Final consumption expenditure
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residential investment. Finally, the buoyancy of non-
resident investment in property in recent years was
sustained in 2001, despite the slowdown in the
world economy.
Housing starts slowed last year, reflecting a cer-
tain easing of demand in relation to the previous
years. That said, new house prices remained on a
strongly rising trend that was greater in coastal than
in inland areas, owing probably to the rise in sec-
ond-residence purchases. In any event, it is difficult
to evaluate the impact of the relative rise in house
prices on the demand for housing. Naturally, price
increases have, in principle, a contractionary effect
on the demand for housing. Yet insofar as such in-
creases fuel prospects of rising values, they act as a
spur to house purchases as an alternative means of
maintaining wealth.
On the available estimates, gross fixed capital
formation in Spanish companies slowed most signifi-
cantly in 2001, growing by around 1% in real terms
compared with 6.5% the previous year, a rate
which, in turn, signified a loss of steam in relation to
1997 and 1999. There was a slowdown in compa-
nies’ expenditure in 2001 both on construction and
capital goods, markedly so on the latter compo-
nent, the rate of which turned negative as from
2001 Q2 (see Chart IV.2). The buoyancy of con-
struction spending was underpinned by the expan-
sion of investment in infrastructure, routed through
management entities and state-owned corporations,
which are considered part of the private sector.
Meanwhile, spending on non-residential building lost
momentum in the second half of the year in virtual-
ly all its components except that of warehouses,
which grew at a higher rate than the previous year.
As to investment in capital goods, the slowdown
was also across the board, proving of greater inten-
sity in transport equipment and in office and elec-
tronic equipment.
The substantial easing off of private productive
investment in 2001 was the result of a combination
of unfavourable factors: the lesser resilience of final
demand, with the subsequent decline in capacity uti-
lisation; a slight increase in the relative cost of capi-
tal; and a deterioration in expectations which, ac-
companied by heightening uncertainty, prevailed
throughout the year (see Chart IV.6). Indeed, ac-
cording to the half-yearly investment survey con-
ducted by the Ministry of Science and Technology
among industrial firms, all factors having a bearing
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Sources:  INE, Ministerio de Fomento and Banco de España.   
(a)   Real rates of change.   
(b)   Price of new housing in relation to the private consumption 
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(c)   Ten-year government bond yields.
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on investment –  including the financial situation –
deteriorated in 2001.
As earlier commented, final demand slowed sig-
nificantly during the year, this being sharpest in sales
abroad. This diminished demand-side pressure
translated into a reduction in capacity utilisation,
which stood at the end of the year at a level of
78.3%, a similar figure to that recorded in 1997.
Likewise, the proportion of businesses that consid-
ered plant capacity to be greater than necessary in-
creased. The lesser buoyancy of demand com-
pounded the growing deterioration in business ex-
pectations, as the international economic setting
worsened. Further, there was a significant increase
in uncertainty, associated with the September
events in the United States and the unfolding of the
Argentine crisis (see Chart IV.4). This greater un-
certainty, against a backdrop of slowing final de-
mand, would have led companies to postpone their
investment decisions, almost irrespectively of the
return expected thereon. In fact, investment fore-
casts for the year 2001, which were provided by
entrepreneurs themselves in the half-yearly industri-
al investment survey, were revised substantially
downwards during the year.
It is estimated that the relative cost of capital,
measured by its user cost in relation to wages, in-
creased slightly in 2001. This was due to the increase
in the real interest rate of relevance for its calcula-
tion, namely the nominal rate deflated by the rise in
capital good prices, which was very small. Nonethe-
less, the user cost of capital stands at low levels, low-
er indeed than those in the early nineties, at the end
of the previous upturn. Actually, the slowdown in in-
vestment in 2001 came about against a background of
favourable financing conditions. Interest rates re-
mained low while, according to data from the Banco
de España Central Balance Sheet Office Quarterly
Survey, company profitability held at high levels. As a
result, the leverage ratio (the difference between the
return on assets and the cost of financing) remained
positive, at a similar value to that of the previous year.
However, this result was obtained in a context where
activity and the funds generated within businesses
were slowing. Consequently, despite the deceleration
in investment, borrowing requirements increased: the
resort to borrowed funds continued to expand con-
siderably, with a fresh increase in the debt ratio.
Taking a longer view, the small increase in pro-
ductive investment in 2001 compounds a relatively
Sources:  INE, European Commission and Banco de España.   
(a)   Real rate of change and differences for the degree of plant 
capacity utilisation.    
(b)   Relative costs measure the user cost of capital divided by the 
user cost of labour, proxied by compensation per employee.   
(c)   Data obtained from the CBA annual survey until 2000 and 
from the CBQ survey for 2001.
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modest performance by investment over the latest
expansionary cycle which, in part, should be related
to the existence of investment opportunities
abroad, many of which emerged in the context of
privatisation and sectoral restructuring in Latin
America. During 2001, investment abroad, though
falling, remained high, with flows amounting to 4.5%
of GDP and accounting for one-third of total cor-
porate investment and 50% of capital investment.
As indicated in Chapter I, the relative slackness
of Spanish investment partly explains the low
growth of productivity in the Spanish economy. A
pick-up in investment, which is needed to maintain
the positive growth differential with the EU coun-
tries, resides on the existence of domestic invest-
ment opportunities with appropriate returns and
requires a sound financial position on the part of
companies. In this respect, the current high levels of
debt, against the backdrop of the slowdown in
funds being generated within businesses, might cur-
tail investment decisions and check the recovery in
economic activity.
Stockbuilding contributed positively (one-tenth
of a point) to GDP growth in 2001, in line with the
usual counter-cyclical behaviour of this variable. Ac-
cording to the monthly business survey, the pro-
portion of businesses reporting a higher than desir-
able level of stocks continued to rise, meaning the
involuntary component of stocks must have in-
creased during the year. Drawing on the same in-
formation source, this behaviour was extensive to
the whole of industry, although more acute in the
case of intermediate goods.
General government final consumption spend-
ing grew by 3.1% in real terms in 2001, compared
with 4% the previous year. In nominal terms the
slowdown was somewhat greater, with growth of
6%, 1.5 percentage points less than in 2000. The
pattern was the same across all the consumption
components. In particular, general government
employee compensation grew by 5.1%, five-
tenths of a point down on the previous year, ow-
ing to the low increase in compensation per em-
ployee, while public-sector employment ad-
vanced strongly. Public investment was most
buoyant, with real growth of 6.1% compared
with the decline posted the previous year. This
performance was due to the rise in investment in
infrastructure, which continued on the path of
recovery initiated at the end of 2000.
Overall, the moderation of household and cor-
porate spending last year gave rise to growth in na-
tional demand of 2.8%, against 4.2% in 2000, moving
on a slowing profile. At the same time, the change
in the international outlook led trade to slip back.
Real exports of goods and services lost momentum
with greater intensity than national demand, which
is reflected both in the reduction in the average an-
nual growth rate (from 9.6% in 2000 to 3.4% in
2001) and in the fact that they ended the year
growing at a rate of 1.3%. The sluggishness of ex-
ports was greater in the case of goods, while the
slowdown in services was less marked, though they
slipped by more than four percentage points to a
growth rate of 6.8% in 2001. Under services, tour-
ism held firm following its strong deceleration the
previous year.
The deterioration in the international economic
situation was reflected in the slackness of foreign
markets, the growth of which was abruptly inter-
rupted in 2001 after having surged by more than
12% the previous year. As discussed, goods exports
slowed particularly sharply, posting negative real
rates of change in the final quarter of the year. The
loss of steam was most intense mid-year, when the
European economies felt in full the impact of the
crisis in the United States and the south-east Asian
countries, and both the pace of activity and that of
imports weakened appreciably. Although the weak-
ness of foreign demand lay behind the falling off of
exports (and, in turn, was conducive to export pric-
es being contained), worsening competitiveness,
which was reflected in a generalised way in the vari-
ous relative price and cost indicators, also exerted
a contractionary effect (see Chart IV.7).
Merchandise exports, which according to cus-
toms statistics grew by 2% in real terms last year,
performed unevenly in the different geographical
and economic areas. Sales to the EU increased by
4%, while those to third countries fell by 2.5%. In
the EU, exports to certain countries – to Germany
and France for instance, which account for more
than 50% of trade with the euro area – slowed sig-
nificantly in nominal terms, reflecting the apprecia-
ble loss of momentum in final demand in these
countries and the contraction in their imports. Like-
wise, the growth rates of exports to the United
States and Latin America, whose economies are in
recession, fell substantially, turning negative in the
case of the former. Conversely, the favourable be-
haviour of exports to central and eastern European
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countries should be highlighted: following the ex-
pansionary boost seen in 2000, they grew at over
20% in nominal terms. The growth of trade with
this area, in particular with the ten candidate coun-
tries that entered into preferential agreements with
the EU, shows the interest of Spanish exporting in-
dustries to gain market share in these economies,
which have high growth potential and which sus-
tained appreciable import volumes in 2001. The
buoyancy of sales means this area is now ranked
third in respect of non-Community trade.
In terms of product groups, the weakness of ex-
ports was extensive to all its components, more so
in sales of capital goods, which contracted with
growing intensity throughout the year. Likewise, the
growth of consumer goods sales slackened: follow-
ing their buoyancy in 2000, durable goods, which
are very sensitive to transport equipment sales,
eased off considerably. Lastly, intermediate goods,
like the other components, ended the year running
at very low rates.
World tourist activity in 2001 was affected by
the growing economic uncertainty and by the con-
sequences of various events that had a marked
bearing on tourist flows. Specifically, according to
the WTO, the number of international travellers
fell by 1.3%, having been below the average for pre-
vious periods already prior to the events of 11th
September. Against this background, tourist de-
mand for Spain held up, checking the strong slow-
down it had undergone in 2000 and consolidating
its second place worldwide behind France in terms
of tourists received.
Nonetheless, the rate of increase of tourist re-
ceipts was cut slightly to 5.1% in real terms, while
numbers of visitors entering Spain at borders retained
moderate growth rates, in line with the previous year
(3.6% against 2.4% in 2000). Price pressures were re-
corded during the year in tourism-related services
which, as the central panel of Chart IV.7 shows, gave
rise to a deterioration in the sector’s competitive-
ness, which may influence future developments. In
this respect, it should be noted that, in the absence of
political instability, the areas competing with Spain of-
fering similar forms of tourism and prices have been
absorbing comparatively greater flows from the mar-
kets in which Spain specialises.
As a result of the lower growth rate of national
demand and the marked slackness of exports, the
Sources: IMF, OECD, INE and Banco de España.   
(a)   Real rates of change.   
(b)   Measured by relative export prices, proxied by deflators.   
(c)   Negative values denote a gain in competitiveness, positive va-
lues a loss.   
(d)   Average of GDP of countries of origin of tourists to Spain, 
weighted according to the relative significance of the number of visi-
tors.   
(e)   Index of competitiveness vis-à-vis developed countries, mea-
sured with consumer prices.    
(f)   Prices of Spanish non-energy imports in relation to the non-
energy producer price index.
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average growth of final demand in the Spanish econ-
omy fell by 2.4 percentage points last year to 3%.
This lesser momentum of final demand fed through
to a greater extent to goods and services imports
than to domestic output, whereby GDP showed a
more contained slowdown than final demand, post-
ing growth of 2.8% for the year as a whole com-
pared with 4.1% in 2000. Real imports of goods and
services registered growth of 3.7%, against 9.8% a
year earlier. The resulting profile was one of dimin-
ished buoyancy in the first two quarters which
tended to stabilise at the end of the year, similar to
that of final demand. The marked restraint of ex-
ports and imports translated into a minor negative
contribution of net external demand to GDP
growth (–0.1%), slightly less than that of the previ-
ous year.
The growth of goods imports in real terms was
curbed to 3.6% in 2001, against 9.6% in 2000, when
final demand had already shown signs of easing and
in which year international prices rose considerably.
In early 2001, the slowdown in imports steepened
as a result of the marked sluggishness of industrial
activity and of exports, although at the end of the
year purchases picked up slightly given the growing
moderation of import prices (see bottom panel of
Chart IV.7). Nonetheless, despite the containment
of import prices, the rate of penetration of import-
ed products in the Spanish market (measured in
real terms) continued to slacken. And that, togeth-
er with price developments, contributed to stabilis-
ing the weight of nominal imports in the value of fi-
nal demand.
According to customs data, real goods imports
grew by 4.1% last year, with those from the EU in-
creasing by 3.2% and those from the rest of the
world by 6%. While nominal purchases from Com-
munity countries slowed across the board, those
from third countries, such as the United States and
Japan, slipped significantly. Conversely, mirroring
exports, purchases from central and eastern Euro-
pean countries grew substantially above 14% (30%
in the case of purchases from the candidate coun-
tries). These increases, along with those recorded
in 2000 (exceeding 60%), confirm the growing – al-
though still relatively insignificant – importance of
these markets for Spanish trade.
As regards the distribution of imports by type of
product, imports of both consumer goods and in-
termediate products remained quite robust in real
terms, in keeping with the trend of certain demand
components. Conversely, capital goods imports fell
appreciably, in line with the contractionary behav-
iour of productive investment expenditure. Energy
import volumes increased above average, although
in nominal terms they declined owing to the nota-
ble correction to oil prices on international mar-
kets. Finally, tourism payments, in step with their
expansionary course over recent years, grew by
9.2% in real terms, a similar rate to the previous
year. The behaviour of tourism expenditure was in
line with that of non-durable consumption, although
it began to slide when, at the end of 2001, interna-
tional uncertainty heightened. Nonetheless, the low
levels of this expenditure item are worth noting.
1V.3. ACTIVITY
Last year domestic output continued on the
slowing path initiated in 2000, as the expansionary
phase the Spanish economy had enjoyed since the
mid-nineties concluded. GDP growth in 2001 thus
stood at 2.8%, significantly down on the figure of
4.1% the previous year. The lesser buoyancy of ac-
tivity was concentrated in the market branches,
since activity in non-market services quickened
slightly to 2.9%. The growth rate of GVA in the
market sector declined by 1.3 percentage points,
settling also at a rate of 2.9%. The performance in
the market-oriented branches meant that, in 2001
Q4, the GVA output gap disappeared (see top panel
of Chart IV.8), following four years in which final
demand had been exerting strong pressure on na-
tional production capacity. In any event, the trend
growth of output (as inferred from an analysis of
the associated determinants) also slowed some-
what, albeit less markedly so than final demand.
Contributing to this was the more moderate
growth of labour supply and the lesser increase in
total factor productivity and in the stock of produc-
tive capital, due in the latter case to the heavy slow-
down in gross investment.
A disaggregated analysis of branches of activity
shows that the slowdown in economic activity in
2001 was centred on the sectors most exposed to
foreign competition (agriculture and manufacturing
industry), whereas construction and market servic-
es remained highly buoyant. In the primary branch-
es, output was seen to slip by 0.3%, meaning that
the sector was below its trend level for the third
year running. This contraction was the result of bad
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weather. Indeed, although measures of rainfall were
generally very positive, this could not be harnessed
by agriculture in view of the inadequate regional
and seasonal distribution of rain. Conversely, live-
stock production advanced strongly once the health
problems affecting certain breeds in the closing
months of 2000 were overcome. That said, this
could not offset agricultural crop yield losses.
Industry and energy proved particularly vulnera-
ble to the step-up in adverse factors which had be-
gun to become apparent in the second half of 2000
and which prompted a progressive loss of vigour in
their activity. GVA increased by 1.3% in 2001, far
down on the figure of 4% posted in 2000. The ad-
verse factors in question were essentially the loss of
steam in domestic demand and the weakening of
the main world economies. This led to a notable
deterioration in business expectations and a down-
ward revision of investment plans, amplifying the ef-
fects of the lesser robustness of consumption and
external demand (see Box IV.2). The increase in un-
certainty resulting from the attacks on 11 Septem-
ber exacerbated this unfavourable setting. Thus, ac-
tivity in these productive branches in the final quar-
ter of the year stood below-trend, closing the ex-
pansionary period initiated in 1997(see Chart IV.8).
The industrial branches were more sharply affected
than the energy branches by the slowdown in activi-
ty, and there were notable cuts in the output of in-
dustries with greater technological requirements
(reflecting the weakness of the information technol-
ogies sector internationally) and in the manufacture
of transport equipment intended for private con-
sumption, in contrast to the behaviour of car sales
inside Spain.
For the fourth year running, construction was
the Spanish economy’s most buoyant sector, grow-
ing by 5.5%, slightly down from 6.3% in 2000 (see
bottom panel of Chart IV.8). This vigour was the
result of the continuing high pressure exerted by
demand. However, as earlier discussed, construc-
tion slowed somewhat in 2001, affecting both
strands of building: residential building and, especial-
ly, that intended for other uses. Significantly, ac-
cording to the information available, the loss of mo-
mentum in residential construction was sharper in
the opening months of the year, with the variable
holding up subsequently.
Lastly, market services slowed by seven-tenths
of a point in 2001, taking their growth rate to 3.5%.
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BOX IV.2
The contraction in industry
A salient characteristic of the recent slowdown in the Spanish economy has been its relative mildness. Nonetheless, value
added in industry fell back in the final months of 2001 on QNA estimates, and the industrial production index fell significantly in
most months last year. The coincidence in time of this downturn in Spanish industry with the weakness of the main world econo-
mies and, consequently, of international trade, might denote that the fall in exports had triggered the slowdown in industrial activ-
ity. Yet the evidence available does not fully back this hypothesis; it assigns a key role also to domestic factors, specifically the
lower growth rate of certain national demand components and, more worryingly, the greater penetration of imported industrial
products in the national market.
The synchrony between industry in Spain and in the euro area countries has been very high in the past decade, while with
regard to the United States there has been simultaneity in the phases of expansion and contraction since the second half of the
nineties.  However, in the current slowdown the behaviour of Spanish industry has been somewhat idiosyncratic, as the downturn
began early in relation to the United States and, especially, to the rest of the euro area (see accompanying left-hand chart). That
points to the presence of domestic factors as triggers for the crisis, prior to the decline in exports and coinciding with the turn
away from the consumer buoyancy throughout the year 2000 (see right-hand chart).  The subsequent conjunction of the loss of
steam in consumption with that in investment (which had actually been slowing since 1998) and in exports led to a steeper slow-
down in industrial activity.
Analysis of the sectors making up the Spanish industrial structure reaffirms the role of domestic demand as the factor which
triggered the recent deceleration in industry, at least in certain key activities. The divergent behaviour of domestic output and
exports can thus be seen in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, electrical equipment, shipbuilding or food. Where the loss
of momentum in output is matched by that in exports is in sectors that do not depend excessively on foreign sales, as is the case
with metallic products (see accompanying table). The foregoing would point to domestic demand as the main cause behind the
contraction in industry.
The sluggishness besetting the industrial sector in 2001 cannot mask the presence of structural problems in Spanish industry,
problems that have resulted in a loss of competitiveness on national markets against imported products. Indeed, the presence of
sectors in which imports have quickened (or held stable), while domestic output was losing steam or falling off (electrical equip-
ment, mechanical equipment, cars or metallic products, among others, accounting for up to 33% of output), highlights the losses in
domestic market share that industry is undergoing in the face of the greater vigour of foreign products. This development may
seriously undermine the future of this sector.
Growth rates
Export propensity 
(%)
Exports
(deflated)
Imports
(deflated)
Production
(IPI)
2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001
High technology-intensive sectors 20.1   -2.8   18.4   4.7   5.5   -3.5   
Of which: Office equipment and computers 20.7          23.8   -13.0   52.6   8.2   -9.1   -33.0   
Machinery and electrical equipment 24.3          8.6   9.2   8.0   14.2   7.0   -1.7   
Electronic equipment 27.0          28.1   -12.0   22.8   -17.3   18.7   -14.1   
Chemicals and consumer chemical products 17.5          21.7   -2.5   5.7   28.8   -0.7   1.5   
Medium technology-intensive sectors 23.1   3.2   9.8   5.7   4.9   -0.3   
Of which: Machinery and mechanical equipment 24.0          13.4   -0.3   3.9   5.5   5.2   2.4   
Motor vehicles 46.9          36.7   5.0   14.6   13.9   9.7   -4.1   
Other transport equipment 40.0          14.2   -4.7   16.6   -29.4   -2.1   -0.5   
Chemical industry 24.0          18.0   4.8   11.7   2.7   -2.4   0.2   
Low technology-intensive sectors 10.9   3.5   8.3   6.2   1.4   -2.8   
Of which: Food, beverages and tobacco 10.8          11.8   11.2   1.0   10.8   -0.9   0.4   
Metallic products 14.4          13.0   1.9   1.4   11.4   0.6   -5.3   
Shipbuilding 37.5          -9.9   -36.0   -7.7   25.1   -5.4   -1.0   
   Sources: INE and Banco de España.
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step with the significant loss of momentum in indus-
try, but it induced a cut in apparent labour produc-
tivity. In market services, employment grew by 1.7%
during 2001, compared with 4.2% a year earlier.
Contributing to this was not only the slowdown in
activity but also a real process of capital substituting
labour. The growth rate of employment in con-
struction also fell, although this remained the most
dynamic branch in terms of jobs (5.2%). The other
two branches (agriculture and non-market services)
trended favourably in terms of occupation, posting
rates of 0.2% (after two years of reductions) and
4.4%, respectively.
The labour market reform measures introduced
in March 2001 essentially broadened the group of
workers who can gain access to the permanent em-
ployment-promoting contract (with lower firing
costs), they extended permanent-hire incentives by
means of rebates on employers’ Social Security con-
tributions and they introduced a severance payment
of eight days per year worked for temporary con-
tracts. The aim of these measures is to reduce la-
bour market segmentation, reducing the differences
in the firing costs for both groups, an area in which
further reforms need to be addressed. During 2001,
the growth rate of both permanent and temporary
workers fell (as can be seen in the second panel of
Chart IV.9), posting rates of 2.8% and 1.4%, respec-
tively, according to the EPA (Spanish Labour Force
Survey). Since the slowdown was greater in the
case of permanent-contract workers, the growth
differential between both groups narrowed, so that
the reduction in the proportion of temporary to to-
tal workers (to 31.7%) was even more modest than
in 2000. Nonetheless, the official statistics (INEM)
on contracts showed significant growth of 8% in
permanent contracts in 2001. This was due to the
forceful flow of temporary contracts being convert-
ed into permanent ones. The latter grew by 115.2%,
benefiting strongly from the March reform, after
having been excluded from rebates the previous
year. The March reform also made the legal limits
for the use of part-time contracts more flexible, and
this employment segment experienced a higher
year-on-year growth rate than that of full-time em-
ployment (3.2% against 2.3%). However, the pro-
portion of part-time to full-time employees in-
creased by only one-tenth of a point during the
year (to 8.2%).
The slowdown in economic activity introduced
something of a deterrent to participation in the la-
As a result, their contribution to the rise in market
GVA was 70%. Regarding its cyclical behaviour,
GVA continued in 2001 to draw closer to its trend
level. This approximation had begun a year earlier,
and was a reflection of less demand-side pressure
(see Chart IV.8). The diminished robustness of con-
sumption made its most significant impact on
wholesale/retail and repair activities (with the ex-
ception of car sales), and it was also discernible in
real estate activity, albeit to a lesser extent. Tour-
ism, hotels and restaurants, and transport felt the
adverse effects of the attacks on 11 September, and
activity in these sectors slowed markedly in the final
months of 2001. Lastly, the sectors linked to infor-
mation technologies, as is the case of communica-
tions, were impacted by the generalised diminished
vigour of the Spanish economy, as well as by the de-
lay in certain expected technological innovations
emerging.
1V.4. THE LABOUR MARKET
Despite the lesser buoyancy of activity, job crea-
tion in 2001 was relatively forceful. This marked a
difference from previous slowdowns (see Box IV.3).
On QNA data, employment (4) grew by 2.4%
against 3.1% the previous year, following a mildly
contained profile over the course of the year (see
Chart IV.9). As a result, the rate of increase of ap-
parent labour productivity fell to 0.3%, the lowest
figure recorded over the past decade. Nonetheless,
the slowdown in employment in the market econo-
my was more acute, with growth of 1.9% being
posted, half that achieved in 2000. This gave rise to
a pick-up in labour productivity to 0.9% (see Box
IV.3). The increase in apparent labour productivity
in the market economy had a cyclical component,
since it was the outcome of lower job-creation and
not of the more intense incorporation of techno-
logical progress, as total factor productivity (as dis-
cussed in the previous section) continued to slow.
However, the pick-up in apparent productivity has
been somewhat less than in similar cyclical phases.
Across the different branches of activity, the
slowdown in employment in the market economy
was due both to employment developments in in-
dustry and in market services. On QNA data, indus-
trial employment grew by 1.3% year-on-year, two
percentage points less than in 2000. This was in
(4) Measured by the number of full-time equivalent jobs.
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bour market. Thus, according to the EPA, the
growth of the Labour Force slowed notably from a
year-on-year rate of 2% (5) in 2000 to 0.8% in
2001. That said, it should be clarified that the unu-
sually high increase recorded in 2000 might be dis-
torted by the changes made to the EPA since 1999.
Owing to the slowdown in the labour force, the in-
crease in the participation rate for the population
aged over 16 was limited to three-tenths of a point,
rising to 51.6% (65.9% of the population aged be-
tween 16 and 64). The less favourable economic
setting affected women to a greater extent; their
participation rate posted the smallest increase of
recent years, standing at 40%. This was also reflect-
ed in the moderate reduction (0.9%) during the
year in the group of non-participants engaged in
household tasks (made up essentially by women),
compared with the sharper falls recorded in previ-
ous years. Conversely, the group least affected was
the under-30s, whose participation rate rose from
59.7% in 2000 to 60.9% in 2001. There was also an
increase in the over-45s cohort. This would denote
that the permanent employment-promoting meas-
ures enacted in March were able, for some of the
groups on which they were targeted, to counter
the less favourable expectations of finding work in a
downturn.
As regards joblessness, despite the fact that
there was a fresh reduction in the number of unem-
ployed in 2001, the process of unemployment ab-
sorption slowed considerably. The unemployment
rate therefore declined from 14.1% in 2000 to 13%,
although the rate of decline of unemployment
(6.6%) was 2.7 percentage points down on the pre-
vious year, exhibiting moreover a markedly dimin-
ishing quarterly profile. Indeed, according to EPA,
the number of unemployed increased and the un-
employment rate rebounded in the final quarter of
the year for the first time since 1996. This was con-
firmed by the INEM registered unemployment fig-
ures, which increased by 1% year-on-year that quar-
ter. And the trend has stepped up in the opening
months of 2002.
By sex, the easing of the year-on-year rate of
decline in unemployment was much more marked
among men. The related rate for males declined by
5.4%, half the figure for 2000, meaning that the con-
Source: INE (QNA and EPA).   
(a)   QNA. Trend-cycle. Full-time equivalent jobs.   
(b)   EPA.   
(c)   Over one year unemployed.
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(5) The growth rates of the EPA variables for 2000 included
in this section are those adjusted by INE for the effect of the up-
dating of the censual sections of the survey.
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gained wage settlements both in 2000 and 2001 (see
Chart IV.10). The initial rebound in inflation, which
was essentially due to temporary factors external to
the Spanish economy, was ultimately incorporated
into social agents’ inflation expectations, resulting in
wage settlements of 3.1% in 2000, and of 3.5% in
2001. Moreover, the presence of inflation-adjustment
safeguard clauses in most collective bargaining agree-
ments, which affect over 70% of wage-earners subject
to collective bargaining, allowed deviations by inflation
from official targets in 1999 and 2000 to be passed
through to wage increases in the following years. Spe-
cifically, the effect of the clauses for 2000 on the wage
increase in 2001 was 0.6 percentage points, giving rise
to an average increase in wages of 4.1%. This con-
firms that the current collective bargaining system
causes a delayed adjustment by wages to inflation, the
increase in which tends to persist through this chan-
nel.
On QNA estimates, compensation per employ-
ee (a wider wage-cost item for companies than col-
lectively bargained wage settlements, since it in-
cludes all sorts of wage drift and other non-wage
costs) grew by 4.3% in 2001, for the economy as a
whole, and by 5.3% for the market economy. Con-
sequently, wage drift (i.e. the difference between
wage increases negotiated in collective agreements
and the average increase in labour costs that firms
finally face) increased in 2001, maintaining the coun-
ter-cyclical behaviour observed in previous years.
In sum, the rise in social agents’ inflation expec-
tations, the operation of the inflation-adjustment
safeguard clauses and wage drift all prompted an in-
crease in real labour costs in 2001. This was notably
more marked in the market economy and was ap-
parent in a greater slowdown in this sector’s job-
creation rate (see the bottom panel of Chart IV.10).
As from 1999, the effects on wages arising from up-
ward deviations by inflation have seen something of
a departure from the wage moderation of recent
years, to which cyclical factors may have partly con-
tributed. However, for the Spanish economy, with
its still-high level of unemployment, it is vital that
the mismatches still present in the labour market
should be further corrected so as to continue cut-
ting the unemployment rate without prompting ten-
sion in specific market sectors (occupations, regions
or industries) that may prevent wage moderation.
In this respect, the signing of the Inter-confeder-
al Pact for Collective Bargaining by trade unions and
Sources: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales and Banco 
de España.   
(a)   Including prior-year inflation-adjustment clause. The figure for 
2002 is on information to March.   
(b)   Without inflation-adjustment clause.   
(c)   Year-on-year rate as at December.   
(d)   Compensation per employee deflated by the GDP deflator.
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tribution of women to the fall in the total unem-
ployment rate was greater. Nonetheless, although
the gap narrowed, the female unemployment rate
(18.8%) remains over twice the male rate (9.1%).
Long-term unemployment continued to abate,
standing at 42.7% of the total unemployed, below
the EU average. As can be seen in the bottom panel
of Chart IV.9, this reduction ran in parallel to that
in youth unemployment which, though still at a very
high level (20.4% in 2001), has fallen continuously
and notably in recent years. The successive reforms
in the labour market have allowed the upturn in the
Spanish economy in recent years to reduce consid-
erably the structural component of unemployment,
with the long term unemployed and jobless youths
particularly benefiting.
The behaviour of wages in 2001 was influenced by
the rising trend of inflation dating back to 1999, which
prompted an upward reaction in collectively bar-
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BOX IV.3
Sectoral productivity, productive structure and convergence
Throughout the nineties, the gap between the Spanish
economy’s productivity level and that of the EU increased,
widening in 2001 to eight percentage points.  Since aggregate
productivity is calculated as the average of sectoral productiv-
ities, weighted by the related weight in employment, the pro-
ductivity differential in question might be attributable both to
sectoral productivity differences and to productive structure
differences.
The first figure shows the relative levels of productivity
and the sectoral weights of the Spanish economy in relation to
the EU (EU=100) for the periods 1991-95 and 1996-99, re-
spectively.  For most sectors, it can be seen that productivity in
Spain is lower than that in the EU.  Nonetheless, notable differ-
ences are also discernible in the weight of each sector. There is
also something of a negative relationship between these two
variables, whereby sectors in which Spain shows a greater rela-
tive weight post comparatively lower productivity. This might
account, at least in part, for the Spanish economy’s lower over-
all level of productivity in relation to the EU.
To see to what extent different productive structures
explain the different level of aggregate productivity, two exer-
cises have been conducted.  The first calculates the level of
aggregate productivity assuming that the Spanish economy’s
productive structure, measured by the sectoral weights in
employment, is equal to that of the EU as a whole.  If the rel-
ative level of productivity thus calculated is greater than actu-
al productivity, it is because the different productive composi-
tion contributes to explaining the gap in the productivity lev-
els. In the second exercise, the relative level of productivity is
calculated assuming that sectoral productivities in Spain are
equal to those in the EU.  In this case, a level of productivity
higher than that observed would indicate that the sectoral
productivity differentials help explain the differential of the
economy as a whole.
The outcome of these two exercises is shown in the
second figure. For the period 1991-95, the relative level of
productivity for the market economy as a whole would have
been nine points higher than that observed if the productive
structure in Spain had been equal to that of the EU. Howev-
er, if the sectoral levels of productivity had been equal to
those observed in EU, this gain in the relative level of produc-
tivity would have been only one percentage point. These re-
sults suggest that, in this period, the different productive
structure has had a greater bearing on the sectoral productiv-
ity differentials in the productivity gap of the market economy
as a whole. That said, it is important to point out that the re-
sults obtained for manufacturing and for market services are
divergent. Thus, for manufacturing, the productivity differen-
tial for the aggregate is essentially due to the sectoral produc-
tivity differentials, while for market services the differential is
attributable to a different sectoral composition.
The results for the period 1996-99 are very similar, al-
though greater gains are obtained in the relative level of ag-
gregate productivity when the sectoral productivities of the
Spanish economy are made equal to those of the EU.  Thus,
for the economy as a whole, this gain increases from one
point (in the period 1991-95) to four points (in the period
1996-99); for manufacturing, the gain is from 9 to 11.  The
productivity gains obtained when the sectoral weights are
made equal are very similar to those for the first period.
Consequently, in the second period, the contribution of the
sectoral productivity differentials in the aggregate is greater
than in the first period, whereas the contribution of the dif-
ferent productive structures is virtually unchanged, with the
gap in the level of aggregate productivity thus widening. This
result is due to a less favourable performance of sectoral pro-
ductivities in the Spanish economy than in the EU for virtually
all the sectors considered (as can be seen in the third figure).
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employers’ associations is a step in the right direc-
tion which may provide for moderation in wage set-
tlements in 2002. Nonetheless, this agreement
should not sideline the need to reform the current
wage bargaining mechanism so as to allow a closer
relationship between wage increases and compa-
nies’ and employees’ specific conditions. The great-
er decentralisation of collective bargaining would
widen the possibilities for adjusting wages in the
face of different shocks that affect the labour mar-
kets, thereby reducing the intensity of employment
adjustments. It would also allow the wide differenc-
es in unemployment across different groups to be
narrowed by offering the necessary incentives for
job mobility via greater differentiation in wage in-
creases.
1V.5. COSTS AND PRICES
Over the course of 2001, the main price indica-
tors showed, to differing degrees of intensity, a de-
terioration in the inflationary situation of the Span-
ish economy. This deterioration was in response to
domestic factors since import prices, in line with
the declining trend of inflation internationally, post-
ed lower growth. However, in the summer months
inflation, which had begun rising in the first half of
the year, began to decline, placing the Spanish econ-
omy in a more favourable position to tackle the
year 2002. This turnaround was the result of a
combination of external and domestic factors. On
the external front, the declining profile of commod-
ity prices (energy and non-energy goods alike)
steepened further as a result of the generalised
slowdown in activity and the containment of infla-
tion in the international setting. This process was
only partly offset by the depreciation of the euro
against the dollar. On the domestic front, the con-
tractionary effect on business margins of diminished
demand-side pressure and, in those branches ex-
posed to foreign competition, of the less inflation-
ary external environment ultimately offset the
marked rise in unit labour costs.
The inflation rate, measured by the consumer
price index (CPI), posted an increase of 0.2 per-
centage points in 2001, standing at 3.6%. The dete-
rioration was marked in the group of products
(services and non-energy processed goods) whose
prices exhibit less variability; from growth of 2.5%
in 2000, these rose to 3.5% and showed no signs of
abating during the year. Such behaviour was the
consequence of processed food price develop-
ments, where growth stood at 3.4% for the year as
a whole, with a notable rising trend in milk prod-
ucts, cereal derivatives and olive oil. By contrast,
service prices slowed slightly in the second half of
the year, although they were those which most
grew for the year on average (4.3%). The declining
profile was marked by the cut in telephony prices
and by the stabilising of the rise in transport service
prices, which ultimately captured the effect of the
fall in energy prices. In the non-energy industrial
goods component, inflation held very stable (2.7%),
slowing slightly in the fourth quarter of the year
The respective behaviour of the CPI compo-
nents whose prices show most volatility differed.
While the prices of energy products fell by 1% over
the year as a whole, declining by up to 9% in the fi-
nal quarter, fresh food prices climbed by 8.7%. In
the case of the former, the cuts responded to the
marked decline in the oil price on international
markets, which stood at $24.40 per barrel for the
year on average, $4 less than the previous year. In
the case of the latter, the rise in prices was brought
on by the veterinary crises beleaguering part of the
national livestock, which only began to abate at the
end of the year.
At the start of 2002 the inflation rate rebound-
ed due to various factors: the mechanical effect of
the energy price cuts at the beginning of 2001 being
stripped out; the increase in certain excise duties;
and, also, the temporary effect of the adjustment of
prices to euro, which has given rise to a certain up-
ward bias in price-setting in the new currency.
Nonetheless, price moderation should foreseeably
resume, based to a greater extent on domestic fac-
tors (expected wage moderation and the progres-
sive closing of the output gap), since on the foreign
front commodity prices have risen.
The rate of increase of the final demand deflator
was 1.7 percentage points down at 3.1% in 2001.
This behaviour was different from that of the pri-
vate consumption deflator (which, in closer step
with the CPI, stabilised at a rate of 3.2%) and was
the result both of the reduction in inflation in in-
vestment goods and in exports. Export prices are
mainly determined by the prices of equivalent prod-
ucts on international markets, given that the weight
of Spanish exports in world trade is limited. In the
case of investment goods, the growth rate of the
deflators of capital goods and of construction un-
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derwent a similar cut, although it remained much
higher in this latter branch. The moderation of infla-
tion in capital goods was the result of the reduc-
tions in the import prices of this type of good;
moreover, domestic prices were also less buoyant.
Last year saw the imports deflator slow sharply
with a reduction of 9.4 percentage points in its rate
of change to 0.4% (see upper panel of Chart IV.11).
This slowdown became more acute as the year un-
folded, and the year-on-year rates of goods import
prices turned negative in the second half of the
year. As earlier discussed, the sharpest cut was in
energy goods prices, but imported inflation in other
goods also fell to a large extent. This performance
reflects the moderate increases in the export prices
of our main trading partners, in their own curren-
cies, which more than offset the slight depreciation
of the euro against the dollar during the year on av-
erage (3%), although the euro appreciated marginal-
ly in the final quarter.
Unlike the behaviour exhibited by the foreign
trade deflators, domestic prices, proxied by the
GDP deflator, quickened by 0.5 percentage points
to a rate of 3.9% (see central panel of Chart IV.11)
This acceleration would, moreover, have been
greater had unit indirect taxes net of subsidies not
been cut, as a consequence of the freeze on excise
duties taxing certain goods and of a slight increase
in subsidies. Indeed, the value-added deflator, which
excludes the direct impact of net taxes, grew by
4.3% in 2001 compared with 3.4% the previous
year. This was not the only favourable contribution
of the public sector to the performance of the do-
mestic component of inflation, since the growth
rate of the value-added deflator of non-market
services declined clearly from 3.5% in 2000 to 2.6%
in 2001, the result of the moderate growth of pub-
lic-sector employee compensation. By stripping out
this component and focusing on the domestic de-
terminants of inflation related to the market econo-
my (reflected in the corresponding value-added de-
flator), the latter could be seen to have accelerated
sharply by 1.2 percentage points to 4.6%.
Behind this marked increase in the domestic
component of inflation lies the performance of unit
labour costs in the market economy. These rose by
4.4% over the year as a whole, two percentage
points up on the previous year (see lower panel of
Chart IV.11). This substantial rise was in response
to the aforementioned acceleration in compensa-
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tion per employee (5.3%), which was offset only in
part by the muted rise in apparent labour produc-
tivity (0.9%). Against this background, and despite
the rebound in the value-added deflator, the growth
rate of the gross operating surplus per unit of value
added eased significantly. While at the aggregate
level these developments are consistent with the
progressive weakening of demand-side pressure and
are qualified by the greater widening of margins in
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previous years, at a more disaggregated level the
performance of margins was very uneven. In fact,
the margins of the branches most exposed to inter-
national competition deteriorated to a greater ex-
tent, while the opposite occurred in the more shel-
tered branches. That highlights the fact that there is
still scope to increase competition in some of these
branches and to use more productive technologies
in general, within a framework of moderate wage
growth. The shortcomings in these areas have been
responsible for the problem of dual inflation in the
Spanish economy in recent years (see Box IV.4).
1V.5.1. Costs and prices: the productive
branches
As indicated in the previous section, the growth
rate of the market economy’s unit margin moderat-
ed substantially in 2001, to the point of being virtu-
ally stable, as a result of the various branches of ac-
tivity performing very differently. Specifically, in the
branches most exposed to international competi-
tion (agriculture and industry), margins continued
to be squeezed, while in the more sheltered
branches (construction and market services), mar-
gins continued to widen, albeit at a slower rate.
As can be seen in the top panel of Chart IV.12,
the value-added deflator in primary activities quick-
ened notably in 2001 to a growth rate of 4.2%
(–0.3% the previous year). This was more in re-
sponse to supply-side factors than demand-led pres-
sure. In fact, as previously mentioned, some crops
were in short supply, while the prices of livestock
products were affected by the health problems aris-
ing in certain areas the previous year. This accelera-
tion did not suffice to counter the marked increase
in unit labour costs, led by strong wage growth,
which only began to turn down towards the end of
the year when the diminished momentum of em-
ployment allowed for a pick-up in labour productivi-
ty. Consequently, the unit margin narrowed once
again in 2001 on average, picking up in the second
half of the year.
In the industry and energy branch, the value-
added deflator grew by 3.8%, 2.5 percentage points
up on 2000. There were two clearly differentiated
strands to the behaviour of the deflator in 2001. In
the first half of the year there was an acceleration,
extending the profile of the previous year, while in
the second half the lesser pressure of demand (ex-
ternal demand in particular) led the deflator patent-
ly to moderate (see Chart IV.8). The trend of the
value-added deflator was consistent with a signifi-
cant slowdown in final sale prices during the year,
since the growth of import prices moderated ap-
preciably in relation to the previous year. As a re-
sult, the trend of final sale prices was very similar to
that of our main trading partners.
The growth of unit labour costs remained high
throughout the year, outgrowing the deflator. Ac-
cordingly, the unit margin continued to worsen.
The course of unit labour costs can be explained by
the acceleration in compensation per employee,
and by the flatness of apparent productivity, which
held at the levels of the previous year. The slack-
ness of productivity is a sign of the limited increase
in the stock of capital and of the under-use of tech-
nology in these activities. And such slackness is fur-
ther illustrative of the risk of the pick-up in margins
coming about through the diminished robustness of
employment, seeing as it is impossible to raise pric-
es against the background of heavy foreign competi-
tion in which the sector operates. Significantly, the
reduction in the unit margin extended to virtually
all the industrial branches, the only exceptions be-
ing the processing of food, beverages and tobacco,
and the manufacture of rubber and plastics. By con-
trast, the margin widened in the energy industry as
a result of labour productivity gains linked to the
employment adjustment undertaken in this branch
in recent years.
As can be seen in Chart IV.12, the growth of the
value-added deflator in construction remained high
(5.6%), although it was significantly lower than a
year earlier (8.8%). The main reason behind this
price performance was the resilience of demand,
which enabled the level of activity to hold signifi-
cantly above its potential. The unit operating margin
widened for the fourth year running, despite the
sharp growth of unit labour costs, since the moder-
ate trend of apparent productivity was unable to
offset the strong increase in compensation per em-
ployee.
In market services, demand-pull pressure dimin-
ished as the year unfolded, although activity contin-
ued to hold above its trend level. Consequently, as
has habitually been the case, the acceleration in unit
labour costs passed through without difficulty to
prices, raising their growth to 4.5%, nine-tenths of a
point up on the previous year. This inflationary bias
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BOX IV.4
Dual inflation, productivity and sectoral margins
Spanish incorporation into Economic and Monetary Un-
ion in 1999 marked a fundamental change in the macroeco-
nomic adjustment mechanisms.  In this new setting, the abili-
ty to withstand different types of shocks without generating
price adjustments that entail losses in competitiveness and
fuel the phenomenon of dual inflation (a persistent inflation
differential between branches exposed to and sheltered from
competition) will depend on the degree of competition in
place both for goods and services and for production factors.
The upper panel of the accompanying chart depicts in-
flation and its respective course for the manufacturing
branches (open to international competition) and services,
measured by the value-added deflators. The chart shows that
services inflation has been systematically higher than manu-
facturing inflation, although the significance of the dual infla-
tion phenomenon has not been the same over the past 15
years. Two periods can be distinguished in the chart.  In the
first, commencing in the mid-eighties and ending in the mid-
nineties, dual inflation was very high, especially during the
first half of the nineties (89-94), when it was 4% on average.
The second period coincides with the recent expansionary
phase, commencing 1997. During these years the inflation
differential between these branches narrowed to levels of
around 2%.
The middle panel of the chart offers a breakdown of
this differential. In a perfect competition setting, prices are
determined by companies’ marginal costs, which depend on
the relationship between nominal wages and marginal labour
productivity.  Under imperfect competition, companies will
determine their prices setting a margin on these costs. Con-
sequently, the inflation differential between different produc-
tive branches will be determined by changes in relative mar-
ginal productivity and inter-sectoral margins (i.e. by the de-
gree of relative competition).  Given that, under the most
commonly used assumptions, productivity may be broken
down into so-called total factor productivity (i.e. technologi-
cal progress) and the capital/labour ratio, the inflation differ-
ential between the branches exposed to and sheltered from
competition (dual inflation) may be analysed as follows: dual
inflation will be higher if total factor productivity grows more
in the sectors exposed to competition than in the sheltered
sectors (in the manufacturing/services total productivity ra-
tio), if the capital/labour ratio between manufacturing and services increases and if, finally, relative margins in services increase in
relation to those in manufacturing.
The second panel of the chart shows that, in the first of the two periods considered, relative productivity in manufacturing as
opposed to in services increased moderately. Moreover, and more significantly in quantitative terms, there was a notable reduc-
tion in margins in the manufacturing branches (against the background of the greater openness of the Spanish economy and the
strong appreciation of the exchange rate), while margins in services showed no adjustment (see third panel). The narrowing of the
differential in the second period was rooted in the progressive reduction in relative productivity between manufacturing and serv-
ices, which essentially masks a falling off of productivity in the branches most exposed to competition. However, the widening of
relative margins in the services sector has continued to contribute significantly to the inter-sectoral inflation differential. The con-
tribution of the capital/labour ratio to dual inflation has been of secondary importance.
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prompted a fresh widening of the unit operating
margin for the year on average, albeit with a pro-
gressively moderating profile over the course of the
year. Influencing the dynamics of this situation was
the high growth of compensation per employee,
which was offset only in part by the vigour of la-
bour productivity, against the backdrop of strongly
slowing employment.
The increase in margins was not common to all
the services branches. As usual, in both the commu-
nications branch (where liberalisation and strong
price competition continue apace, making for a
sharp adjustment of margins) and in certain corpo-
rate services branches (where market power on
the demand side is possibly high, making it more dif-
ficult to pass on the sharp increases in costs to pric-
es) the unit margin narrowed. Conversely, in the
transport branch, margins widened substantially,
offsetting the decline the previous year against a
background of strong fuel price increases.
1V.6. COMPETITIVENESS
As indicated in the foregoing sections, the nota-
ble slowdown in Spanish exports in 2001 was due
primarily to the weakness of the international econ-
omy, although there was also a loss of competitive-
ness, manifest in a higher growth of Spanish prices
and costs compared with our competitors. Indeed,
set against an historical experience characterised
until very recently by substantial gains in share, over
the past years the Spanish share in world trade has
remained virtually stable (see Chart I.2), despite the
fact that this share is lower than the weight of the
economy in world output. However, imports,
which grew in prior years at far higher rates than
did domestic output, saw their rate of penetration
in the Spanish markets largely diminish, despite the
moderate increase in their prices. Such a result is,
in part, related to the composition of demand last
year.
The analysis of export shares shows that sales
to the euro area grew over the last three years at a
similar rate to this market, while those targeted on
third markets initially performed more favourably,
in response to the gains in competitiveness record-
ed. However, a loss of competitiveness in non-
Community markets was recorded in 2001, and this
translated into a slight reduction in share according
to the data available.
Source: INE.   
(a)   Non-centred year-on-year rates based on QNA trend-cycle 
series.
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Among the factors that help explain the stagna-
tion of the share in the euro area, to which over
60% of exports are directed, the lack of gains in
competitiveness in terms of prices and costs is to
the fore. Nonetheless, behind these results are also
factors of a more structural nature, such as the very
characteristics of the Spanish trade pattern. Spanish
exports specialise in medium technology products
which are relatively vulnerable to the strong in-
crease in sales by emerging countries competing at
very favourable prices. In parallel, the Spanish pro-
ductive structure is not very specialised in those
sectors which, in recent years, have stood out for
the intensity of demand and the capacity to gener-
ate value, as is the case with the ICT sector. In this
respect, the information drawn from the export
specialisation indices, calculated in relation to
France, Germany and Italy, shows that the share in
sales of goods produced in high-technology indus-
tries is comparatively low, having even declined in
the past decade (see Table IV.2). Moreover, the rel-
ative structure of imports, measured via the relative
dependence indices, reveals that import intensity in
high-technology industrial goods (which are essen-
tially investment goods) has slackened since the
start of the nineties vis-à-vis the three reference
countries.
The overall pattern of the competitiveness indi-
ces compiled with various price and cost indicators
was affected by the slight appreciation of the nomi-
nal component and by the unfavourable behaviour
(to varying degrees) of the relative price and cost
indicators (see Chart IV.13).
Closer analysis of the behaviour of the price and
cost indicators vis-à-vis the euro area shows that
the index compiled using consumer prices saw a de-
cline in its rate of increase in relation to the previ-
ous year. This was due to the better behaviour of
the energy component which offset, in part, the de-
terioration in the relative prices of non-energy
goods and, above all, of services, which reflected
the inflationary pressures in the sectors sheltered
from foreign competition. Conversely, the indices
calculated with relative producer prices saw a halt
in the favourable behaviour they had shown in
2000, and evidenced a loss of competitiveness that
originated in the positive consumer-good inflation
gap. Unit labour costs also outgrew those in the
euro area. In particular, in terms of manufacturing
labour costs, the losses in competitiveness – though
having eased in relation to 2000 – remained signifi-
Sources: OECD and Banco de España.   
(a)   IERi=[Xiespaña/Xmespaña)]/[Xigrupo/Xmgrupo)]*100, where 
Xi are exports of branch i, Xm are total exports of manufactures.   
(b)   IDRi=[Miespaña/Mmespaña)]/[Migrupo/Mmgrupo)]*100, where 
Mi are imports of branch i, Mm are total imports of manufactures.
1991 2000
EXPORTS (a):
High-technology industries 52.1 44.4
Aircraft 34.9 27.0
Pharmaceutical products 66.3 55.9
Office machinery and computers 86.6 58.1
Electronic equipment 56.1 48.1
Surgical and precision instruments 32.0 38.6
Medium/high-technology industries 102.5 103.7
Machinery and electrical equipment 80.7 86.6
Motor vehicles 169.8 162.4
Chemical industry 56.1 58.3
Railway and other transport
equipment 60.5 168.5
Machinery and mechanical equipment
construction 76.0 73.6
Medium/low-technology industries 142.2 151.8
Oil refining 183.5 209.4
Rubber transformation and plastic
materials 140.0 173.3
Other non-metallic mineral products 155.8 188.5
Boats 344.6 173.4
Metallurgy and manufacture of
metallic products 120.2 116.9
Low-technology industries 98.0 114.4
Various manufactures 94.0 107.3
Wood, cork, paper, graphic art
and publishing 102.8 117.7
Food, beverages and tobacco 95.1 110.6
Textiles, clothing, leather and footwear 100.3 119.6
TOTAL MANUFACTURES 100.0 100.0
IMPORTS (b):
High-technology industries 98.4 76.1
Aircraft 78.7 58.4
Pharmaceutical products 87.2 87.7
Office machinery and computers 107.5 65.0
Electronic equipment 101.8 88.4
Surgical and precision instruments 110.8 78.1
Medium/high-technology industries 116.8 115.6
Machinery and electrical equipment 138.3 100.5
Motor vehicles 104.2 135.9
Chemical industry 89.0 79.2
Railway and other transport
equipment 180.3 115.2
Machinery and mechanical equipment
construction 146.6 136.0
Medium/low-technology industries 94.2 112.0
Oil refining 71.6 104.3
Rubber transformation and
plastic materials 140.8 166.4
Other non-metallic mineral products 86.9 79.5
Boats 103.5 193.8
Metallurgy and manufacture of
metallic products 89.0 99.4
Low-technology industries 83.4 92.0
Various manufactures 107.5 105.4
Wood, cork, paper, graphic art
 and publishing 87.7 93.7
Food, beverages and tobacco 81.3 88.6
Textiles, clothing, leather and footwear 74.9 88.7
TOTAL MANUFACTURES 100.0 100.0
   TABLE IV.2
Specialisation and relative dependence indices
vis-à-vis Germany, France and Italy 
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theless compared with the previous year) and the
strengthening of the euro. True, the gains in the
nominal component of these indices in the two
years prior to 2001 allowed a certain competitive
advantage to be sustained over these countries. But
the persistent differential growth of prices and,
above all, of costs, is slowly eroding this edge.
Moreover, in 2001 there was a smaller difference in
the growth of Spanish export prices by economic
area. This would appear to indicate that, faced with
the extreme weakness of foreign demand, Spanish
exporters eased up on setting different margins in
different markets, an habitual practice when the de-
preciation of the euro had enabled higher price ris-
es to be set outside the euro area. However, it
could still be seen that relative prices vis-à-vis the
developed countries increased more than vis-à-vis
the euro area.
To conclude, when comparing the competitive-
ness indices of Spain and of the euro area, compiled
on the basis of manufacturing unit labour costs, it can
be seen that although both types of indices followed a
similar pattern of behaviour in 2001, losses in com-
petitiveness were more marked in the case of Spain.
Further, manufacturing unit labour costs stabilised in
the euro area, whereas they increased in Spain. Once
more, this is due to the differing behaviour of com-
pensation per employee, which advanced relatively
more in Spain in 2001 (see Chart IV.14).
Source: Banco de España .   
(a)   An increase in the index denotes a loss in competitiveness, 
and vice versa.
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cant. The performance of unit labour costs was es-
sentially due to the bigger increases in compensa-
tion per employee in Spain compared with those in
the euro area.
As earlier discussed, in 2001 the competitive-
ness indices vis-à-vis the non-euro area developed
countries generally showed losses in competitive-
ness. This was due to the combination of worsening
price differentials (which narrowed slightly never-
Sources: Banco de España and European Central Bank.   
(a)   An increase in the index denotes a loss in competitiveness 
and vice versa.   
(b)   Competitiveness indices for Spain vis-à-vis the group of non-
euro developed countries and competitiveness indices for the euro 
area vis-à-vis a limited group of countries comprising: United States, 
Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Greece 
(until December 2000), Norway, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, Ko-
rea and Singapore.  
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1V.7. GENERAL GOVERNMENT
ACTIVITY
The goal of a balanced budget initially envisaged
for the overall general government sector (see Ta-
ble IV.3) was achieved in 2001. The primary bal-
ance, for its part, posted a surplus of 3.1% of GDP,
two-tenths of a point up on the previous year,
while public debt as a proportion of GDP stood at
57.2%, below the Maastricht Treaty threshold of
60%.
The deficit of the State and its agencies was
0.4% of GDP, slightly above the initially budgeted
figure of 0.3%, but an improvement on the forecast
of 0.5% in the latest Updated Stability Programme
(2001-2005). The Social Security System, for which
a surplus of 0.3% of GDP had initially been project-
ed (0.5% of GDP in the Updated Stability Pro-
gramme), ran a surplus of 0.8% of GDP, enabling a
contribution of €1,803 million to be made to the
Social Security reserve fund, a figure far higher than
budgeted (€541 million). Territorial government,
however, for which a balanced budget had been
forecast, posted a deficit of 0.4% of GDP, one-tenth
of a point more than in 2000. This deficit was at-
tributable in its entirety to the autonomous (region-
al) governments, since the local government tier
maintained a balanced budget. Significantly, 2001 is
the second year in which the regional governments
have deviated considerably from the budgetary tar-
gets set in the related Stability Programme.
In National Accounts terms, total revenue in-
creased by 7% in 2001, slightly above nominal GDP.
However, and unlike the previous year, the relative
weight of overall tax revenue in GDP diminished,
while the growth of non-tax revenue was higher. To-
tal general government spending once again grew less
than nominal GDP, whereby its weight in relation to
the economy as a whole diminished, albeit to a lesser
extent (two-tenths of a percentage point) than a year
earlier, when the related reduction was eight-tenths
of a point. The reduction in spending in 2001 was due
both to primary current expenditure and to interest
payments, while the share of capital expenditure in
GDP climbed significantly.
The reduction in the weight of tax revenue was
due to the weak growth of taxes on production and
imports, while income and wealth tax as a propor-
tion of GDP remained unchanged and social securi-
ty contributions increased substantially, outgrowing
nominal GDP. The growth in income and wealth tax
was 6.9%, although the data available show their
main components to have trended unevenly. There
was a substantial increase in personal income tax
(12.9% in respect of revenue raised) and a virtually
zero increase in corporate income tax. The latter,
in addition to the fall in corporate earnings, would
be indicative of a step-up in the process of pension
fund externalisation by companies and an improve-
ment in the tax treatment of dividends and capital
gains arising on investment abroad.
The increase in the tax base associated with the
notable vigour of employment and of Social Security
registrations was a determining factor of the
growth of personal income tax revenue in 2001.
The potential increase in revenue-raising capacity
for this tax and the free play of fiscal drag in respect
of the schedule may also have contributed to this
outcome. Conversely, there was an appreciable de-
cline in indirect tax, the share of which in GDP was
three-tenths of a point down as a result of the
1998 1999 2000 2001
Total revenue 39.4 40.1 39.9 40.0
Current revenue 38.0 38.6 38.9 38.9
Taxes on production and
imports 11.1 11.7 11.7 11.4
Taxes on income and wealth 10.2 10.2 10.5 10.5
Social contributions 13.0 13.1 13.3 13.5
Other revenue (a) 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.5
Capital revenue 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1
Total expenditure 42.0 41.1 40.3 40.1
Current expenditure 36.8 35.8 35.3 34.9
Final consumption expenditure 17.5 17.4 17.4 17.3
Social benefits in cash 12.8 12.4 12.3 12.2
Actual interest payments 4.3 3.5 3.3 3.1
Subsidies 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1
Other transfers 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2
Capital spending 5.1 5.4 4.9 5.1
Gross capital formation (b) 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.5
Other expenditure 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7
Net lending (+) or
borrowing (-) -2.6 -1.1 -0.3 0.0
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Primary balance 1.7 2.5 2.9 3.1
Gross debt 64.6 63.1 60.4 57.2
   Sources: INE, Ministerio de Hacienda and Banco de España.
   (a)   Includes fixed-capital consumption.
   (b)   Includes acquisitions of non-produced, non-financial assets.
Main general government non-financial
transactions (ESA 95)
TABLE IV.3
% of GDP
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slowdown in its growth rate from 8.3% in 2000 to
3.9% in 2001. This significant deceleration was due
above all to VAT (in line with the slowdown in con-
sumption and imports and with the tax deductions
for the agricultural and transport sectors), the reve-
nue for which grew by 3.8% against 8.7% the previ-
ous year. The increase in the case of excise duties
was also weak (3.5% in terms of revenue raised),
given the freezing of certain tax rates, particularly
so regarding taxes on hydrocarbons.
Revenue relating to social security contributions
held at a high growth rate in 2001 (8.6% against
9.7% in 2000), a sign of the positive behaviour of
the number of Social Security registrations. Lastly,
non-tax revenue trended very favourably owing es-
pecially to the higher-than-expected ordinary prof-
its of the Banco de España, to the charge levied for
use of the radioelectric spectrum (applied for the
first time in 2001) and to something of a pick-up in
capital transfers from European funds.
Under primary current spending, final consump-
tion expenditure increased by 6%, slowing significantly
from the rate of 7.5% the previous year. The main
component of final consumption expenditure (general
government employee compensation) increased rela-
tively moderately by 5.1%, somewhat down on the
figure of 5.6% for 2000. The data available relate this
slowdown to general government employee compen-
sation rather than to changes in the number of public-
sector employees in 2001. Social transfers in kind ac-
quired on the market (associated essentially with
health-care and education spending) also moderated,
as did inputs (purchases of goods and services), large-
ly attributable in this latter case to the local govern-
ment budgetary outturn.
Social benefits in cash increased by 6.3% in 2001,
with their weight in GDP diminishing slightly, having
slowed from 6.6% in 2000. This reflects the moder-
ate growth of the number of pensions, which may be
expected to hold stable for several years, in keeping
with the fact that the less numerous generations
born during the Civil War and the immediate post-
war period are reaching retirement age. Conversely,
spending on unemployment benefits increased con-
siderably in 2001. This was partly the result of the
numbers of unemployed registered with INEM (with
an increase of 0.1% in 2001, taking as a reference the
previously employed non-farm registered unem-
ployed, compared with a decline of 4.5% in 2000),
and partly of the considerable increase in the re-
placement ratio relating to unemployment benefits.
Regarding this latter point, although there have been
no legislative amendments bearing on the conditions
for qualifying for these benefits, the strong decline in
long-term unemployment and the reduction in the
proportion of temporary employees of factors which
help explain the rise and the replacement ratio.
Overall, the number of unemployment benefit benefi-
ciaries climbed by 5.9% in 2001, against a 2.7% de-
cline the previous year.
Interest payments by general government
showed slight growth of 1.4% in 2001, meaning a
fresh fall of two-tenths of a point in the interest on
public debt/GDP ratio. This decline has been easing
since 2000, evidencing how the downward trajecto-
ry of the average interest rate paid on public debt
has run its course. That said, the weight of interest
is expected to continue falling in the coming years
owing to the decline in the public debt/GDP ratio.
Capital expenditure increased considerably in
2001, with its growth rate rising to 11.3%, translat-
ing into an increase of two-tenths of a point in
terms of its weight in GDP. The increase was due
above all to public investment, which climbed by
13.1%. This rate is not strictly comparable to that
recorded in 2000, since this last year included (with
a negative sign) the proceeds obtained through the
concession of the UMTS mobile telephony licences.
Stripping this effect out, the growth of public invest-
ment in uniform terms would have been 10.3% in
2001, against 4.4% in 2000. Consequently, even with
this adjustment, the increase in public investment in
2001 should be viewed as substantial.
In sum, the highlight of the budgetary outturn
in 2001 was the achievement of a balanced budg-
et against the background of a somewhat sharper
than initially envisaged economic slowdown, but
one consistent, as seen, with favourable employ-
ment developments. The fiscal impulse indica-
tors, with all the caveats that should be applied
to analyses based thereon, show that the fiscal
policy stance in 2001 was slightly restrictive (see
Box I.4). Significantly, however, no additional dis-
cretionary budget adjustment measures were
taken during the year, and there was, moreover,
a substantial increase in public investment. This
was possible first, due to the general restrictive-
ness of fiscal policy applied in recent years, which
particularly affects certain expenditure headings
such as government consumption; and further, to
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the decline by two-tenths of a point in interest
payments as a proportion of GDP (when this
proportion was expected to be maintained) and
the slight increase in the weight of revenue (both
non-tax revenue and tax receipts most directly
related to employment), which contributed to
achieving a balanced budget in 2001.
1V.8. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
In 2001, the balance of payments posted a cu-
mulative deficit on current and capital account of
€11.4 billion, equivalent to –1.8% of nominal GDP,
compared with –2.6% in 2000. The improvement is
due to a smaller trade-balance deficit and to a siza-
ble increase in the surplus on the balances of servic-
es and, to a lesser extent, of transfers, which offset
the deterioration in the income balance (see Table
IV.4 and Chart IV.15).
The deficit on the trade balance, which had
reached a cyclical peak in 2000, declined by 1% in
2001 to –5.4% of GDP. The nominal growth of both
receipts and payments eased (to 4.2% and 1.7%, re-
spectively), due to the appreciable slowdown in the
volume of trade and to price developments. As ana-
lysed in the previous sections, the sluggishness of
real exports was essentially due to the halt in the
growth of world trade, set against a loss of compet-
itiveness of the Spanish economy. The growth of
real imports also diminished, in line with the slack-
ness of final demand, which was particularly acute in
the case of capital investment and industrial output.
There was a notable improvement in the terms of
trade owing to the heavy falls in import prices, par-
ticularly those of energy products.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
RECEIPTS:
Current account 28.3 31.3 32.0 31.9 35.0 35.7
Goods 16.9 19.0 19.0 18.7 20.7 20.2
Services 7.3 7.9 8.4 8.9 9.6 10.0
Tourism 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.6
Other services 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.5 4.1 4.3
Income 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.7 3.4
Current transfers 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.2
Capital account 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.0
PAYMENTS:
Current account 28.2 30.9 32.5 34.2 38.5 38.3
Goods 19.5 21.4 22.5 23.8 26.9 25.6
Services 3.9 4.3 4.7 5.1 5.6 5.8
Tourism 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
Other services 3.1 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.6 4.8
Income 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.7 4.2 5.0
Current transfers 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
Capital account 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
BALANCE:
Current account 0.1 0.5 -0.5 -2.3 -3.4 -2.6
Goods -2.7 -2.4 -3.5 -5.1 -6.2 -5.4
Services 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.2
Tourism 3.7 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.6 4.6
Other services -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
Income -1.0 -1.2 -1.3 -1.6 -1.5 -1.6
Current transfers 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3
Capital account 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.9
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Overall balance
on current and
capital account 1.1 1.6 0.6 -1.2 -2.6 -1.8
   Source: Banco de España.
Balance of payments: summary table 
% of GDP
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The surplus on services rose to 4.2% of GDP
(4% in 2000). There was an increase of 11.9% in
the surplus on trade in services, which was attrib-
utable to the improvement in the tourism balance
(7.9%) and to a significant reduction in the deficit
on other services (20%). Tourism receipts and pay-
ments grew by 8.5% and 11.7%, respectively. And
although both items slowed substantially as from
Q2, the deceleration steepened in the wake of the
events on 11 September. As regards the two coun-
tries that are the main source of tourists for Spain,
numbers from Germany slipped back and the in-
crease in visitors from the United Kingdom was
smaller. Conversely, tourists from France and Italy
rose notably. Other non-tourist services held firm
in respect of both receipts and payments. As in
previous years, mention should be made of the fa-
vourable performance of sectors related to infor-
mation, communications and corporate services.
The buoyancy hitherto characterising these sectors
continued.
The deficit on the income balance worsened in
2001 to –1.6% of GDP (–1.5% in 2000). Flows of
both receipts and payments increased considerably
(35.5% and 29.5%, respectively). In terms of institu-
tional sectors, there was a notable increase in the
receipts of other resident sectors (growth of 74%,
up on 2000) and of the credit sector (15%, which
was however only half that for the previous year).
In respect of payments, the rates of increase for
these sectors and, to a lesser extent, for the gener-
al government sector were higher than those in
2000.
Finally, the balances on current and capital
transfers stood, in terms of GDP, at 0.3% and 0.9%,
respectively, similar to the previous year. Both
flows improved as a result of the increase in funds
from the EU, although these increases were less
than expected. Indeed, a portion of these flows was
in compensation for the delays incurred in 2000; as
this was the first year of a new period of financing
(2000-2006), there were lags in the drawing up of
the related programmes.
On balance of payments statistics, the Spanish
economy’s net borrowing in 2001 declined to
€11.4 billion (against €15.81 billion in 2000). This
may have been due to the mild recovery in the
economy’s saving ratio, coupled with a concurrent
marginal decline in the investment rate. The follow-
ing chapter analyses in detail how this deficit posi-
tion has been financed.
CHAPTER V
SPANISH FINANCIAL FLOWS, MARKETS
AND INTERMEDIARIES
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As mentioned in the foregoing chapters of this
Report, the year 2001 was marked, in Spain and
most of the industrialised economies alike, by the
slowdown in activity. The deceleration was linked
largely to a series of global shocks (the rise in oil
prices, the crisis in the technology sector, the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, etc.) which, in combination,
prompted a widespread climate of uncertainty on
the financial markets. Significantly, however, com-
pared with similar episodes in the past, international
financial systems in general, and the Spanish system
in particular, evidenced a greater capacity to with-
stand these circumstances, thereby contributing to
tempering their effect on the different economies’
growth.
The diminished buoyancy of activity in Spain in
2001 did not, as on past occasions, translate into a
sharp slowdown in the funds obtained by house-
holds and firms to finance their spending decisions.
Indeed, spurred on by generous monetary condi-
tions, the financing received by these sectors grew
at around 16%. Though somewhat down on previ-
ous years, this rate is high when viewed in the light
of the Spanish economy’s cyclical position. On pro-
visional information available on 2002 Q1, this vari-
able has, at slightly over 15%, continued growing at
the same rate as in 2001 Q4.
As might be expected in an environment such as
that described, Spanish corporations raised a lesser
volume of funds via the equity markets, on which
trading and prices were adversely affected by the
climate of greater uncertainty. However, the issu-
ance of fixed-income securities was boosted some-
what, particularly by financial corporations, and this
bore favourably on activity in the secondary market
for this type of instrument.
Nonetheless, it was mainly financing raised
through bank credit which most contributed to sus-
taining the spending level of Spanish corporations
and, in particular, households. In this respect, the
increases in house-purchase loans (above 16% for
the year as a whole) and in consumer loans (the
year-on-year rate of which was in excess of 22% at
end-2001) are particularly notable. As a result,
credit institutions once again played a crucial role in
channelling financial flows in Spain. The strength of
their traditional domestic business (albeit against a
background of heightening competition) enabled
them to meet the increases in provisioning require-
ments in connection with the so-called statistical
provision and with the events in Argentina without
their profit and loss accounts being excessively im-
pacted. In fact, the growth of Spanish institutions’
profits eased in relation to previous years but was
still higher than many of their main international
competitors.
The financial assets acquired and the liabilities
incurred vis-à-vis non-residents amounted to 10.3%
and 12.2% of GDP, respectively. These figures were
substantially down on 2000 (which was probably an
exceptional year), but comparable with those for
1998 and 1999, which were propitious to the
growth of capital flows.
Admittedly, in the light of these data, it may be
said that the growth of financing appears to have
contributed to easing the depth and, possibly, the
duration of the slowdown in activity in Spain. Set
against this, however, it should not be forgotten
that Spanish households and non-financial corpora-
tions continued to increase their levels of debt last
year both in absolute terms and compared with
their income or their financial assets. As a propor-
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tion of household gross disposable income, house-
hold debt climbed four percentage points to close
to 77%. The debt/gross operating surplus ratio for
corporations, meanwhile, increased from 342% to
380%.
The financial position of Spanish households and
corporations remains, in any event, healthy and, as
discussed previously in this Report (see Box I.1),
debt levels are on a comparable footing with those
for the euro area on average. The recent increase
in levels is, moreover, based on favourable expecta-
tions about the future growth of the Spanish econo-
my. But even under these conditions, this does not
prevent the rise in a sector’s debt level involving
greater relative exposure for it in the face of poten-
tial shocks. For instance, in the case of households,
given the weight of real estate assets in their total
wealth, a potential correction in house prices
(which have grown by 37% in real terms over the
last four years – see Box V.1) might weaken their
financial position. In the case of corporations, the
key risk factors are probably those associated with
increasing international expansion, which have seen
companies’ assets vis-à-vis the rest of the world
double in terms of GDP in less than three years. In
these circumstances, the degree of relative vulnera-
bility of the private sector’s financial position might
influence to some extent the speed at which con-
sumption and investment may be expected to re-
cover in a fresh cyclical upturn.
V.1. FINANCIAL FLOWS IN THE
SPANISH ECONOMY
V.1.1. The capital account of the
institutional sectors
On National Accounts figures, the Spanish econ-
omy’s net borrowing declined to 1.9% of GDP in
2001, compared with 2.5% in 2000. This reduction
was a result both of the pick-up in national saving
and of a lower share of the resident sectors’ total
investment in output (see Table V.1 and Chart V.1).
By sector, general government attained a balanced
budget, the outcome of an increase of five-tenths of
a point of GDP in its gross saving, despite the slight
increase in its investment, as discussed in the previ-
ous chapter. The trend of public saving was a result
of a containment of current expenditure in virtually
all its components, while the share of current reve-
nue in GDP held at the previous year’s level.
The net lending of households stood, as in 2000,
at 0.3% of GDP, and household saving and residen-
tial investment as a percentage of GDP practically
repeated the levels of the previous year. Lastly, the
net borrowing of Spanish corporations fell by two-
tenths of a point of GDP to 2.2%, although the be-
haviour of financial and non-financial corporations
differed. The former saw their net lending increase
to 1.2% of GDP (half a point up on the previous
year), while the latter witnessed a fresh rise in their
net borrowing to 3.4% of GDP.
V.1.2. Financial flows in the Spanish
economy
The financial accounts of the Spanish economy
contain information on financing flows and financial
investment between the different institutional sec-
tors, thereby providing a view of the channels
through which agents’ consumption and real invest-
ment are financed and of the instruments in which
their saving materialises. They thus provide a differ-
ent set of information from the non-financial ac-
counts, but one which nevertheless reflects the
same economic reality, since agents adopt their
spending and financing decisions simultaneously.
Furthermore, the financial accounts enable the bal-
ance-sheet position of the Spanish economy’s vari-
ous sectors to be analysed. In many cases this posi-
tion proves vital for understanding and evaluating
agents’ spending (and debt) decisions. The following
sections analyse recent developments in the main fi-
nancial flows on the basis of the information provid-
ed by the financial account. The balance-sheet posi-
tion of the private sector will be addressed in sec-
tion V.4.
V.1.3. Financial flows of households and
non-financial corporations
The net financial saving (“net financial transac-
tions” according to ESA 95 terminology) of house-
holds and private non-profit institutions serving
households (NPISHs) picked up moderately in 2001
in terms of GDP to 1.3% (see Table V.2), thereby
breaking the declining trend recorded since 1995.
However, this figure masks different patterns in the
first and second half of the year. Until mid-2001, the
recovery in household net financial saving was rela-
tively intense, spurred by a generalised downward
revision of growth expectations, by households’
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BOX V.1
Recent house price developments in Spain
In recent years both the price of housing and the
credit extended to households for house purchases have
grown sharply. This greater volume of debt means that
households, especially those which have bought their
house recently (and, along with them, the banks that
have granted these loans) are more exposed not only to
a potential increase in interest rates or to a less positive
than expected change in their income, but also to a pos-
sible fall in the value of this real asset. Bearing in mind
that real estate assets account for approximately 70% of
total Spanish household wealth and are used as collateral
for loans representing around 40% of the total credit ex-
tended by Spanish banks, analysis of house prices is of
particular importance for assessing the economic situa-
tion in a country.
The accompanying chart shows the course of recent
house prices deflated by the CPI, both in Spain and in a
sample of developed countries. Two points stand out in
this chart. First, the presence, in general, of a long-term
rising trend in the relative price of housing, the intensity
of which varies from country to country. And second,
the presence of sizeable fluctuations in the short and me-
dium run.
Behind the long-term trend of prices in the various
countries are probably factors such as the high income
elasticity of real estate goods, the increase in the quality
of housing, demographic patterns or the limited volume
of land available. The short- and medium-term fluctua-
tions, for their part, are the results of characteristics
proper to the housing market, such as the slow adjust-
ments by supply, the existence of sizeable transaction
costs and the potential feedback effects of price changes.
First, property price increases give rise to a wealth effect
that stimulates investment in real assets. Moreover, they
prompt expectations of fresh future increases which fuel
the demand for housing for speculative purposes.
In Spain’s case, the increase in the relative price of
housing has, as the chart shows, been very sharp, especially in recent years. Several factors help explain this increase.
These include most notably: the singular decline in interest rates as a result of convergence towards the euro area; in-
come growth; the high relative preference for owner-occupied housing (favoured by its tax treatment) and for investment
in tangible assets; rigid land-use market regulations; the rise in the population of household-forming age and in immigra-
tion; and the relative weight of residential tourism. Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out that these structural factors may
prove insufficient to justify the increase in its entirety, which might entail the risk of a possible future correction. In fact,
following the phase of strong house-price growth in Spain between 1984 and 1991, there was a decline in these prices in
real terms of 15% in the three following years (plus a further 3% until 1997), although in nominal terms prices fell only
during the first two years (by 1.7%).
That said, the current phase of strong growth in house prices displays some different characteristics, although both
periods coincide with phases of vigorous GDP growth. The phase in the second half of the eighties was more intense and
prolonged (see chart): between 1984 and 1991, the average relative prices of housing grew by 124% in real cumulative
terms (12% per annum on average), while this growth was 37% in the last four years (8% in annual average terms). Fur-
ther, although, in relation to average household gross disposable income, house prices in 2001 were 4% above their 1991
level, mortgage loan interest rates had fallen by somewhat over 10 percentage points, while their average life tended to
lengthen (see Table V.4). Other differences between both periods relate to the bigger volume of new houses built in the
current cycle and to the growing significance of the second-residence market in Spain, both for nationals and foreigners.
However, although the current expansionary phase has so far been less accentuated and the housing affordability
indicators more favourable, it cannot be ruled out that a possible rise in interest rates, given growing household indebted-
ness, or a less favourable than expected trend in household income may ultimately trigger mechanisms leading to a cor-
rection of the current price of housing. In addition, the firming of low inflation rates following Spanish EMU membership
makes it unlikely that any future adjustment in the relative price of housing will take place, as occurred in the past, without
a significant change in nominal housing prices.
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Sources: INE and Banco de España.   
(a)   Includes the adjustment for the change in the net share of households in pension fund reserves, adding for households' saving and sub-
tracting for that of financial institutions and non-financial corporations.   
(b)   Includes the change in stocks and net acquisitions of valuables and of non-financial non-produced assets (added) and net capital trans-
fers (subtracted).
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1. Gross disposable income 99.6  99.5  99.3  99.0  98.9  98.8  
General government 16.7  18.0  18.7  20.3  20.9  21.3  
Financial institutions 2.0  1.7  1.7  1.4  2.0  2.5  
Non-financial corporations and households and NPISHs 81.0  79.8  78.9  77.4  75.9  75.0  
Households and NPISHs 69.1  68.1  67.2  66.1  64.8  64.4  
Non-financial corporations 11.8  11.7  11.7  11.3  11.1  10.6  
2. Consumption 77.6  76.9  76.7  76.8  76.6  76.0  
General government 17.9  17.5  17.5  17.4  17.4  17.3  
Households and NPISHs 59.6  59.3  59.3  59.4  59.2  58.7  
3. Gross national saving (1-2) 22.1  22.6  22.6  22.2  22.3  22.7  
General government -1.2  0.4  1.2  2.9  3.5  4.0  
Financial institutions 1.6  1.3  1.5  1.0  1.4  1.8  
Non-financial corporations and households and NPISHs 21.7  20.8  19.9  18.4  17.3  16.9  
Households and NPISHs 9.9  9.1  8.2  7.1  6.2  6.3  
Non-financial corporations (a) 11.8  11.7  11.7  11.3  11.1  10.6  
4. Gross capital formation (b) 20.8  21.0  22.1  23.3  24.8  24.6  
General government 3.7  3.6  3.8  3.9  3.9  4.0  
Financial institutions 0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.6  
Non-financial corporations and households and NPISHs 16.6  16.8  17.9  18.9  20.2  20.0  
Households and NPISHs 4.9  4.8  5.2  5.5  5.9  6.0  
Non-financial corporations 11.7  12.0  12.7  13.4  14.3  14.0  
5. Net lending (+) or borrowing (-)
of the nation (3-4) 1.2  1.6  0.5  -1.1  -2.5  -1.9  
General government -4.9  -3.2  -2.6  -1.1  -0.3  0.0  
Financial institutions 1.0  0.7  1.0  0.5  0.7  1.2  
Non-financial corporations and households and NPISHs 5.1  4.0  2.1  -0.5  -2.8  -3.1  
Households and NPISHs 5.0  4.3  3.0  1.6  0.3  0.3  
Non-financial corporations 0.2  -0.3  -1.0  -2.1  -3.1  -3.4  
6. Net financial transactions (7-8) 1.2  1.6  0.5  -1.1  -2.5  -1.9  
General government -4.9  -3.2  -2.6  -1.1  -0.3  0.0  
Financial institutions 1.0  0.7  1.0  0.5  0.7  1.2  
Non-financial corporations and households and NPISHs 5.1  4.0  2.1  -0.5  -2.8  -3.1  
Households and NPISHs 5.2  4.5  3.3  2.0  0.9  1.3  
Non-financial corporations -0.1  -0.5  -1.2  -2.5  -3.8  -4.4  
7. Financial transactions (assets) 43.1  43.2  49.6  51.9  58.5  47.4  
General government 3.7  0.4  1.4  1.8  2.1  -0.2  
Financial institutions 20.2  21.3  24.4  22.8  19.9  22.0  
Non-financial corporations and households and NPISHs 19.2  21.4  23.8  27.4  36.5  25.6  
Households and NPISHs 9.1  9.9  9.8  9.6  8.9  7.8  
Non-financial corporations 10.1  11.5  14.0  17.8  27.6  17.7  
8. Financial transactions (liabilities) 41.9  41.6  49.2  53.0  61.0  49.2  
General government 8.6  3.6  4.0  2.8  2.5  -0.1  
Financial institutions 19.2  20.6  23.5  22.3  19.2  20.7  
Non-financial corporations and households and NPISHs 14.1  17.4  21.7  27.9  39.3  28.6  
Households and NPISHs 3.9  5.4  6.5  7.6  8.0  6.5  
Non-financial corporations 10.1  12.0  15.3  20.3  31.3  22.1  
Use of income, capital and financial accounts. National economy
Breakdown by sector
TABLE V.1
% of GDP
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need to reconstitute assets following the deteriora-
tion in their financial wealth in 2000 and by the un-
certainty prevailing over the foreseeable course of
their disposable income.
Nonetheless, during the second half of the year,
the pick-up in net financial saving in terms of GDP
came to a halt, despite the fact there were no sig-
nificant changes in growth expectations and that un-
certainty heightened in the wake of the September
11 attacks (thereby accentuating the fall in stock
market prices). One factor that might help us un-
derstand this behaviour of saving is the progressive
reduction in lending interest rates over the course
of the year, against a background in which invest-
ment in real assets has continued to offer a high rel-
ative return as a result of the prolonged growth in
house prices (see Chart V.3 and Box V.1). Indeed,
house-purchase loans increased in 2001 by 16.5%
year-on-year. However, the relative buoyancy of
private consumption, which ultimately outpaced
GDP in the second half of the year, suggests the
presence of additional factors, including possibly the
implications of the then-imminent introduction of
euro-denominated notes and coins.
Component by component, the acquisition of
financial assets in terms of GDP held on the
mildly declining trend marking its course since
1998 (see Chart V.2). In parallel, there was a re-
structuring of household portfolios in favour of
more liquid and less risky assets. Thus, cash and
cash equivalents accelerated slightly (see Table
V.3), despite the substantial reduction in cash
holdings ahead of the peseta/euro changeover.
Time deposits, although they continued to at-
tract a sizable portion of household saving, in-
creased to a lesser extent than the previous
year. They were probably affected by the greater
demand for shares in money market funds which,
as a result of their improved tax treatment in
2000, advanced notably during 2001. Net sub-
scriptions of fixed-income funds also initiated a
recovery last year, albeit with much more mod-
erate intensity than money market funds. Con-
versely, redemptions of shares in equity and in-
ternational funds were high. Lastly, contributions
to pension and insurance schemes, though they
increased less than in the two preceding years,
continued to grow at a higher rate. On the liabil-
ities side, the new financing obtained by the
households and NPISHs sector fell slightly during
2001 in terms of GDP (see Chart V.2 and Table
V.3), owing to the slowdown in bank credit,
which is the main source of financial resources
for households.
With regard to non-financial corporations, the
net balance of their financial transactions (which re-
flects the gap between gross capital formation and
gross saving in the sector) continued to fall in 2001
to –4.4% of GDP (see Table V.2), despite the slack-
CHART V.1
Saving, investment and national net
lending (+) or net borrowing (-)
   Sources:  INE and Banco de España.
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ness of private productive investment. As discussed
in the previous chapter, this was due to lesser gen-
eration of internal funds.
If regard is had not only to gross capital formation
but also to permanent financial investment abroad
(proxied by the equity portfolio), the gap between
the overall investment and gross saving of non-finan-
cial corporations, i.e. the financing gap, narrowed con-
siderably last year owing essentially to the modera-
tion of the international expansion process in which
Spanish corporations have been involved (see Chart
V.4). Notwithstanding, the financing gap remained
wide (around 8% of GDP), in excess of the pattern
seen in the years prior to the period 1999-2000,
which saw the concentration of significant investment
by certain major Spanish corporations abroad. Proba-
bly contributing to this was the growing relative
weight of financial flows from Spanish parent compa-
nies towards their non-resident subsidiaries.
The slowdown in investment abroad led to low-
er net acquisitions of financial assets by non-finan-
cial corporations (see Table V.3 and Chart V.4).
Further, the acquisition of shares in domestic cor-
porations fell, while net investment in other finan-
cial assets was scarcely changed overall.
Despite the lesser buoyancy of their real and fi-
nancial investment, the financing of corporations con-
NET FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
National economy 1.2    1.6    0.5    -1.1    -2.5    -1.9    
Non-financial corporations and households and NPISHs 5.1    4.0    2.1    -0.5    -2.8    -3.1    
Non-financial corporations -0.1    -0.5    -1.2    -2.5    -3.8    -4.4    
Households and NPISHs 5.2    4.5    3.3    2.0    0.9    1.3    
Financial corporations 1.0    0.7    1.0    0.5    0.7    1.2    
General government -4.9    -3.2    -2.6    -1.1    -0.3    0.0    
INTER-SECTORAL FLOWS (a)
Households and NPISHs 5.2    4.5    3.3    2.0    0.9    1.3    
Vis-à-vis:
Credit institutions (b) -2.7    -6.7    -4.4    0.2    -0.1    -1.5    
Institutional investors (c) 8.8    10.8    7.5    0.8    0.4    4.2    
Non-financial corporations -0.1    -0.5    -1.2    -2.5    -3.8    -4.4    
Vis-à-vis:
Credit institutions (b) -0.3    -3.2    -4.3    -3.8    -6.7    -3.8    
Rest of the world 0.4    1.7    0.9    -0.8    1.7    -1.9    
General government -4.9    -3.2    -2.6    -1.1    -0.3    0.0    
Vis-à-vis:
Credit institutions (b) -0.4    1.4    1.4    1.4    2.2    -2.5    
Institutional investors (c) -5.9    -3.9    -2.6    1.7    3.9    2.6    
Rest of the world -0.2    -2.0    -1.1    -4.4    -6.0    -1.7    
Rest of the world -1.2    -1.6    -0.5    1.1    2.5    1.9    
Vis-à-vis:
Credit institutions (b) 0.9    2.8    7.1    2.0    5.2    3.9    
Institutional investors (c) -0.9    -2.5    -6.3    -3.6    -5.7    -4.7    
Non-financial corporations -0.4    -1.7    -0.9    0.8    -1.7    1.9    
General government 0.2    2.0    1.1    4.4    6.0    1.7    
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
2000 20011996 1997 1998 1999
Net financial transactions and inter-sectoral flows
TABLE V.2
% of GDP
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   A positive sign denotes the extension of financing to the counterpart sector. A negative sign denotes financing from the counterpart sector. 
   (b)   As defined by the First Banking Directive.
   (c)   Insurance corporations and collective investment undertakings.
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tinued to require a substantial volume of funds (see
Table V.3 and Chart V.4). Thus, although the increase
in liabilities in 2001 was, in terms of GDP, lower than
that recorded the previous year, it was above the re-
lated increases observed throughout the nineties. The
slowdown in internal funds, along with the mainte-
nance at high levels of more permanent financial in-
vestment, is the main factor behind this behaviour.
Box V.2 analyses in greater detail the most significant
changes in non-financial corporations’ investment and
financing flows in recent years.
Compared with the previous year, the lesser ac-
cumulation in liabilities in 2001 essentially took the
form of a lower issuance of shares and other equity
which, however, rose to a significant amount, as dis-
cussed in greater detail in section V.2. Conversely,
funds obtained from resident credit institutions, from
foreign loans and via the issuance of fixed-income se-
curities declined only slightly in terms of GDP (see
Table V.3). This was somewhat more marked in the
case of financing from resident credit institutions
aimed at business sectors which, in 2000, had most
resorted to bank financing: construction and services.
V.1.4. General government financial flows
The net balance of general government financial
transactions in 2001 was zero. This achievement of
Source: Banco de España.   
(a)   Not including unpaid accrued interest, which is included under 
"Other".
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
-5
0
5
10
15
20
 OTHER
 SHARES AND OTHER EQUITY
 OTHER DEPOSITS PLUS FIXED-INCOME SECURITIES (a)
 CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS
 TOTAL
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (ASSETS)
% of GDP % of GDP
Financial transactions of households and NPISHs
CHART V.2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
NET FINANCIAL SAVING
% of GDP % of GDP
 FINANCIAL ASSETS
 LIABILITIES
 SAVING
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
 OTHER
 TRADE CREDIT
 LOANS
 TOTAL
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (LIABILITIES)
% of GDP % of GDP
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
REAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS
% % 
SIGHT AND
SAVINGS DEPOSITS
TIME DEPOSITS
HOUSE  
PRICES (a)
FIAMM (b)
FIM (b)
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Year-on-year growth.
   (b)   Cumulative 12-month return.
Yields
CHART V.3
110
a balanced budget marked a historical milestone in
general government conduct (see Chart V.5 and
Box I.4). The balanced budget was the combined
outcome of a surplus on Social Security and a mod-
erate central and territorial government deficit.
In step with the headway in fiscal consolidation,
the issuance of marketable securities held on the
declining trend of recent years. Thus, the net issue
of short-term securities remained negative, while
that of long-term securities, though positive, contin-
ued to decline. As a result, the share of long-term
debt in overall general government securities rose
by three percentage points last year (to 88% at end-
2001) and the average life of government debt in-
creased to almost 6 years. Notably, such general
government budgetary discipline was rewarded, in
December, with the decision by Moody’s to raise
the Spanish public debt credit rating to that of max-
imum solvency. This is having a positive bearing on
the cost of general government financing, as the
yield gap between the German bund and Spanish
bonds has narrowed by around 10 basis points.
Analysis of the sectoral origin of the funds ob-
tained by general government in 2001 highlights the
increase in net financing received from credit institu-
tions. By contrast, the relative weight of net flows
from the rest of the world diminished (though they
remained positive) and the holdings of resident insti-
tutional investors (mutual funds, insurance companies
and pension funds), which continued with the net di-
vestment of their public assets, given the growing in-
ternationalisation of their debt portfolios. Significantly,
February saw the commencement of the monthly
Treasury liquidity tenders, through which the State
assigns on a daily basis to credit institutions most of
their liquid balances, which were previously held in
their entirety at the Banco de España.
V.1.5. Investment and foreign financing
of the Spanish economy
The net balance of financial transactions of the
Spanish economy with the rest of the world stood at
–1.9% of GDP in 2001, signifying lower net borrowing
Non-financial corporations Households and NPISHs
Net financial saving -2.5  -3.8  -4.4  2.0    0.9    1.3    
Financial transactions (assets) 17.8  27.6  17.7  9.6    8.9    7.8    
Cash and cash equivalents 0.7  0.9  1.6  4.5    1.0    1.2    
Other deposits (a) -1.4  1.0  0.5  2.1    6.1    3.4    
Securities other than shares 1.1  0.4  0.2  0.5    0.4    -0.3    
Shares and other equity 8.2  14.1  4.2  -2.0    -2.9    0.3    
Of which:
Shares in mutual funds 0.2  -0.3  0.0  -2.2    -3.4    0.8    
Rest of the world 6.5  10.9  3.7  0.4    -0.4    -0.1    
Insurance technical reserves 0.3  0.3  0.3  3.3    3.4    2.8    
Credit and other 9.0  10.8  10.9  1.2    1.0    0.4    
Financial transactions (liabilities) 20.3  31.3  22.1  7.6    8.0    6.5    
Securities other than shares 0.4  -0.5  0.0  
Shares and other equity 5.1  12.3  3.9  
Loans 8.4  11.2  10.6  7.2    7.0    5.5    
Of which:
Credit institutions 4.8  6.7  6.1  6.5    6.8    5.0    
Rest of the world 3.0  3.5  3.6  0.0    0.0    0.0    
Trade credit 6.2  8.2  7.7  0.5    0.5    0.6    
Insurance technical reserves and other 0.1  0.2  -0.1  -0.2    0.5    0.4    
2000 20011999 2000 2001 1999
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Does not include saving deposits since these are included under cash and cash equivalents.
Non-financial corporations and households and NPISHs
Financial transactions
TABLE V.3
% of GDP
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than the previous year (see Table V.4). There was
also a simultaneous reduction in the volume of lend-
ing and deposit financial transactions with non-resi-
dents, though these remained at a high level. Chief
among the reasons for this reduction in financial activ-
ity with the foreign sector is the greater uncertainty
over the outlook for the main developed economies,
along with some emerging economies, which painted
a rather unfavourable picture for the growth of inter-
national capital flows. The military conflict which fol-
lowed the September 11 attacks and the economic
and political crisis in Argentina contributed to exacer-
bating this uncertain panorama. The Spanish econo-
my, which is increasingly integrated into the global
economy, was naturally affected by these processes.
In any event, it should be stressed that in previous
years there was an exceptional volume of foreign
transactions linked to strategic purchases.
The Spanish economy’s investment in foreign fi-
nancial assets fell from 24.4% of GDP in 2000 to
10.9% of GDP in 2001, owing essentially to the low-
er amount of acquisitions of shares and other equity
(which fell in terms of GDP by something more
than 11 percentage points). All sectors of the Span-
ish economy contributed to this reduction, which
was particularly sharp in the case of corporations,
whose financial investment in terms of GDP de-
clined by over 7 percentage points. The information
available on the regional distribution of Spanish in-
vestment in the rest of the world indicates that the
EU was the main focal point in 2001 for most net
capital flows in the form of direct investment. The
financing of investee companies situated abroad (in-
cluded under Loans in Table V.4) diminished only
slightly in relation to 2000. At the same time, in-
vestment in securities other than shares climbed
significantly due to the behaviour both of credit in-
stitutions, which showed a greater preference for
fixed-income securities than in previous years, and
of institutional investors.
The Spanish economy’s liabilities against the rest
of the world increased in 2001 by an amount which,
in terms of GDP, was less than in the two preceding
years. The rising trend marking this variable in the
second half of the nineties was thus interrupted.
Among the reasons (in addition to those previously
indicated) for these flows from abroad easing off is a
phenomenon specific to the Spanish economy: the
significant decline in the volume of external financing
received by resident credit institutions, brought about
by the Treasury’s liquidity tenders. These appear to
Source: Banco de España.   
(a)   Financial resources that cover the gap between permanent 
real and financial investment and gross saving.   
(b)   Includes capital transfers.   
(c)   Includes, in addition to GKF, stockbuilding.   
(d)   Calculated incorporating foreign equities.   
(e)   Not including unpaid accrued interest, which is included under 
"Other".
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have provided resident financial institutions with re-
sources they would previously raise abroad. As a re-
sult, this sector’s liabilities against the rest of the
world increased by 2.8% of GDP, compared with an
average figure over the past five years of 5% of GDP.
V.2. SPANISH FINANCIAL MARKETS
As in most developed economies, Spanish finan-
cial markets in 2001 were marked by an intense
shift in activity on both the primary and the second-
ary markets from equities to fixed-income. Against
a backdrop of heightened uncertainty over future
economic developments and corporate earnings,
and given the progressive slide in listed share prices,
investors were not prepared to bear additional
risks. As a result, the cost of financing for corpora-
tions through capital increases became greater. Set
against this, the fixed-income markets met a greater
proportion of Spanish financial and non-financial
corporations’ borrowing requirements. However,
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Net financial transactions 1.2    1.6    0.5    -1.1    -2.5    -1.9    
Financial transactions (assets) 6.5    9.6    12.3    14.8    24.5    10.9    
Gold and SDRs 0.0    0.0    0.0    -0.2    0.0    0.0    
Cash and deposits 1.3    1.3    3.2    1.7    2.8    -2.6    
Credit system 0.0    -1.5    0.0    3.7    2.5    -2.8    
Other resident sectors 1.3    2.7    3.2    -2.0    0.4    0.1    
Securities other than shares 3.3    3.5    3.4    2.8    3.8    7.1    
Credit system 2.8    1.9    -1.4    -0.9    -0.3    2.0    
Other resident sectors 0.5    1.6    4.7    3.7    4.1    5.1    
Shares and other equity 1.0    2.9    4.3    9.8    15.1    3.7    
Credit system 0.0    0.5    0.4    0.7    1.7    -0.1    
Other resident sectors 1.0    2.4    3.9    9.0    13.4    3.8    
Of which:
Non-financial corporations 0.9    1.7    2.2    6.5    10.9    3.7    
Loans 0.9    1.9    1.4    0.7    2.7    2.7    
Credit system 0.0    0.8    0.2    -0.2    0.5    0.8    
Other resident sectors 0.9    1.1    1.2    0.9    2.2    1.9    
Financial transactions (liabilities) 5.3    8.0    11.8    15.9    27.0    12.7    
Deposits 3.4    4.4    5.9    4.1    6.7    2.8    
Of which:
Credit system 3.4    4.4    5.9    4.1    6.8    2.8    
Securities other than shares 0.5    2.2    1.0    5.4    7.0    3.1    
Credit system 0.1    0.2    0.2    0.9    0.8    0.6    
General government 0.4    2.1    1.0    4.3    5.7    1.6    
Other resident sectors 0.0    0.0    -0.2    0.2    0.5    0.9    
Shares and other equity 1.0    1.0    2.9    3.9    9.1    3.5    
Credit system 0.1    -0.2    0.1    0.3    1.7    0.5    
Other resident sectors 0.9    1.2    2.8    3.6    7.4    3.0    
Loans 1.0    1.2    2.2    3.8    4.5    4.4    
General government 0.0    -0.1    0.1    0.1    0.1    0.1    
Other resident sectors 1.0    1.2    2.1    3.7    4.4    4.3    
Other, net (a)
-0.6    -0.8    -0.2    -1.4    -0.3    -1.1    
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Includes the asset item which covers insurance technical reserves.
Financial transactions of the nation
TABLE V.4
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BOX V.2
Financing and investment of non-financial corporations
During the last expansionary phase, private pro-
ductive investment in Spain increased at a rate which,
on average, was lower than that of the previous cycli-
cal upturn. By contrast, foreign direct investment by
non-financial corporations grew sharply, far outpacing
its historical pattern up to the first half of the nineties.
Thus, in the recent period, a substantial portion of the
sector’s permanent investment has taken the form of
investment abroad (see Chart A).
The rapid growth of investment in the second half
of the nineties gave rise to a significant increase in cor-
porations’ financial requirements. Although funds gen-
erated within businesses held over these years at a
higher level than those of the period 1988-91 (see ad-
joining table), they were insufficient to finance the rap-
id increase in gross capital formation and in financial
investment abroad. Consequently, the sector had to
resort increasingly to external contributions from fi-
nancial markets and intermediaries (see Chart A). The greater resort to external financing in the recent period has
been further fuelled by the reduction in the real cost of borrowed funds (interest-bearing debt), which gave rise to
a substantial decline in corporations’ financial expenses as from 1993 (see Chart B). However, the structure of cor-
porations’ external borrowings has not changed significantly. Bank credit extended by resident institutions contin-
ues to play a predominant role and foreign loans are of increasing importance, while the issuance of fixed-income
securities remains residual.
A significant rise in the level of debt may, at least potentially, influence corporate investment decisions. Firstly, it
may bear on the cost of financing for corporations, since it raises the insolvency risk premium, thereby affecting the
cost of (or indeed the possibility of resorting to funds for) undertaking new investment plans. Likewise, it may influence
the speed of recovery of gross capital formation at a time when the cycle is turning, insofar as it may lead investment
projects to be postponed so as to avoid further growth in debt and further deterioration of the net worth situation.
Moreover, greater dependence on external borrowings generally places corporations in a more vulnerable position,
making them more susceptible to investors’ (whether debtors or shareholders) loss of confidence.
In sum, a higher proportion of external financing requires of non-financial corporations greater efficiency in
business management and the adoption of strategies that contribute to holding up the confidence of intermediaries
and investors. In this respect, there has in the recent period been a significant influx of stable funds via the issuance
of shares and other equity, which has increased corporations’ capital and has thus contributed to bolstering their
balance sheet, offsetting in part the effects derived from the greater level of debt. Hence, although in terms of GDP
the growth of share issues has been lower than that of external financing, the ratio of the latter to the former (i.e.
the leverage ratio) has declined moderately.
% of GDP
Average
1988-1991
Average
1992-1996
Average
1997-2001
1. Resources 19.6  16.0  24.9  
Internal resources
(Gross saving) 11.9  12.3  12.3  
Other resources 7.7  3.7  12.5  
Borrowed funds 7.1  1.7  8.1  
Credit from resident
credit institutions 5.4  1.3  5.7  
Foreign loans 0.8  0.8  2.4  
Fixed-income securities 0.9  -0.4  0.0  
Shares 1.4  1.5  4.2  
Other liabilities -0.8  0.5  0.3  
Trade credit -1.3  -0.2  0.2  
Other 0.6  0.8  0.0  
2. Other financial assets 3.6  1.6  4.7  
3. Net resources 16.0  14.5  20.2  
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the total volume of funds routed through the Span-
ish markets declined once again in 2001, while the
maintenance of high – though likewise declining – is-
sues by Spanish corporations’ subsidiaries abroad
continues to highlight the challenges Spanish mar-
kets face in a setting of growing internationalisation
and heightening competition.
V.2.1. The primary markets
Activity on the Spanish primary markets in 2001
differed greatly from 2000. Compared with a net
equity issue of €32.5 billion in 2000, last year saw
only €4.9 billion issued (see Table V.5). Among the
causes contributing to this were the impact of ad-
versely trending prices, greater economic uncer-
tainty generally and the decline in the volume of ac-
quisitions of non-resident companies by Spanish
firms, these operations tending in many cases to be
financed via capital increases.
The smaller volume of financing from the equity
markets was partly offset by an increase in the issu-
ance of debt securities, albeit without reaching the
levels recorded in 1999. Nonetheless, the behav-
iour of the various sectors in terms of issuance ac-
tivity differed greatly.
As discussed in Section V.1, the general govern-
ment sector saw the culmination of the fiscal con-
solidation process, enabling it to reduce its net is-
sues on securities markets. In 2001, these account-
ed for less than 20% of total resident net fixed-in-
come issues, although they still account for 74% of
the total outstanding balance.
In the private sector, by contrast, corporations
with a high credit rating took advantage of the low
interest rate levels to significantly increase their fi-
nancing on the primary fixed-income markets, espe-
cially via the issuance of long-dated securities. Thus,
43% of total net issues and 60% of long-term securi-
ties took place in the final quarter of the year, when
interest rates had perhaps reached their lowest lev-
els in the current cycle. However, these issues
were, in the main, by financial institutions, since the
net issue of long-term debt by non-financial corpo-
rations was negative, amounting to only €1.3 billion
in the case of short-term debt.
Large corporations continued to issue a high vol-
ume of securities on international markets via their
-2
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subsidiaries abroad, reflecting perhaps the greater dif-
ficulties or relative costs entailed by issues on the
Spanish market. But this affected only seven issuers,
and the remaining Spanish non-financial corporations
appear to continue to depend almost exclusively on
intermediated financing. Among financial institutions,
savings banks, which were more expansionary than
banks in terms of granting credit, were particularly ac-
tive in issuing long-term fixed-income securities and in
the securitisation of assets, principally mortgage-
backed instruments. The net issue of securitised
bonds and notes in 2001 was almost double that at-
tained in the two previous years. As a result, these
securities channel funds equivalent to 4% of the total
credit granted by Spanish institutions and 24% of the
total outstanding balance of private fixed-income se-
curities. Securitisation is thus contributing tellingly to
the growth of private fixed-income markets in Spain,
whose level of development is, however, still limited.
V.2.2. Secondary market activity
Activity on the secondary markets in 2001 (see
Table V.6) was influenced by the same factors that
affected the primary markets. The volume of share
trades on the Spanish stock markets fell by 9.7%,
while there was strong growth in the trading of
public debt (18% in the Book-Entry System and 42%
on the stock markets) and of private fixed-income
securities (42% on the AIAF market).
The fall in share trades was in line with that seen
on other international markets, but in contrast to
the marked growth the previous year (69%). In ad-
dition to the factors discussed previously, this dif-
ference is due to the strong correction in technolo-
gy stock prices in the first half of 2000. In this re-
spect, the Spanish Ibex Nuevo Mercado (New Mar-
ket), on which companies associated with the new
technology industries are quoted, underwent a 56%
decline in turnover, which alone accounts for two-
thirds of the total decline. Conversely, trading in
the Latibex segment grew by 43%, although this was
merely a residual part of the market (less than
0.02% of total trading, despite the increase in the
number of quoted companies and in capitalisation).
During 2002 Q1 the same pattern as the previous
year has prevailed, with trading on the Spanish
stock markets falling off by 3.6%.
1998 1999 2000 2001
Net issuance by residents (a) 27,966      58,154      47,505       33,393      
Fixed income 20,841      48,839      14,965       28,537      
State 12,364      13,583      10,688       3,856      
Territorial government 1,387      1,662      1,166       759      
Credit institutions 3,850      24,810      -1,774       12,686      
Other financial firms 3,211      5,280      5,689       9,986      
Non-financial corporations (b) 29      3,504      -804       1,250      
Equities 7,125      9,315      32,540       4,856      
Credit institutions 4,034      812      9,979       2,223      
Other financial firms -46      291      735       323      
Non-financial corporations 3,137      8,212      21,826       2,310      
Public offerings 11,240      5,042      3,074       3,085      
Privatisations 10,857      772      0       696      
Other 383      4,270      3,074       2,389      
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
Net issuance by foreign subsidiaries 13,089      21,221      32,845       23,234      
Financial institutions 12,235      11,734      21,695       11,886      
Non-financial corporations 854      9,487      11,150       11,348      
   Sources: CNMV and Banco de España.
   (a)   Includes issuance by residents, in both domestic and foreign currency.
   (b)   Short-term issuance is commercial paper registered with the CNMV.
Issuance and public offerings of marketable securities
TABLE V.5
 € m
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As mentioned, turnover on the Spanish book-
entry debt market grew significantly in 2001. Unlike
the previous year, the increase was in all operations
and not only in debt repos. One of the factors that
may have been influential in this increase in trading
(in addition to the shift by investors from equities
to fixed-income instruments) has been the start-up
of Spanish Treasury liquidity tenders, as financial in-
stitutions wishing to have access to this liquidity
must ensure the return thereof by means of repos
on public debt securities. In any event, the opening
months of 2002 have seen a fall (in year-on-year
terms) in the trading of these instruments.
As regards the AIAF private fixed-income mar-
ket, turnover reached a new high, with an increase
of 42% on the previous year. Growth was even
greater in 2001 Q4 (102%) and this has continued
into the first quarter of the current year (149%), es-
sentially due to the growth of commercial paper
trades.
The Spanish derivatives markets remained those
most adversely affected by international competi-
tion. Overall, the turnover on MEFF fell by 28% in
relation to the previous year, with the trading of in-
terest rate contracts virtually negligible. Owing to
their recent emergence, individual share options are
the only instruments to have posted positive year-
on-year growth rates over the year as a whole.
The ongoing internationalisation and integration
of domestic financial markets continued in 2001.
The management companies of the Spanish mar-
kets continued to develop new links with interna-
tional markets, while integration of the domestic
markets deepened. In this connection, the company
“Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, Sociedad Holding de
Mercados y Sistemas Financieros SA” was incorpo-
rated, combining all the existing quotation, trading,
clearing and settlement systems in Spain. The in-
ception and structure of this company are ex-
plained in Box V.3.
1998 1999 2000 2001
Public-debt book-entry market (a) 13,870,974  13,109,675  13,788,917  16,237,439  
Spot (b) 2,242,008  1,817,465  1,585,460  2,041,091  
Repo 11,604,279  11,254,309  12,186,364  14,173,002  
Forward (b) 24,687  37,901  17,093  23,346  
AIAF fixed-income market (b) 43,120  86,269  99,826  141,509  
Commercial paper 7,935  25,284  46,425  97,801  
Ordinary and asset-backed bonds and mortgage certificates 28,761  58,572  52,189  41,488  
Matador bonds 6,424  2,413  1,212  2,220  
Stock exchange: fixed-income (b) 53,148  44,718  39,692  56,049  
State debt 603  160  73  50  
Territorial government debt 51,791  42,858  38,723  55,105  
Other 754  1,700  896  894  
Stock exchange: equities 261,276  291,975  492,980  445,379  
MEFF derivatives markets (c) 2,668,336  966,975  678,406  499,951  
Fixed-income 2,111,985  378,065  109,785  29,050  
Short-term 1,125,442  20,262  335  0  
Medium and long-term 986,543  357,803  109,450  29,050  
Equities 556,351  588,910  568,621  470,901  
Ibex 35  549,329  574,109  536,416  435,384  
Stock options 7,022  14,801  32,205  35,517  
 Turnover on secondary and derivatives markets
TABLE V.6
 €  m 
   Sources: AIAF, MEFF, Spanish stock exchanges, CNMV, Federation of European Securities Exchanges and Banco de España.
   (a)   Only includes transactions with State securities.
   (b)   Nominal turnover.
   (c)   Turnover is expressed in monetary units and has been obtained by multiplying the number of contracts traded by their size.
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As regards the role of non-resident investors,
these continued divesting, in net terms, from the
Spanish stock markets for an amount somewhat
higher than that of the previous year. Nonetheless,
in terms of activity they continued to account for
somewhat more than half (54%) of the total traded
volumes. On the book-entry government debt mar-
ket, the outright portfolio of non-resident investors
grew once more in 2001, rising from 36% of the to-
tal outstanding balance at end-2000 to 40% twelve
months later.
V.2.3. Secondary market prices
Prices on the Spanish stock markets and on the
main international markets held on a declining trend
practically throughout 2001 (see Chart V.6). Adding
to the adverse consequences of the end of the in-
vestment euphoria for new technology stocks was
the worsening during the year of the outlook for
the world economy, a deterioration exacerbated by
the September 11 attacks on United States. The
Ibex 35 reached its low on September 21, with a
cumulative decline of 28.7% since the end of 2000,
and the volatility implicit in options on this index in-
creased to levels similar to those observed during
the autumn 1998 crisis (see Chart V.6). Subsequent-
ly, however, quoted share prices rallied, thanks to
an easing of international political uncertainty and
to the emergence of the first signs of a possible re-
covery in the world economy during 2002. In the fi-
nal months of 2001 and in the opening months of
the current year, however, bad news once more
came to bear in relation to the earnings of many
companies, the bankruptcy of certain corporations
(some of which particularly prominent), political un-
certainty in the Middle East and, in the case of
Spain, the impact of the Argentine crisis on the re-
sults of certain national corporations.
Over the year as a whole, and for the second
year running, both the Ibex 35 and the Madrid
Stock Exchange General Index posted declines of
7.8% and 6.4%, respectively. Nonetheless, these falls
were less than a year earlier and than those on oth-
Stock price indices
CHART V.6
   Sources: Madrid Stock Exchange, Bloomberg and Banco de España.
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er international markets such as the US S&P 500
(down 13%) or the European broad Dow-Jones
Euro Stoxx (which fell by 19.7%). The better per-
formance of Spanish share prices, which partly off-
sets the adverse result the previous year, is no
doubt due to the lesser incidence in Spain of some
of the factors that have borne on the downtrend in
international stock markets. Thus, the economic
slowdown has been milder in Spain’s case than in
the euro area and the United States, and the decline
in corporate earnings has also been more moderate
in Spain. As to the impact of the Argentine crisis, al-
though it has adversely affected certain large Span-
ish concerns with interests in the area, it has to
date been limited, in line with the relative weight of
business in Argentina in the overall activity of these
companies.
Sector by sector, the fall in the Madrid Stock Ex-
change General Index reflects the poor performance
of the two main groups, namely banking and commu-
nications, which accounted for 49.6% of total market
capitalisation at end-2000 and which posted falls of
10.3% and 13.2%, respectively, in 2001. The other
sectors improved in relation to 2000, particularly so
in the case of investment (+41.5%), construction
(+25.5%) and consumption (+16%). The Ibex Nuevo
Mercado index declined by 20%.
On the Spanish public debt market, yields trended
– as has been habitual in recent years – closely in line
with those of other European markets, such as Ger-
many’s (see Chart V.7). In turn, the German market
also ran closely in parallel in 2001 to the US market.
Nonetheless, as previously indicated, Moody’s up-
grading of Spain’s credit rating provided for a virtually
immediate reduction of around 10 basis points in the
Spanish/German sovereign debt spread.
In step with changes in the ECB’s monetary poli-
cy, short-term interest rates fell markedly during
the year (more significantly so as from September
11), while long-term interest rates did so to a much
lesser extent. Consequently, the slope of the yield
curve (see Chart V.7) increased significantly during
the year. In the closing months of 2001 and the ear-
ly months of 2002, the slope increased even more
further to the increase in long-term interest rates
arising from the improved expectations about the
pick-up in global activity.
The reduction in public debt interest rates dur-
ing 2001 also fed through to the market for private
Government debt yields (a)
CHART V.7
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Monthly averages.
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debt, where risk premia (see Chart V.8) held at
around their end-2000 levels (at around 20 basis
points for the three-month yield and around 70 ba-
sis points for the 10-year yield), albeit with sizeable
fluctuations over the course of the year. As stated,
these credit spreads were conducive, against a
background of low interest rates, to the relative re-
sort by corporations to fixed-income securities is-
sues.
V.3. SPANISH FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES
The climate of greater uncertainty and the per-
formance of securities markets also had a significant
impact on the activity of Spanish financial intermedi-
aries in 2001. Their international activity, which had
grown substantially in previous years, was adversely
affected; their financial flows (on the assets and lia-
bilities sides alike) with non-residents declined in
terms of GDP by half in relation to 2000. In any
event, exchanges were still above pre-1998 levels,
while the gross positions of the various intermedi-
aries vis-à-vis the rest of the world remain high.
Fewer financial flows with the rest of the world
were offset by continuing high activity in the do-
mestic market. Despite the economic slowdown,
households and non-financial corporations contin-
ued to demand a high volume of financing, which
was met thanks to the growth of the credit granted
by deposit money institutions. Furthermore, the
moderate pick-up in household financial saving (dis-
cussed in section V.1) had a favourable bearing on
the activity of resident institutional investors.
V.3.1. Deposit money institutions
The international expansion by certain major
Spanish deposit money institutions in recent years
has raised their exposure to economic events un-
folding in the rest of the world, in general, and in
certain regions in particular. In this respect, the
year 2001 posed a substantial problem for the Span-
ish banking system owing to the slowdown in the
world economy and to the difficulties undergone by
certain Latin American countries and, most espe-
cially, by Argentina. However, Spanish institutions
appear to be satisfactorily overcoming this unfa-
vourable turn to international economic circum-
stances. Contributing to this has been both the lim-
ited participation by Spanish banks in the invest-
ment banking business and the relative resilience of
the domestic market. Moreover, the effects of the
problems in certain Latin American economies have
been at least partly offset by the favourable results
obtained in other countries. In any case, heightened
global uncertainty prompted a slowdown in the in-
ternational expansion of Spanish banks’ business.
The total assets of the consolidated groups of Span-
ish deposit money institutions grew by only 7.3%,
due precisely to the decline in business abroad (–
9%), which nonetheless accounted for somewhat
more than one-fifth of total assets and of earnings
before tax at the end of the year.
As regards the business of individual resident
deposit money institutions, average assets grew by
11.2%, in line with the pattern of recent years. That
said, in relation to off-balance sheet activity, particu-
lar mention should be made of the reduction in fees
for services relating to the securities markets, con-
sultancy and marketing of financial products (al-
though in this latter case the fall in fees for the
commercialisation of investment funds was partly
offset by growth in fees linked to the commerciali-
sation of instruments such as insurance and pension
funds). The expansionary trend of business in Spain
was consistent with a sharper fall in the number of
bank agencies of overall deposit money institutions
than in 2000. This was the outcome of the downsiz-
ing that has followed major bank mergers, and of
Yield differential between private
 and public debt (a)
CHART V.8
   Sources: Reuters, AIAF and Banco de España.
   (a)   Monthly averages.
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BOX V.3
The integration of Spanish securities markets
In recent years European financial markets in general, and Spanish markets in particular, have been subject to
far-reaching changes that have contributed to modifying their structures and operations and giving greater promi-
nence to the role of negotiable securities in international portfolios and financial flows. The source of these changes
must be sought in the combination of financial disintermediation, globalisation of financial exchanges, institutionalisa-
tion of saving and improved communication and information disclosure systems, along with the spur that the proc-
ess leading to economic and monetary union has entailed.
In Spain, as in other countries, these changes are crystallising in an institutional process of securities market
integration. The process has been lengthy and laborious, owing to the initial fragmentation of the securities trading
and settlement systems in our country. As regards listing and trading, the background to the process may be taken
back first to April 1998, with the signing of the protocol agreement for the development of the fixed-income mar-
kets by the heads of the four stock market management companies, the SCLV (Securities Clearing and Settlement
Service) and the CNMV (National Securities Market Board). In June 1999, the securities agency Infomedas created
SENAF as an electronic public debt trading system and, later, in October 2000, the AIAF (Spanish Securities Deal-
Source: Banco de España.   
(a)   Stock market fixed-income traded under the open outcry system is currently settled at stock market management companies.   
(b)   Equities, fixed-income and warrants are traded in the SIBE.   
(c)   "Blind" trading system for book-entry government debt.   
(d)   Mercado de futuros y opciones sobre cítricos S.A. (Citrus fruit futures and options market company).   
(e)  IBERCLEAR is the commercial name of the company "Promotora para la gestión de los sistemas españoles de liquidación SA", which 
at present does not yet have legal authorisation for the settlement of securities.
SCLV CADE
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BOX V.3
The integration of Spanish securities markets (cont’d)
ers’ Association) took a 60.1% stake in SENAF, bringing about the first integration of fixed-income trading systems
into a single corporate platform (1).
Subsequently, in July 2001, the fixed-income and financial derivatives markets were integrated via the creation
of the company “MEFF-AIAF-SENAF Holding de Mercados Financieros, SA”, which consolidated the SENAF spot
trading platform, the MEFF derivatives trading platform, the AIAF-ECN Internet-based trading platform and the
MEFF system for the management of the derivatives CCP (Clearing House).
With respect to clearing and settlement, the SCLV and the Banco de España CADE (Central de Anotaciones
de Deuda Española, the Public Debt Book-Entry System) merged into a single entity called “Promotora de la socie-
dad de gestión de los sistemas españoles de liquidación, SA”, which is better known under its commercial name
IBERCLEAR. This company, until it is legally incorporated as an entity that can officially perform the bookkeeping
function (2), aims to unify public and private fixed-income and SCLV-administered equities and CADE general gov-
ernment bonds settlement systems through the use of the CADE platform and technical procedures. In line with
this project, all securities admitted to listing on the AIAF market joined the CADE technical platform in February
2002. That concluded the first step of the project to integrate securities registration, clearing and settlements sys-
tems in Spain. The fixed-income securities (mainly regional government debt) admitted to listing on the Spanish
stock markets continue to be traded and settled under the clearing and settlement systems of the stock market
management companies.
Finally, in February 2002 the trading platforms and the clearing and settlement systems existing in Spain were
integrated by means of the incorporation of “Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, Sociedad Holding de Mercados y Siste-
mas Financieros, S.A.”. This new company directly or indirectly owns the shares and participations of the companies
that manage the fixed-income secondary markets, the equities and derivatives markets (including the Valencia com-
modities market), and the securities registration, clearing and settlement systems.
As the accompanying figure shows, the final result is the vertical integration of Spanish financial markets. This
integration is at an ownership level initially, and will be at the operational level once technical conditions are harmo-
nised. The grouping of the different stages of the financial services production process (i.e. from listing and trading
through to clearing and settlement) will provide for a significant cut in costs and a greater rationalisation of servic-
es, while being conducive to an improved return on invested own funds. In sum, all these developments should lead
to the greater efficiency of Spanish markets and to an improvement in their competitive position on the interna-
tional stage.
(1) Later, in February 2001, this trading platform was re-named SENAF.SON as an organised trading system to which members of other
countries’ markets are given access.
(2) Current legislation entrusts accounting and private fixed-income and equity securities clearing and settlement responsibility to SCLV.
the gradual petering out of the geographical expan-
sion strategy pursued by savings banks, credit co-
operatives and certain medium-sized banks.
The slowdown in the Spanish economy last year
was accompanied by a significant decline in interest
rates, which fed through to bank rates. The synthet-
ic lending rate of banks and savings banks declined
by 1.5 percentage points (p.p.) in 2001, stabilising at
around 4.9% in the opening months of 2002. This
reduction was similar to that in the three-month in-
terbank interest rate (1.6 p.p.). The synthetic de-
posit rate fell by 0.8 p.p., almost half the related re-
duction in the lending rate. As a result, the margin
on banks’ new business narrowed. This lower re-
duction in the deposit interest rate was partly due
to the heightened competition to raise deposits,
driven by the aggressive strategies of those banks
operating mainly through the Internet.
Analysis of the balance sheets of deposit money
institutions reveals that, on the asset side, the
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growth of business was routed, as in prior years, in
the expansion of credit to the private non-financial
sector (see Table V.7). Although there was a slow-
down in 2001 in step with the greater relative
weakness of activity, lending to households and
non-financial corporations grew at rates that were
still high (see Chart V.9). Including both credit in-
vestment in the true sense of the term and financing
via the acquisition of fixed-income securities, total
credit extended by Spanish deposit money institu-
tions to the resident private sector commenced
2001 growing at a year-on-year rate of 17.8%. This
rate progressively fell during the year to 11.5% in
December. In the early months of 2002, however,
the growth rate does not appear to have fallen fur-
ther, meaning the growth in credit has been clearly
higher than that in corporate and household in-
come, with the subsequent additional increase in
their rates of indebtedness.
Component by component, the slowdown was
more evident in the case of credit extended by
banks under the unsecured-loan category. Mortgage
loans, however, continued to grow in late 2001 at a
year-on-year rate of 18.6%, basically as a conse-
quence of the rise in credit to households for house
purchases (16.5% in December 2001). The strong
increase in mortgage loans means their weight in
total credit to the resident private sector has risen
to 50% (62% at savings banks). Credit granted at
floating rates expanded more than that extended at
fixed rates, accounting for 65% of the total (73% at
savings banks). Notably, too, in the second half of
the year credit to households slowed more than
that to non-financial corporations.
The factors behind credit outgrowing activity
are undoubtedly complex. On the demand side,
the behaviour of households and corporations is
probably underpinned by favourable expectations
about future developments in the Spanish econo-
my and, therefore, about income. On the supply
side, growing competition between banks and the
current low levels of loan defaults (lower than in
the previous slowdown – see Chart V.9) may
also be playing a relevant role. It should be re-
membered, however, that late loan payments
usually emerge with a lag in relation to the cycli-
cal slowdown. Lastly, it should also be mentioned
that the rise in real estate wealth, resulting from
the strong increase in house prices (see Box
V.1), has contributed to boosting both the de-
mand for and supply of credit.
On the liabilities side, the growth of net own
funds and of customer deposits has allowed a more
stable financing of the credit extended (see Chart
V.10). Thus, the sum of debt securities and non-res-
ident accounts payable (in which funds raised via se-
curities issued by subsidiaries abroad are also in-
cluded) has grown significantly, but more moderate-
ly than last year. Meanwhile, the net resort to the
interbank market has been slightly negative, allow-
ing for something of a reduction in the net debit
position of Spanish banks (from 4.7% to 3.8% of to-
tal assets, in annual average terms).
Notable under customer deposits is the growth
of funds raised from general government (68%, sig-
nifying an increase of €13.4 billion), due essentially
to the effects of the Treasury liquidity tenders. As
indicated, it was in fact the obtaining of financing
through this channel which allowed institutions to
reduce their resort to financing on the international
interbank markets.
With regard to resident private-sector deposits,
the increase in previous years in deposits with an
agreed maturity was reversed considerably in 2001
owing to the fall in interest rates and to competi-
tion from investment funds. The latter were fa-
voured by the June 2000 tax reform, in which the
minimum holding period for capital gains to be
taxed at a flat rate of 18% was cut from two years
to one. However, the fall in interest rates boosted
the growth of sight and savings deposits (to an an-
nual rate of 14.3%), adding to which was the impact
of the lower demand for cash associated with the
proximity of the changeover from peseta- to euro-
denominated notes and coins. Overall, total resi-
dent private-sector deposits increased by 12.1%
during 2001, a rate similar to that of the previous
year. Significantly, the financial institutions operating
principally through the Internet continued to in-
crease their market share (1.4% in December 2001)
and contributed 7% to the total growth of deposits
during the year (5.1% in 2000).
Turning to the analysis of the profit and loss ac-
count for the sector, the earnings before tax of
Spanish deposit money institutions as a whole post-
ed a very modest increase in 2001 (2.7% at the con-
solidated level and –1.2% in the case of individual
resident deposit money institutions), after having
grown the previous year. But this performance is
the result, above all, of the high provisioning institu-
tions had to make (see Table V.7). This is partly in
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Source: Banco de España.   
(a)   Banks, savings banks, and credit co-operatives. Total turnover figures, including banks' foreign branches but not subsidiaries, refer to all the ins-
titutions existing in each period.   
(b)   Cash, central banks (except BE repos) and ECB.   
(c)   Credit and savings institutions (forward accounts, repos and securities lending) and repo purchases from the BE.   
(d)   Premises and equipment, sundry accounts and other assets with credit and savings institutions.   
(e)   Credit and savings institutions (forward accounts, repos and creditors on short sales).   
(f)    Sundry accounts and other liabilities with credit and savings institutions.
2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001
ASSETS:
Cash and central banks (b) 1.5    1.4    1.4    1.3    1.7    1.5    
Interbank market assets (c) 17.3    16.2    20.7    19.5    12.7    11.7    
Lending 52.7    53.4    48.2    47.9    58.8    60.7    
General government 2.8    2.5    2.7    2.4    3.0    2.7    
Other resident sectors 46.5    47.5    40.6    40.7    54.6    56.4    
Non-residents 3.4    3.4    4.9    4.8    1.2    1.5    
Securities portfolio 20.5    21.1    20.9    22.5    20.5    19.7    
Of which:
Government debt 8.8    8.3    7.9    7.7    10.4    9.3    
Equities 6.0    6.8    6.6    8.0    5.4    5.3    
Other assets (d) 7.9    8.0    8.8    8.7    6.1    6.4    
LIABILITIES:
Banco de España 1.5    1.2    1.7    1.3    1.2    1.2    
Interbank market liabilities (e) 22.2    19.9    29.9    26.8    11.2    10.5    
Customer funds 58.8    60.0    49.1    50.7    72.6    72.7    
Asset repo sales to customers 7.6    7.1    6.8    6.6    9.2    8.3    
Creditors: general government 1.9    2.9    1.8    3.1    2.0    2.5    
Creditors: other resident sectors 38.1    38.2    26.4    26.2    55.0    53.6    
Creditors: non-residents 8.2    8.7    11.3    11.7    3.6    4.6    
Debt securities 3.0    3.2    2.8    3.0    3.6    3.7    
Own funds, special reserves
and subordinated financing 11.3    12.8    11.5    13.9    10.8    11.1    
Of which:
Subordinated financing 2.7    2.7    3.2    3.2    2.1    2.1    
Other liabilities (f) 6.3    6.3    7.8    7.8    4.2    4.2    
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT:
(+) Interest income 5.24  5.58  5.32  5.73  5.10  5.33  
Of which:
Dividends 0.37  0.62  0.41  0.88  0.33  0.28  
(-) Interest expenses 3.07  3.14  3.51  3.47  2.44  2.70  
Net interest income 2.17  2.44  1.81  2.26  2.65  2.63  
(+) Commissions 0.71  0.66  0.77  0.70  0.63  0.60  
(+) Profits on financial operations 0.11  0.06  0.15  0.06  0.06  0.06  
Gross income 2.99  3.16  2.72  3.02  3.34  3.29  
(-) Operating expenses 1.91  1.80  1.72  1.62  2.19  2.04  
Net income 1.08  1.35  1.01  1.40  1.15  1.25  
(-) Write-downs and provisions 0.34  0.61  0.28  0.74  0.44  0.41  
(+) Other income 0.23  0.12  0.15  0.12  0.37  0.11  
Pre-tax profit 0.96  0.86  0.88  0.78  1.07  0.95  
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Pre-tax profit
(as a % of own funds) 16.0    13.6    15.5    12.5    17.2    15.7    
Average total assets (EUR bn) 1,042       1,158       628       685       378       431       
Year-on-year growth rate (%) 9.9    11.1    7.4    9.2    13.9    14.1    
Total (a) Banks Savings banks
Deposit money institutions
Structure of balance sheet and profit and loss account
TABLE V.7
%  of average total assets
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response to the application of the statistical provi-
sion throughout the year (as opposed to only half
the year in 2000), but is due above all to the provi-
sions certain institutions made to cover their expo-
sure in Argentina.
The net interest margin grew substantially, despite
the narrowing of the spread between the synthetic
lending and deposit rates for new business. This was
due to the expansion of business and to the mainte-
nance of the gap between average yields and costs.
However, in the individual accounts (shown in Table
V.7) all the commercial banking margins – including
even the net income margin – are distorted as a re-
sult of the heavy increase in 2001 in the dividends re-
ceived by a large institution, which is subsequently off-
set by greater provisions. By excluding the results of
the variable-yield portfolio and adjusting costs accord-
ingly, commercial banks’ net interest income would
have risen from 1.75% of total assets in 2000 to
1.81% in 2001, with growth in absolute terms of
11.1% rather than the figure of 36.7% that is derived
from the non-adjusted data.
The favourable performance of net interest in-
come offset the lower growth of commission for
securities market services and the decline in com-
mercial banks’ income on financial transactions.
Moreover, the increase in operating expenses
(which was moderate at banks and sharper at sav-
ings banks and credit co-operatives) was in all cases
less than that in the gross income margin. Accord-
ingly, all groups of institutions improved in terms of
efficiency, although this headway was much more
significant at banks.
V.3.2. Institutional investors
There was a significant pick-up in the net vol-
ume of funds raised by institutional investors in
Source: Banco de España.   
(a)   Real year-on-year rates.   
(b)   Liabilities affected by bankruptcy or suspension of payments 
to creditors as a percentage of total debt of Spanish non-financial 
corporations.   
(c)   Doubtful assets / credit.   
(d)   Period of credit curbs.
Credit, doubtful loans and business cycle.
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2001 (see Table V.8). Nonetheless, this was still be-
low that recorded in the period 1996-98 and did
not prevent the liabilities of pension funds, collec-
tive investment undertakings and insurance compa-
nies from continuing to lose weight in relation to
those of deposit money institutions. Moreover, in-
struments related (mainly) to long-term retirement-
provision saving continued to show a very different
trend from other collective investment instruments.
The flows intended for pension funds and life
assurance policies are, by their very nature, more
stable and are linked to structural factors related
to demographic trends and expectations about
public benefit provision systems. In 2001, net
contributions both to pension funds and to life
assurance policies consolidated the relatively
high levels reached the previous year. Boosting
this was the ongoing externalisation of compa-
nies’ pension commitments (this process is
scheduled for completion by November this
year) and the improved tax treatment of these
instruments. In terms of the stock of saving un-
der administration, both the net asset value of
pension funds and the mathematical provisions
for life assurance policies grew by 16%. Howev-
er, in the case of life assurance, a strong deceler-
ation in unit-linked insurance (where the invest-
ment component is greater than the provision el-
ement) combined with an equally significant in-
crease in guaranteed-return insurance policies.
The net asset value of mutual funds declined by
2.6% in 2001. This was less of a contraction than
the previous year and came about as a result of de-
velopments in opposing directions in securities
funds and money market funds (1). Thus, against a
background of negative returns on money market
funds and of uncertain expectations about share
prices on international stock markets, new inves-
tors showed a clear preference for funds with a less
risky profile. As a result, money market funds had
positive net subscriptions for the first time in re-
cent years. As for securities funds, there were net
Total (b) 35,467   10,642   3,178   17,040   295,088   
Pension funds
Net contributions (c) 2,692   3,026   6,454   6,738   43,829   
Life assurance
Premiums net of claims (d) 4,610   8,065   10,941   10,462   69,936   
Mutual funds
Net share purchases 28,165   -449   -14,217   -161   181,322   
FIAMM -12,268   -7,229   -10,172   9,390   43,830   
FIM 40,433   6,780   -4,046   -9,551   137,492   
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Deposit money institutions: change in accounts payable
Other resident sectors 14,968   21,282   52,424   55,174   560,503   
   
1998 1999 2000 2001Balances (a)2001
   Sources: Banco de España, CNMV, INVERCO, Dirección General de Seguros and ICEA.
   (a)   Balances to December. Net asset value in the case of funds, and mathematical provisions in the case of insurance.
   (b)   Sum of contributions, premiums and net share purchases.
   (c)   In-house estimate based on the change in the net asset value and annual yield of the funds.
   (d)   The 2001 figure is provisional (based on ICEA estimates).  
Funds raised by other financial intermediaries
TABLE V.8
EUR m
(1) The fall is less (0.7%) if collective investment undertak-
ings (close-end and open-end investment companies), foreign in-
stitutions with a commercial presence in Spain and real estate in-
vestment funds are included. This was due to the growth of SIM-
CAV (33%), whose growth in recent years (linked, owing to the
characteristics of the product, to that of private banks) continued
in 2001. At the end of the year, savings placed in these institu-
tions accounted for 9% of the total net asset value of investment
funds. By contrast, the volume of assets of foreign institutions
with a commercial presence in Spain fell back by 11% after sever-
al years of strong growth.
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redemptions in mixed and equity funds, although
net subscriptions were positive in the case of short-
and long-term fixed-income funds and guaranteed
fixed-income funds. Hence, the last three categories
of funds accounted for 44% of the total net assets
value of securities funds in December 2001.
In step with the behaviour of shareholders and
with price developments, the weight of equity in-
struments in the net asset value of securities firms
diminished (see Chart V.11) from 29% to 24.5%,
with a greater decline in shares issued by non-resi-
dents than in those quoted on domestic markets.
As to fixed-income instruments, mutual funds con-
tinued to jettison Spanish public debt and to pur-
chase euro-denominated fixed-income assets issued
by non-residents. Overall, the weight of the foreign
portfolio in total assets continued to increase
(44.5% in money market funds and 50.3% in securi-
ties funds). Despite the greater volume of issues of
private fixed-income securities on the Spanish secu-
rities markets, there was no significant increase in
the relative weight of these assets in mutual funds’
portfolios.
The breakdown of the portfolio held by pension
funds remained very stable, with the weight of equi-
ty instruments holding at 21%, and that of foreign
assets at 23%.
V.4. THE NET WORTH POSITION
OF THE PRIVATE NON-FINANCIAL
SECTOR
The financing and financial investment decisions
and the trend of financial asset prices described in
the foregoing sections entailed a fresh increase in
the relative indebtedness of the private non-finan-
cial sector during 2001. Although the rate of expan-
sion of financing to this sector moderated over the
course of the year, its growth was still clearly high-
er than that of financial wealth and income.
In the case of households, the growth of financ-
ing and financial asset price developments meant
that their net financial wealth declined by around
six percentage points of GDP. And this despite the
fact (as discussed in the previous section) that stock
market prices rallied in the final quarter of the year
after the September 11 effects (see Chart V.12).
Nonetheless, the total net worth of this sector was
favoured, as in previous years, by the marked in-
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   Sources: CNMV, Banco de España and INVERCO.
   (a)   Includes repos.
   (b)   Includes repos and money market assets.
   (c)   Cumulative return over last 12 months.
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BOX V.4
Recent developments in the household financial burden
Indebtedness entails a financial burden in the form
of regular interest and principal payments which de-
pend on three components: the outstanding balance of
the debt, the interest rate applied and the period over
which the debt is to be repaid. In the case of Spanish
households, each of these factors has trended differ-
ently in recent years.
Household debt has expanded strongly and, at
the end of 2001, its value was close to 77% of gross
disposable income (GDI). The growth in household lia-
bilities was relatively sharper for loans intended for
house purchases. This form of credit entails a relative-
ly more moderate financial burden than other uses
such as, for example, consumption, as it is generally
secured by a real asset which allows the interest rate
applied to be lower and the loan repayment term to
be longer. Moreover, the environment of greater
nominal stability characterising the Spanish economy,
owing to EMU membership, has made for a significant
contraction in interest rates of over 50% in the past
10 years. Further, lower inflation levels and the subse-
quent reduction in interest rate risk have allowed re-
payment terms to be lengthened, further reducing the
regular payments associated with debt. The improve-
ments in credit institutions’ lending portfolio risk man-
agement techniques and the heightened competition
among such institutions may also have contributed to
the lowering of loan interest rates and to longer re-
payment terms.
Bearing in mind the breakdown of household debt
by credit use (housing, consumption and other uses)
and by original repayment maturity, and considering a
relevant interest rate for each of these categories, it is
possible to estimate the average financial burden
borne by Spanish households as a whole. According to
this estimate, the greater debt taken on by Spanish
households has meant a moderate increase in the average financial burden from 11% of GDI in 1994 to 13.3% in
2001 (see Chart A). This growth has been concentrated in the last three years, when the expansion of debt was
relatively intense and the downward trend of interest rates had run its course, following Spanish EMU membership.
As might be expected, regular debt repayment instalments have grown sustainedly since 1994, rising to 8.7% of GDI
in 2001. However, and despite greater debt, interest payments have fallen from 5.7% of GDI in 1994 to 4.6% in
2001, after having bottomed out in mid-1999. In comparison with other countries (1) over the 1998-2001 period,
the household financial burden in Spain – as in the Netherlands and Portugal – showed a more pronounced in-
crease than in the other euro area countries (see Chart B). In Spain’s case, unlike the Netherlands or Portugal, this
behaviour involves convergence towards the average euro area levels.
According to this estimate, therefore, the strong increase in Spanish household debt has not to date involved a
similar increase in the attendant average financial burden for the sector as a whole, although it has naturally raised
the sensitivity of household financial expenditure to the future course of interest rates. It should be stressed that,
most probably, the distribution of the financial burden among the different Spanish household income or job-related
segments will be far from homogenous.
(1) These estimates should be interpreted with all due caution. In estimating the household financial burden in euro area countries, regard is
had solely to credit from monetary financial institutions, and the assumptions on repayment maturities are similar for all the countries. In the United
States, this indicator is compiled by the Federal Reserve on the basis of information on individual mortgage and personal loans.
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crease in the price of its main component, namely
housing, which exceeded 15% in 2001.
Likewise, household holdings of financial assets
shifted towards a lower-risk profile. Thus, at the
end of 2001, cash, deposits and shares in fixed-in-
come money-market and securities funds accounted
for 40.1% of the household financial portfolio, com-
pared with 37.8% in 2000. The weight of the value
of insurance technical reserves increased in the
portfolio, in line with the trend of recent years, ris-
ing to 13.8% of total financial assets in 2001. The
value of direct equity holdings and shares in mutual
funds other than fixed-income money market and
securities funds fell, accounting for 31% and 6.5%,
respectively, of the sector’s portfolio at the end of
2001.
As a result of the foregoing, household debt ra-
tios increased once more in 2001 (see Chart V.13).
In terms of their gross disposable income, the fact
credit outgrew income prompted a rise in the ratio
between both variables of close to four percentage
points to almost 77%, a similar level to the average
for the euro area and below that for US and UK
households. As a proportion of total assets, house-
hold debt rose from 25% to 28%, while a greater
demand for less risky instruments explains why, in
terms of the more liquid assets, the rate of indebt-
edness should have increased less (by about two
percentage points), to around 47%.
The aggregate net worth position of house-
holds, however, remains sound. Along with the
shift towards lower-risk assets, it should be not-
ed that the rise in debt has not translated into a
comparable increase in the household financial
burden. This is due to the effects derived from
the lengthening of average repayment terms and
from the low level of interest rates (see Box
V.4). Indeed, the default ratio in the sector held
in 2001 at a low level. However, the growing
weight of real estate wealth in the sector’s total
assets, and of mortgage debt in its overall liabili-
ties, means it is more exposed in relative terms
to future house price developments.
Non-financial corporations saw the value of
their net wealth decrease, thereby breaking the
trend of recent years (see Chart V.12). In partic-
ular, the growth of borrowed funds continued af-
fecting the net worth position of this sector.
During 2001, the value of its debt, measured by
the outstanding balance of bank loans and fixed-
income issues, amounted to 379% of the sector’s
gross operating surplus, against 342% in 2000
(see Chart V.13). In terms of the portfolio of
lower-risk financial assets, this ratio stood at
71.2% compared with 68.7% the previous year.
The growth in debt was greater than that for the
euro area on average. As a result, Spanish corpo-
rations continue to converge rapidly on the aver-
age level of the euro area which, in terms of
CHART V.12
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GDP, stood at around 74%(71% in Spain). For
the second year running, the greater levels of
debt took the form of an increase in the sector’s
financial charges (interest payments over the
gross operating surplus), which might ultimately
exert some influence on its future investment
plans. By type of financial instrument, and al-
though the main component of corporate debt is
credit from resident institutions (accounting for
around 65%), foreign loans have played an in-
creasingly important role in recent years. At the
end of 2001, foreign debt represented around
25% of corporations’ borrowed funds (compared
with 17% in 1994).
As with households, corporations show a
healthy net worth position overall, reinforced in re-
cent years by a significant influx of stable funds
raised through the issuance of shares and other eq-
uity. Such soundness notwithstanding, the increase
in the sector’s debt has raised its relative vulnerabil-
ity to shocks that may affect the profitability of on-
going investment projects. In particular, there has
been a notable increase in the exposure to and fa-
vourable developments in the external environ-
ment, against a background in which, in terms of
GDP, Spanish non-financial corporations’ assets vis-
à-vis the rest of the world have increased by 25
percentage points over the last three years.
CHART V.13
Debt ratios
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Includes bank credit extended by resident credit institutions, foreign loans, fixed-income securities and financing through securitisation funds. 
   (b)   Total financial asets, excluding "Other".
   (c)   Total financial assets, excluding "Other", shares and other equity, and FIM shares.
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INTRODUCTION
The annual accounts of the Banco de España
(“the Bank”), as established by Article 29.1 of its in-
ternal rules, comprise the balance sheet, the profit
and loss account and the notes on the accounts.
The accounts, pursuant to the provisions of the
same article, have been prepared in accordance
with the Bank’s internal accounting rules. These
rules follow generally accepted accounting princi-
ples, adapted to the special characteristics of the
operations and functions of a central bank. They
also comply, in all applicable aspects, with the ac-
counting criteria and valuation rules established for
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), as
required by Article 26.4 of the Statute of the ESCB,
relating to standardisation of accounting principles
and practices in the Eurosystem.
The annual accounts of the Banco de España
have been subject, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Articles 29 and 32 of its internal rules, to
audit by the Internal Audit Department and to re-
view by the Accounts Review Committee, appoint-
ed for the purpose by a resolution of the Governing
Council of the Banco de España of 22 December
2000. The accounts have also been audited by inde-
pendent external auditors, as stipulated by Article
27 of the Statute of the ESCB.
Under the provisions of Article 4.2 of Law 13/
1994 of 1 June 1994 of Autonomy of the Banco de
España, it is for the government, upon proposal by
the Minister of the Economy, to approve the bal-
ance sheet and accounts of the Bank, which will be
sent to Parliament (Cortes Generales) for informa-
tional purposes. The Governing Council of the
Bank, under the provisions of Article 21.1 (g) of the
aforementioned Law, is responsible for formulating
the Bank’s accounts.
Unless otherwise indicated, the figures refer to
millions of euro. For ease of comparability, 2000 fig-
ures are also given on the basis of the new structure
of the balance sheet, profit and loss account and ac-
counting standards applied in 2001, as described in
the relevant explanatory notes.  It should be pointed
out that the discrepancies that may, on occasions, be
observed between the breakdowns in the notes and
the figures in the balance sheet and profit and loss ac-
count arise from the rounding of the former.
This document presents the accounts for the
year 2001. Section I includes the balance sheet and
profit and loss account; Section II, the notes on the
accounts, with the valuation criteria used and ex-
planatory notes on the most important aspects of
the balance sheet and profit and loss account; and
Section III, in compliance with Article 4.2 of the
Law of Autonomy, details the contributions made
to the Deposit Insurance Funds and the loans and
transactions agreed on other than an arm’s-length
basis or which in any other way entail a loss of
profit or losses for the Bank, giving estimates of the
amount of such loss of profit or losses.
Finally, the reports of the external auditors and
of the Banco de España Accounts Review Commit-
tee on the annual accounts presented in Sections I-
III are included in Annexes 1 and 2.
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I. BALANCE SHEET AND PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
Note
number 2001 2000
ASSETS
1. Gold and gold receivables 1    5,300.90 4,931.16
2. 33,357.00 32,757.26
2.1. Receivables from the IMF 2    1,958.01 1,727.80
2.2. Balances with banks and security investments, external loans and other 3    31,398.99 31,029.46
external assets
3. 0.03 0.06
4. Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in euro 0.00 0.00
4.1. Balances with banks, security investments and loans 0.00 0.00
4.2. Claims arising from the credit facility under ERM II 0.00 0.00
5. 4    10,546.69 16,142.87
operations denominated in euro
5.1. Main refinancing operations 8,477.22 14,309.62
5.2. Longer-term refinancing operations 2,069.47 1,821.47
5.3. Fine-tuning reverse operations 0.00 0.00
5.4. Structural reverse operations 0.00 0.00
5.5. Marginal lending facility 0.00 0.00
5.6. Credits related to margin calls 0.00 11.78
6. 2.57 1.97
7. Securities of euro area residents denominated in euro 0.00 0.00
8. General government debt denominated in euro 5    10,380.90 11,006.79
9. Intra-Eurosystem claims 6    29,603.01 45,724.81
9.1. Participating interest in ECB 444.68 444.68
9.2. Claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserves 4,446.75 4,446.75
9.4. Other claims within the Eurosystem (net) 24,711.58 40,833.38
10. Items in course of settlement 7    398.84 7.45
11. Other assets 6,549.31 7,837.63
11.2. Tangible and intangible fixed assets 8    234.39 225.64
11.3. Other financial assets 9    3,572.04 3,443.84
11.4. Off-balance sheet instruments revaluation differences 10    0.00 188.18
11.5. Accruals and deferred expenditure 11    727.27 929.90
11.6. Sundry 12    2,015.61 3,050.07
TOTAL ASSETS 96,139.25 118,410.00
Other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro
Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
Lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy 
Claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
Balance sheet of the Banco de España as at 31 December 2001
(€ m)
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Note
Number 2001 2000
LIABILITIES
1. Banknotes in circulation 13    46,227.56 57,198.32
2. 14    12,273.21 8,391.21
policy operations denominated in euro
2.1. Current accounts (covering the minimum reserve system) 12,272.85 8,385.21
2.2. Deposit facility 0.00 6.00
2.3. Fixed-term deposits 0.00 0.00
2.4. Fine-tuning reverse operations 0.00 0.00
2.5. Deposits related to margin calls 0.36 0.00
3. 15    2,451.79 0.00
4. Debt certificates issued 0.00 0.00
5. Liabilities to other euro area residents denominated in euro 13,289.66 30,238.29
5.1. General government 16    12,238.04 29,298.24
5.2. Other liabilities 17    1,051.62 940.05
6. 18    61.74 24.63
7. 20.52 3.72
8. 298.12 453.67
8.1. Deposits, balances and other liabilities 19    298.12 453.67
8.2. Liabilities arising from the credit facility under ERM II 0.00 0.00
9. 20    425.65 418.35
10. Intra-Eurosystem liabilities 0.00 0.00
10.2. Liabilities related to promissory notes backing the issuance of ECB debt certificates 0.00 0.00
10.3. Other liabilities within the Eurosystem (net) 0.00 0.00
11. Items in course of settlement 21    90.07 385.32
12. Other liabilities 1,666.94 1,599.84
12.1. Off-balance-sheet instruments revaluation differences 22    67.30 0.00
12.2. Accruals and deferred income 23    604.70 917.53
12.3. Sundry 24    994.94 682.31
13. Provisions 25    3,868.40 3,864.79
14. Revaluation accounts 26    10,667.56 10,068.62
15. Capital and reserves 4.54 4.54
15.1. Capital 27    1.37 1.37
15.2. Reserves 28    3.17 3.17
16. Profit for the year 29    4,793.49 5,758.70
TOTAL LIABILITIES 96,139.25 118,410.00
Counterpart of special drawing rights allocated by the IMF
Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in euro
Liabilities to euro area credit institutions related to monetary
Other liabilities to euro area credit institutions denominated in euro
Liabilities to euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
Balance sheet of the Banco de España as at 31 December 2001 (cont'd)
(€ m)
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Note
number 2001 2000
Interest income 1     4,010.60   4,540.61   
Interest expense 2     -966.07   -919.57   
Net interest income 3,044.53   3,621.04   
Realised gains/losses arising from financial operations 3     2,048.07   2,494.67   
Write-downs on financial assets and positions 4     -85.16   -7.00   
Transfer to/from provisions for foreign exchange rate and price risks 0.00   0.00   
Net result of financial operations, write-downs and risk 
provisions 1,962.91   2,487.67   
Fees and commissions income 13.91   16.03   
Fees and commissions expense -1.66   -1.46   
Net income from fees and commissions 5     12.25   14.57   
Income from equity shares and participating interests 6     181.27   1.75   
Net result of pooling of monetary income 7     2.02   1.85   
Other income 8     75.02   41.23   
TOTAL NET INCOME 5,278.00   6,168.11   
Staff costs 9     -182.59   -174.76   
Administrative expenses 10     -66.96   -51.97   
Depreciation of tangible and intangible fixed assets 11     -18.50   -16.60   
Banknote production services 12     -166.97   -68.13   
Other expenses -1.43   -1.39   
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES -436.45   -312.85   
Transfers and additions to other funds and provisions 13     -48.06   -96.56   
PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 14     4,793.49   5,758.70   
Profit and loss account of the Banco de España for the year ending 31 December 2001
(€ m)
Countersigned by
The Governor,
JAIME CARUANA
The Comptroller,
ANTONIO ROSAS
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1I. NOTES ON THE ACCOUNTS
1I.1. VALUATION CRITERIA
1. Basic principles
The following accounting principles have been
applied:
• economic reality and transparency;
• prudence;
• recognition of post-balance-sheet events;
• materiality;
• the accruals principle;
• consistency and comparability.
2. Basis of accounting
The accounts have been prepared on an histori-
cal cost basis, except in the case of marketable se-
curities, gold and the foreign currency position,
which are valued at market prices. Transactions in
assets and liabilities are reflected in the accounts on
the basis of the date on which they are settled.
As an exception to the application of the general
historical cost criterion it should be pointed out
that, on 31 December 1998, at the time the ESCB
was established and in application of the harmo-
nised accounting standards established for the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks, gold, domestic and
foreign securities and foreign currencies were val-
ued at the prices and exchange rates then prevail-
ing, without recognising profits, in the event of un-
realised gains, and with a charge to the profit and
loss account in the case of unrealised losses. These
unrealised gains are subsequently credited to the
profit and loss account, when the sale of the asset
in question takes place or, under certain conditions,
when unrealised losses arising at a later date can be
netted against them.
The specific valuation criteria applied to each of
the assets and liabilities specified were the following:
Gold
Gold is recorded at its purchase price, which is
determined by the cash amount paid, including all
the expenses inherent in the transaction.
The cost of sales is obtained by applying the dai-
ly LIFO method. In the event that the cash to be
paid or received is specified in a foreign currency, it
is translated into euro at the mid-market exchange
rate two business days before the settlement date.
On the last day of each month stocks are valued
at the market price of a troy ounce of fine gold sup-
plied by the European Central Bank, with the ap-
propriate accounting adjustments, without changing
the average book price
Unrealised losses existing at the end of the year
are taken to the profit and loss account and the av-
erage book price is modified. Such losses are con-
sidered irreversible.
Sales of gold against foreign currency under re-
purchase agreements are recorded as off-balance-
sheet items, with no effect on the balance sheet.
The foreign currency received by way of considera-
tion is recorded on the assets side, with the obliga-
tion to repay it being recorded simultaneously on
the liabilities side. Possible differences arising be-
tween gold delivered spot and that received for-
ward are recorded as if there had been an inde-
pendent outright sale or purchase, at the time of
maturity of the transaction.
Special drawing rights
SDRs and the net IMF position are valued at the
year-end SDR market exchange rate.
Foreign securities
Foreign securities are recorded at the purchase
price, which is determined by the cash amount paid,
after deducting any accrued gross coupon.
The cost of foreign securities sold or redeemed
is determined by the average book price of the se-
curity in question.
Foreign securities are revalued monthly, in line
with market price. This revaluation is carried out
without any netting of unrealised gains and losses
on different security codes. Gains and losses (with
the exception of losses at year-end) are reflected in
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adjustment accounts and credited or debited, re-
spectively, to revaluation and expense accounts,
with both cancelled at the end of the following
month.
Losses existing at the end of the year are taken
to the profit and loss account. Their amount is
credited directly to the securities account, and the
average book price – and therefore the internal
rate of return – of the security code concerned is
modified. Such losses are considered irreversible,
not being cancelled at the end of the following
month.
Any premiums, discounts and coupons that have
accrued but are not due are recorded in accruals
accounts, using the internal rate of return of each
security code for their calculation.
The above references to purchase and market
prices shall, in relation to securities denominated in
foreign currency, be understood to refer to the
currency concerned, these amounts being translat-
ed into euro, as stipulated below.
Foreign currencies
Purchases are recorded at the purchase price in
euro. Purchases and sales of foreign currencies
against euro are valued at the exchange rate agreed
in the transaction. Where foreign currencies are
bought and sold against other foreign currencies
the euro valuation is at the mid-market exchange
rate of the currency sold on the contract date.
The cost in euro of foreign currency sold is cal-
culated using the daily LIFO method.
On the last day of each month stocks are val-
ued at the mid-market exchange rate, with the
relevant adjustments, without changing the aver-
age book price. Losses existing at the end of the
year, for each currency, are taken to the profit
and loss account, and the average book exchange
rate changed. Such losses are considered irre-
versible.
Foreign banknotes
The same criteria are applied as indicated above
for convertible currencies.
Repurchase agreements involving securities
Reverse repurchase agreements involving securi-
ties are recorded on the assets side of the balance
sheet as collateralised outward loans for the
amount of the loan. Securities acquired under re-
verse repurchase agreements are not revalued or
included in the securities portfolio.
Repurchase agreements involving securities are
recorded on the liabilities side of the balance sheet
as an inward deposit collateralised by securities.
The balance sheet shows the deposits and the value
of the items given as collateral. Securities sold un-
der this type of agreement remain on the balance
sheet of the Banco de España and are treated as if
they remained part of the portfolio from which they
were sold. Repurchase agreements involving securi-
ties denominated in foreign currencies have no ef-
fect on the average cost of the currency position.
Doubtful debtors
Where there is any reasonable doubt over the
recovery of an asset it is recorded in a separate ac-
count and the relevant provision set aside.
Loans to financial institutions and balances
with EU central banks
These are valued at their nominal amount.
Special loans to the State and the Social
Security System
Special loans granted to the State that are re-
ferred to in transitional provision seven of Law 21/
1993 on the State budget for 1994, and those grant-
ed to the Social Security System that are envisaged
in transitional provision six of Law 41/1994 on the
State budget for 1995, are valued at their nominal
amount, in accordance with the ESCB’s harmonised
rules.
Book-entry domestic State securities
The criteria used to record and value book-en-
try domestic State securities are the same as those
indicated above for foreign securities.
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%
• Land and buildings 2
• Facilities 6
• Furniture and office equipment
— Libraries 10
— Furniture 10
— Office machines other than computer equipment 20
— Machines for the treatment of banknotes and coins 20
— Computer equipment 25
— Other machines and equipment 20
• Transport equipment 20
• Computer applications 33
• Art collection 0
Participating interests in institutions and other entities
Participating interests in national and/or interna-
tional institutions, including the participating inter-
est in the ECB, are valued at their purchase price.
Tangible and intangible fixed assets
In general, fixed assets are valued at the pur-
chase price, which includes any non-deductible VAT
paid and all additional expenses that may arise until
they are in operation. Fixed assets whose cost is
less than EUR 120 are recorded as expenses in the
year in which they are acquired.
Annual charges for depreciation are calculated
on the basis of the estimated economic life of the
various assets using the straight-line method. Land
and items forming part of the Bank’s art collection
are not considered to be depreciable assets. Depre-
ciation is carried out on a monthly basis, starting
from the month following that of the date the asset
is recorded in the accounts or put into operation.
Assets paid for out of the Beneficent-Social Fund
(Fondo de Atenciones Benéfico Sociales) are consid-
ered automatically depreciated.
Relevant expenses relating to projects due to be
in effect for several years may be capitalised and de-
preciated over a maximum period of four years.
In 2001, the depreciation percentages applied to
the various fixed assets were the same as those ap-
plied in 2000, and were as follows:
the event that the amount so obtained is less than
the book value.
Banknotes
Banknotes in circulation are recorded on the lia-
bilities side of the balance sheet at their face value,
and their purchase cost is recorded as an expense
in the relevant year.
Recognition of income and expenses
Income and expenses are recognised in the peri-
od in which they accrue.
Realised gains and realised and unrealised losses
are taken to the profit and loss account. The aver-
age cost method is used to calculate the purchase
price of individual items sold. In the case of unreal-
ised losses on any item at year-end, its average cost
is reduced in line with the end-of-year market price
and/or exchange rate
Unrealised gains are not recognised as income,
but are transferred to a revaluation account.
Unrealised losses are taken to the profit and
loss account if they exceed previous revaluation
gains recorded in the corresponding revaluation ac-
count, and are not reversed in subsequent years
against new unrealised gains. Unrealised losses in
any one security or currency or in gold are not net-
ted against unrealised gains in other securities or
currencies.
Premiums or discounts arising on issued and
purchased securities are calculated and shown as in-
terest income or expenses and amortised over the
remaining life of the securities concerned, according
to the internal rate of return method.
Pension scheme
Contributions to an external pension fund by
employees who, having joined the Bank after
31.1.1986, are eligible to and do participate in
the Pension Scheme, are established at 6.5% of
the so-called “regulating salary”, consisting of the
salary items determined in the Scheme Rules.
The amounts contributed by the Bank are recog-
Purchases of silver are recorded at the purchase
price. At year-end the stocks are revalued at the
London market US dollar price of a troy ounce on
that date, translated into euro at the prevailing ex-
change rate. This revaluation is carried out only in
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(1)  The net position under foreign exchange forward transac-
tions and swaps, and the foreign-exchange gains and losses gen-
erated by such position are shown in the balance sheet under
items 11.4 on the assets side and 12.1 on the liabilities side, de-
pending on their sign.
(2)  One troy ounce is equal to 31.1035 grams.
Type of asset 2001 2000
(EUR millions)
Balances with banks 735.06 446.07
Security investments (3) 30,432.89 30,353.62
External loans and other external
assets 238.81 239.70
Loan provisions –11.95 –14.57
Non-euro area banknotes 4.18 4.64
TOTAL 31,398.99 31,029.46
(3)  At year-end 2001, repurchase agreements were constituted
over part of the USD-denominated securities portfolio, with a market
value of USD 414.15 million. These repurchase agreements were con-
ducted under automated security lending contracts with the deposito-
ries of these securities. Automated security lending contracts allow the
depository to lend the securities to a third party in overnight opera-
tions under the limits established in the contract.
nised as a current expense in the year to which
they relate.
Off-balance-sheet positions (1)
Foreign exchange forward transactions, forward
legs of foreign exchange swaps and other currency
instruments involving an exchange of one currency
for another at a future date, are included in the net
foreign currency positions in order to calculate for-
eign exchange gains and losses.
Interest rate futures are revalued on an item-by-
item basis and treated in a similar manner to securi-
ties.
Profits and losses arising from off-balance-sheet
instruments are recognised and treated in a similar
manner to on-balance-sheet instruments.
Post-balance-sheet events
Assets and liabilities are adjusted to reflect
events that occur between the annual balance sheet
date and the date on which the Governing Council
formulates the financial statements if such events
materially affect the condition of assets and liabili-
ties.
1I.2. NOTES ON THE BALANCE SHEET
1. Gold and gold receivables
The Banco de España’s gold holdings amount to
EUR 5,300.90 million, consisting of 16,829 million
troy ounces of fine gold valued at EUR 314.99 per
ounce (2). This amount is EUR 369.74 million higher
than at end-2000 as a result of the rise in the mar-
ket price of gold during the year (at end-2000 the
price per ounce was EUR 293.01), the number of
ounces having remained unchanged during the year,
except for slight differences arising from deposit
and swap transactions.
2. Receivables from the IMF
These include: a) drawing rights within the reserve
tranche (EUR 1,502.98 million) which include the net
IMF position (EUR 1,502.98 million) and the euro
tranche position and its balancing account (EUR
2,840.21 million, with a positive and negative sign); b)
special drawing rights (EUR 397.71 million), and c) oth-
er claims (EUR 57.32 million). In total, receivables from
the IMF rose by EUR 230.20 million, with respect to
end-2000, due to various factors. Notable among them
were operations carried out through the IMF, basically
aid to other countries and loan extensions, which in-
volved a net increase of EUR 270.14 million, while low-
er unrealised gains on stocks of SDRs involved a reduc-
tion of EUR 39.94 million. There was no change in
Spain’s IMF quota during 2001.
3. Balances with banks and security
investments, external loans
and other external assets
This item includes balances with banks, loans
and other claims on non-euro area residents de-
nominated in foreign currency. Their total amount
is EUR 31,398.99 million, with the following break-
down:
At end-2001, 99.98% of the balances with for-
eign banks, loans denominated in foreign currency
and security investments were denominated in US
dollars.
Under “external loans and other external as-
sets” are included, inter alia, certain assets, to the
value of EUR 11.95 million, considered to be of
doubtful recovery. Country-risk and other provi-
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(EUR millions)
Net sales of foreign currency –2,628.84
Decline in the outstanding gold swaps position at
year-end –140.46
Decline in the market price of foreign securities –67.48
Increase in the market exchange rate 1,009.24
Results obtained from the sale of securities and
futures 362.01
Foreign-currency-denominated interest income 1,835.50
Other –0.44
TOTAL 369.53
Breakdown of the change
31.12.2001 Repayment 31.12.2000
(EUR millions)
Treasury. Law 3/1983 special
account 2,245.39 97.63 2,343.02
Treasury. Law 4/1990 special
account 5,905.78 347.40 6,253.18
Subrogation under loans to
Tabacalera, S.A. (Law 31/1991) — 12.90 12.90
Credits arising from subscription for
participating interests, contributions
and quotas in international
agencies 693.89 40.81 734.70
TOTAL 8,845.06 498.74 9,343.80
sions have been established in respect of these as-
sets for their full amount.
The increase in this item (EUR 369.53 million)
was basically due to the net effect of the factors list-
ed in the following table:
the State budget for 1994. Transitional provision sev-
en of this Law states that the terms and maturities
originally established in such loans shall be maintained
and, in the absence thereof, they shall be repaid on a
straight-line basis within twenty-five years, by means
of annual payments as from 1999.
The outstanding balance as at 31 December
2001 of the loans granted to the State amounted to
EUR 8,845.06 million, broken down as follows:
The change was solely due to repayments made
during the year, as specified in the above table.
b) Social Security System
This item (EUR 1,535.84) corresponds to the out-
standing amount of two loans granted to the Social
Security System under Law 41/1994 of 30 December
1994 on the State budget for 1995. The first includes
the principal of another loan granted to this institu-
tion, which was not paid on its maturity, of EUR
1,539.19 million, and the second includes the interest
due but not paid on the previous loan to 31.12.1994,
amounting to EUR 501.90 million. The repayment of
the first loan, by means of twenty annual instalments
starting in 2000, is treated in the same way as estab-
lished for the repayment of special loans granted to
the Sate, referred to above. The loan for interest due
to 31 December 1994 is being repaid on a straight-
line basis over ten years, the first instalment having
been made on 31 December 1995.
EUR 76.96 million of the reduction in the bal-
ance of this item in 2001 (EUR 127.15 million) cor-
responds to receipt of the second repayment instal-
ment on the loan of EUR 1,539.19. The remaining
EUR 50.19 million corresponds to receipt of the
seventh repayment instalment on the loan of EUR
501.90 million. The amount of this payment was re-
covered by means of set-off against some of the
4. Lending to euro area credit institutions
related to monetary policy operations
denominated in euro
This includes euro-denominated lending to euro
area financial institutions, for the conduct of mone-
tary policy. Most of this lending is in the form of
main refinancing operations.
The amount as at end-2001 is 34.67% down on
2000 (EUR 10,546.69 million in 2001, as against
EUR 16,142.87 million in 2000). Also, the average
daily flow of financing extended during the year was
down 6.04%, from EUR 14,591.41 million in 2000 to
EUR 13,709.67 in 2001. This decrease was primarily
connected with the reduction in the Treasury’s de-
posits with the Banco de España from February
2001 (see Note 16), which entailed a decline in the
financing requirements of credit institutions.
In compliance with the provisions of Article 4.2
of the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España of
1 June 1994, it is hereby stated that in 2001 no
loans were granted to financial institutions other
than on an arm’s-length basis.
5. General government debt denominated
in euro
a) State
Loans which, by virtue of their respective laws of
creation, were granted to the State prior to the entry
into force of Law 21/1993 of 29 December 1993 on
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(4)  Note 7 on the profit and loss account explains the nature
and content of the monetary income for the year 2001.
Accumulated
depreciation
Property
and
facilities
Furniture
and
equipment
Fixed
assets
under
construction
Other
fixed
assets
Total
(EUR millions)
1 January 2001 99.54 61.38 — 15.70 176.62
Change during
the year 8.30 1.96 — 2.48 12.74
31 December
2001 107.84 63.34 — 18.18 189.36
Cost or valuation
Property
and
facilities
Furniture
and
equipment
Fixed
assets
under
construction
Other
fixed
assets
Total
(EUR millions)
1 January 2001 233.42 74.71 12.67 81.46 402.26
Acquisitions 1.42 15.74 17.56 3.44 38.16
Disposals 1.29 5.75 9.32 0.31 16.67
31 December
2001 233.55 84.70 20.91 84.59 423.75
amounts due to the Social Security System in re-
spect of interest payable on its interest-bearing ac-
counts with the Banco de España.
6. Intra-Eurosystem claims
a) Participating interest in ECB
The fully paid-up subscription of the Banco de
España to the capital of the ECB amounts to EUR
444.68 million, which is equal to a share of 8.8935%
in such capital. This percentage, which remained un-
changed during the year, corresponds to the Banco
de España, in accordance with the capital key estab-
lished by the European Commission on the basis of
Spain’s population and GNP.
b) Claims equivalent to the transfer
of foreign reserves
Pursuant to Article 30 of the Statute of the
ESCB/ECB, the Banco de España transferred foreign
reserve assets to the value of EUR 4,446.75 million
to the ECB at the beginning of 1999 . These claims
are equivalent to this transfer.
Until 2001, inclusive, these claims were subject
to a possible reduction of up to 20% in their initial
value, in the event that the European Central Bank
were to incur unrealised losses caused by exchange
rate differences relating to the reserve assets that
could not be covered either with its reserves or
through appropriation of the monetary income for
the year pooled by the participating NCBs. In 2001,
it was not necessary to use this means of covering
unrealised losses, as the ECB made a profit.
c) Other claims within the Eurosystem (net)
The balance of EUR 24,711.58 million reflects the
position of the Banco de España vis-à-vis the ECB, in
respect of the transfers issued and received through
TARGET, both with the banks of the Eurosystem and
with the non-participating NCBs. It also includes the
net position vis-à-vis the ECB in respect of the contri-
bution and reallocation of monetary income (4) and
the balances held with the Eurosystem NCBs through
correspondent accounts, the latter constituting an in-
significant part of the total.
In relation to the transfers made through TAR-
GET, it should be pointed out that, from 30 No-
vember 2000, the balances arising from such trans-
fers vis-à-vis the Eurosystem banks, as well as the
rest of the European Union banks, were netted and
replaced by a single balance vis-à-vis the ECB, the
latter (EUR 24,709.68 million) being almost the en-
tire amount of this item of the balance sheet.
As regards the claims on the ECB arising from
the process of pooling and redistribution of mone-
tary income between the Eurosystem central banks,
as at end-2001 they amounted to EUR 2.02 million,
this being the result of a contribution of monetary
income of EUR 1.67 million and a reallocation to
the Banco de España of EUR 3.69 million.
7. Items in course of settlement
Totalling EUR 398.84 million, they correspond
basically to bills and documents in the process of
being cleared (EUR 389.21 million), as a conse-
quence of 31 December 2001 having been declared
a non-business day for clearing purposes.
8. Tangible and intangible fixed assets
Their balance totalled EUR 234.39 million at
end-2001, of which EUR 423,75 million correspond-
ed to their cost and EUR 189.36 to accumulated
depreciation.
The two tables below show this item broken
down into its components, together with their cost
or valuation and accumulated depreciation.
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Denomination 2001 2000
(EUR millions)
ESP 1,000 1,269.49 1,514.74
ESP 2,000 2,444.00 2,994.34
ESP 5,000 15,250.03 18,837.69
ESP 10,000 27,437.15 33,887.42
Held by other ESCB banks –173.11 –35.87
   TOTAL 46,227.56 57,198.32
The Bank’s holdings of silver, valued at EUR
28.48 million, are included under “Other fixed as-
sets” and were unchanged from 2000.
9. Other financial assets
Of the total amount of this item, 99.9% corre-
sponds to the portfolio of book-entry domestic
State securities, in which the Banco de España has
EUR 3,571.12 million invested, EUR 127.89 million
more than a year earlier. This increase is basically
due to a net purchase of securities (EUR 89.77
million), as well as to the net unrealised gains re-
corded at year-end (EUR 54.82 million), partly off-
set by the reduction in implicit interest accrued
(EUR –16.67 million).
10. Off-balance-sheet instruments
revaluation differences
See Note 22 on the balance sheet.
11. Accruals and deferred expenditure
Of the total balance of this group of accounts
(EUR 727.27 million), the main components are
interest accrued but not yet received on securi-
ties, deposits and other assets denominated in
foreign currency (EUR 314.77 million), on book-
entry domestic State securities (EUR 143.33 mil-
lion), on the claims equivalent to the transfer of
foreign reserves (EUR 165.74 million) and on the
net balance of claims within the Eurosystem aris-
ing from transfers made through TARGET (EUR
66.90 million).
12. Sundry
The most significant component is the transfer
made to the Treasury on 2.11.01 of EUR 2,258.36
million, equivalent to 70% of the Bank’s recorded
profits accrued to 30 September 2001.
The other most important item is the net posi-
tion of the Banco de España vis-à-vis the SNCE (the
National Electronic Clearing System) in respect of
documents presented and received for clearing that
were pending settlement which, as at 31 December
2001, amounted to EUR –408.80 million, as a con-
sequence of that day having been declared a non-
business day for clearing purposes.
13. Banknotes in circulation
The breakdown of banknotes in circulation by
denomination at 31.12.2001 is as follows:
The stock of banknotes in circulation was down
19.2% on end-2000. This reduction, which occurred
in the second half of 2001, was basically related to
the euro cash changeover from 1 January 2002.
As a consequence of the resolutions adopted by
the Governing Council of the ECB in its Decision of
6 December 2001 (ECB/2001/15) on the issue of
euro banknotes, from 2002, 8% of all euro ban-
knotes in circulation shall be assigned monthly to
the ECB. The counterpart of this adjustment shall
be recorded as an “intra-Eurosystem liability relat-
ing to the issue of banknotes”
The remaining 92% of the euro banknotes in
circulation shall be assigned to the NCBs, also on
a monthly basis, so that each NCB shows in its
balance sheet that part of the euro banknotes is-
sued corresponding to it in accordance with its
paid-up share in the capital of the ECB. The dif-
ference between the value of euro banknotes as-
signed to each NCB, in accordance with this ac-
counting system, and the value of euro banknotes
put into circulation shall also be recorded as an
“intra-Eurosystem claim/liability relating to the
issue of banknotes”.
14. Liabilities to euro area credit
institutions related to monetary
policy operations
The overall balance of the different types of de-
posit held by credit institutions with the Banco de
España totalled EUR 12,273.21 million at end-2001.
The increase with respect to the previous year was
concentrated in current accounts (covering the
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(5)  In short, the linear debiting model has involved debiting
the credit institutions on 2 January with one-third of the total
sum of banknotes and coins frontloaded to 31 December 2001,
the remaining two-thirds being debited in equal amounts on 23
and 30 January 2002.
2001 2000
(EUR millions)
Central government (State) 2,793.60 22,907.41
Treasury current account 394.98 20,536.27
Other central government
agencies and similar
bodies 2,398.62 2,371.14
Territorial government 80.21 149.79
Regional (autonomous)
governments, admi-
nistrative agencies
and similar bodies 76.45 140.89
Local government 3.77 8.90
Social security funds 9,364.23 6,241.04
TOTAL 12,238.04 29,298.24
minimum reserve system), which rose from EUR
8,385.21 million at 31.12.00 to 12,272.85 million at
31.12.01. The large year-end balance was a conse-
quence of the need to pay for one third of the
frontloaded euro banknotes and coins on the first
business day of 2002. The average balance during
2001 was EUR 10,401.04 million, 15.4% higher than
in 2000 (EUR 9,009.71 million).
15. Other liabilities to euro area credit
institutions denominated in euro
At 31 December 2001, this item only included
cash deposits of credit institutions of EUR 2,451.79
million to secure that part of the euro banknotes
and coins frontloaded up to that date not covered
by the existing loan agreements with securities
pledges.
These deposits have been cancelled during 2002,
as the frontloaded euro banknotes and coins were
paid for, in accordance with the linear debiting
model (5) approved by the Governing Council of
the ECB at its meeting of 20 July 2000.
16. Liabilities to other euro area
residents denominated in euro.
General government
This item includes the deposits held by general
government with the Banco de España. The out-
standing balance at year-and was EUR 12,238.04
million, which breaks down as follows:
The significant decline in the balance of this item
(EUR 12,238.04 million at end-2001, compared with
EUR 29,298.24 million at end-2000) was basically
due to the large decrease in the balances held by
the Treasury at the Bank, which was slightly offset
by the increase in the balance of the Social Security
System accounts.
The reduction in the balances of the Treasury
was due to the agreement reached with the lat-
ter in accordance with the recommendations of
the ECB to stabilise the effects on Eurosystem li-
quidity of Treasury deposits at the NCBs. Pursu-
ant to this agreement, since February 2001,
Treasury balances have been transferred daily to
credit institutions.
17. Liabilities to other euro area
residents denominated in euro.
Other liabilities
Included here are the current accounts of fi-
nancial institutions other than credit institutions,
such as the Deposit Insurance Funds, other finan-
cial intermediaries associated with securities
markets settlement, other intermediaries in the
debt book-entry market, etc., as well as the cur-
rent accounts of employees and pensioners and
other accounts of legal entities classified in “oth-
er resident non-financial sectors”. The balance at
end-2001 was EUR 1,051.62 million, an increase
of EUR 111.57 million on end-2000, basically due
to the increase in the balances of the current ac-
counts of State bodies (both autonomous agen-
cies and business entities).
18. Liabilities to non-euro area residents
denominated in euro
This item basically includes the balances of euro
accounts held by International agencies and central
banks that do not belong to the Monetary Union.
The total of EUR 61.74 million was 37.11 million
higher than a year earlier.
19. Liabilities to non-euro area residents
denominated in foreign currency.
Deposits, balances and other liabilities
Of the total of these liabilities (EUR 298.12 mil-
lion at end-2001), 99.80% corresponds to debts
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arising under repurchase agreements relating to the
management of the foreign-currency reserves of the
Banco de España. The amount of this item fell by
EUR 155.55 million.
20. Counterpart of special drawing
rights allocated by the IMF
This item, totalling EUR 425.65 million, includes
the counterpart of the special drawing rights allo-
cated to Spain in proportion to its IMF quota.
21. Items in course of settlement
Of the total balance of this group of accounts
(EUR 90.07 million), EUR 78.32 corresponds to
transfers ordered by credit institutions pending
payment at year-end. These transfers also ac-
count for most of the decrease with respect to
2000 (EUR 255.35 million out of a total of EUR
295.25 million).
22. Other liabilities. Off-balance-sheet
instruments revaluation
differences
This item includes the amount of the net credi-
tor position with respect to foreign-exchange for-
ward and swap transactions valued at the exchange
rates prevailing at the end of the year. When this
position is a debtor one, as was the case in 2000, it
is recorded under the same heading in item 11.4 of
the assets. The end-2001 balance, EUR 67.3 million,
is the net value of the forward transactions and cur-
rency swaps outstanding as at that date.
23. Other liabilities. Accruals
and deferred income
The most significant items of this sub-group
of accounts (with an overall balance of EUR
604.70 million) are interest accrued but not yet
paid on remunerated current accounts (with a
notable amount of EUR 354.16 million corre-
sponding to the Social Security System) and ordi-
nary and pre-system profits (EUR 229.29 million).
The latter are attributable to the sale of foreign
currencies under forward transactions outstand-
ing at year-end, such profits being considered un-
realised until the transactions mature and are ex-
ecuted.
24. Other liabilities. Sundry
The most important components of this sub-
group of accounts are those relating to contribu-
tions payable to the Banco de España employee
social welfare scheme (Mutualidad de empleados),
which amounted to EUR 361.13 million, down
EUR 18.36 million on the previous year; “settled
credit interest pending allocation”, correspond-
ing to a loan to the Social Security System, with a
balance at year-end of EUR 150.57 million, down
50.19 million on the previous year (6); and “oth-
er liability transactions pending application”, to-
talling EUR 386.96. The latter are items that have
not yet been credited to their corresponding ac-
counts.
25. Provisions
With the exception of country-risk provisions,
which are presented in the balance sheet in the
form of adjustments to the values of the assets con-
cerned, provisions are recorded under this item,
with the following breakdown:
The most important provision, unchanged dur-
ing the year, relates to pre-system exchange rate
risks. It was created by a resolution of the Execu-
tive Commission of 26 January 1999 to cover future
exchange rate risks affecting the external reserves
of the Banco de España and possible contingencies
in respect of unrealised losses on reserves trans-
ferred to the European Central Bank.
The slight increase in the provision for liabilities
and charges was basically due to greater accuracy in
the calculation of the provision to cover assistance
for death and retirement established in Article 190
of the Bank’s Employment Rules.
The ECB posted a profit in 2000, so that there
was no need to set aside any amount to cover its
losses.
(6) This loan is referred to in Note 5 (b) above.
2001 2000
(EUR millions)
For liabilities and charges 100.54 96.92
For exchange rate risks -
Pre-system account 3,767.58 3,767.58
For other risks 0.28 0.29
TOTAL 3,868.40 3,864.79
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Total
Breakdown of the
change in 2001
Due to the
realisation
of capital
gains in
sales and
redemptions
Due to
netting
against
unrealised
capital
losses
(EUR millions)
Due to exchange rate differences 197.55 — 197.55
Due to price differences 60.66 — 60.66
Gold 0.14 — 0.14
Securities denominated in
foreign currencies 29.93 — 29.93
Book-entry public debt 30.59 — 30.59
TOTAL 258.21 — 258.21
Pre-system revaluation
accounts
Breakdown of change EUR millions
Due to exchange rate differences 412.94
Due to price differences 444.21
Gold 369.85
Securities denominated in foreig currencies 17.66
Book-entry public debt 56.70
   TOTAL 857.15
26. Revaluation accounts
These accounts represent revaluation reserves
arising from unrealised gains on financial assets and
liabilities. Their breakdown is as follows:
The difference between the pre-system and or-
dinary revaluation accounts is that the former
record the unrealised gains existing at end-1998
(immediately before the start of Stage Three of
EMU) and the latter those arising since that date.
The decline of EUR 258.21 million in the balance
of the pre-system revaluation accounts in 2001 has
the following breakdown:
The balance of the ordinary revaluation ac-
counts increased by EUR 857.15 million, with the
following breakdown:
27. Capital
The capital of the Banco de España, constituted in
accordance with the provisions of Royal Legislative
Decree 18/1962 of 7 June 1962, totalled EUR 1.37
million and remained unchanged during the year.
28. Reserves
Included in this item, which remained unchanged
during the year, is the amount of capital, reserves
and profits arising from membership in 1973 of the
former Spanish Foreign Currency Institute in the
Banco de España.
29. Profit for the year
The net profit for the year, having deducted the
transfer to the Beneficent-Social Fund (EUR 9.61 mil-
lion), amounted to EUR 4,793.49 million, 16.8% down
on 2000. Of this amount, EUR 2,258.36 million was
paid to the Treasury on 2.11.01, in accordance with
Royal Decree 1746/1999 of 19 November 1999.
The following amounts corresponding to the
profit for 2000 were also paid to the Treasury dur-
ing the year.
a) On 1.02.01, EUR 2,303.91 million, in order to
reach 90% of the profit for 2000 (EUR 5,758.70
million).
b) On 10.08.01, when the Balance Sheet and Profit
Loss Account for the year 2000 had been ap-
proved by the Council of Ministers, EUR
575.87 million, representing the rest of the
profit for 2000.
The details of the various components of the
profit for 2001 are given in Section II.3 below, relat-
ing to the profit and loss account.
1I.3. NOTES ON THE PROFIT AND LOSS
ACCOUNT
1. Interest income (7)
This item includes income from interest accrued
2001Type of account 2000
Pre-system revaluation accounts 3,879.02 4,137.23
Due to exchange rate differences 980.19 1,177.74
Due to price differences 2,898.83 2,959.49
Gold 2,565.53 2,565.67
Securities denominated in foreign
currencies 11.55 41.48
Book-entry public debt 321.75 352.34
Ordinary revaluation accounts 6,788.54 5,931.39
Due to exchange rate differences 4,949.37 4,536.43
Due to price differences 1,839.17 1,394.96
Gold 1,154.81 784.95
Securities denominated in foreign
currencies 588.42 570.76
Book-entry public debt 95.94 39.25
 TOTAL 10,667.56 10,068.62
(EUR millions)
(7)  The figures for interest income and interest expense in
2000 reflect the criterion used in 2001 whereby the negative inter-
est on foreign-exchange forward and swap transactions is record-
ed as a financial expense.
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Foreign currency
2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000
Euro Total
(EUR millions)
Securities 1,659.58 1,999.66 175.04 170.74 1,834.62 2,170.40
Other assets 183.94 224.88 1,992.04 2,153.90 2,175.98 2,378.78
TOTAL 1,843.52 2,224.54 2,167.08 2,324.64 4,010.60 4,549.18
on the main assets of the Banco de España. It was
made up, in 2001 and 2000, as follows:
As regards the interest on foreign-currency in-
vestments (EUR 1,843.52 million), the majority (EUR
1,692.14 million, equivalent to 91.78%) arose from in-
vestments denominated in US dollars, which had an
average balance of USD 26,264.40 million and an av-
erage yield of 5.6%. In turn, the majority of this inter-
est on US dollar investments (EUR 1,643.42 million)
relates to investments in fixed-income securities de-
nominated in that currency. The rest of the interest
(EUR 151.38 million) arose from much less significant
investments in SDRs, Canadian dollars, etc.
The reduction in US-dollar income with respect
to 2000, was basically due to the decline in the av-
erage balance of investments in fixed-income securi-
ties, which fell from USD 27,451.68 million in 2000
to USD 24,903.44 million in 2001, and to a lower
average yield (6.3% in 2000 and 5.7% in 2001).
As for the interest on euro-denominated invest-
ments (EUR 2,167.08 million), it arose from the fol-
lowing assets:
The decline in euro-denominated interest in-
come was a result of the decrease in the average
balance of investments (EUR 56,054.04 million in
2000), partly offset by a slight increase in their aver-
age yield, which rose from 4.1% to 4.3%.
2. Interest expense
This item includes expenditure on the interest
accruing on liabilities, which breaks down as fol-
lows:
The increase in the expense compared with the
previous year (EUR 37.93 million) was primarily due
to the increase in the average cost of financing re-
ceived, and also to the increase in the average level
of the minimum reserves and of the deposits held
by the Social Security System. This was partly offset
by a decrease in expense due to the transfer to
credit institutions, from February, of the balances of
accounts held by the Treasury, and by the disap-
pearance of debt certificates issued by the Banco de
España in September 2000.
3. Realised gains/losses arising from
financial operations
This item includes the profits and losses arising
from dealing in financial assets. In 2001, there was a
net realised gain of EUR 2,048.07 million, basically
arising from the following sources:
— Foreign exchange gains upon the sale of foreign
currency totalling EUR 1,656.05 million, of
which EUR 252.07 million corresponded to the
realisation of unrealised gains already existing at
31.12.1998 and the rest, EUR 1,403.98 million,
to the realisation of those arising in 2001.
Of the total of EUR 1,656.05 million, EUR
1,383.01 million (83.5%) arose from the sale of
US dollars. The other gains basically related to
the net sale of Canadian dollars (EUR 200.55
million), SDRs (EUR 73.90 million) and other
foreign currencies (EUR –1.41 million).
— The net gains arising from price movements, on
the sale of foreign securities, amounted to EUR
389.83 million, mostly corresponding to the sale
of US dollar-denominated securities (EUR
376.80 million).
Of the total of EUR 389.83 million, EUR 29.92
million corresponds to the realisation of unreal-
Average
investmentAssets Amount
Average
yield in
2001
(EUR millions and %)
Loans to institutions related to
monetary policy operations 13,709.67 610.87 4.4 %
Net position with European
central banks 27,457.90 1,209.68 4.4 %
Claims equivalent to the
transfer of foreign reserves 4,446.75 165.74 3.7 %
Book-entry debt portfolio 3,545.74 175.04 4.9 %
Other — 5.75 —
 TOTAL 49,160.06 2,167.08 4.3 %
Average
financing
Interest expense
2001 2000
Average
cost
in 2001
(EUR millions and %)
Remuneration of minimum
reserves 10,401.04 452.47 369.55 4.3%
General government deposits 10,716.31 456.31 407.91 4.3%
Certificates issued by the Banco
de España — — 99.44 —
Liabilities denominated in foreign
currency 652.45 29.49 41.09 4.5%
Other euro- and foreign-currency-
denominated liabilities — 27.80 10.15 —
TOTAL 966.07 928.14
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Income
2001 2000 2001 2000
Expenses
(EUR millions)
Foreign operations 0.56 4.07 –1.17 –1.15
Domestic operations 13.35 11.96 –0.49 –0.31
 TOTAL 13.91 16.03 –1.66 –1.46
The only significant change from 2000 was the
reduction in the commissions received on foreign
operations, owing to the income recorded in 2000
arising from a guarantee given by the Banco de Es-
paña on a loan granted by the Bank for International
Settlements to Brazil.
6. Income from equity shares and
participating interests
This basically reflects the share of the Banco de
España in the profits obtained by the ECB. In addi-
tion it includes the dividends paid on the participat-
ing interest of the Banco de España in the capital of
the Bank for International Settlements.
Of the total amount recorded (EUR 181.27 mil-
lion), EUR 179.37 million corresponds to the distri-
bution in 2001 of the ECB’s profit for the year
2000.
7. Net result of pooling of monetary
income
According to Article 32.5 of the Statute of
the ESCB/ECB, the monetary income of the na-
tional central banks, accruing in the performance
of the ESCB’s monetary policy function, shall be
allocated to such banks in proportion to their
paid-up shares in the capital of the ECB. The
Governing Council of the ECB, in its meeting of
3 November 1998, decided to calculate mone-
tary income for the period 1999-2001 by the ap-
plication of a reference rate to the liability base,
defined for this purpose as all the central bank’s
deposit liabilities to credit institutions, without
including banknotes. The reference rate used is
the marginal rate of the latest main refinancing
operation and is applied on a daily basis to the li-
ability base of each national central bank.
The table below shows the breakdown of the
net result for the Banco de España of the pooling of
monetary income in 2001.
ised gains existing as at 31.12.1998, and the rest,
EUR 359.91 million, to gains arising and realised
during 2001.
Compared with the previous year the net profit
on these transactions has fallen by EUR 446.6 mil-
lion owing basically to the decrease in foreign ex-
change gains, partly offset by an increase in gains
arising from price movements
— The decrease in foreign exchange gains of EUR
750.94 million basically arose from the lower
volume of sales of US dollars, which had a nega-
tive effect on the result of EUR 894.55 million.
This was partly offset by higher profits obtained
on the sale of Canadian dollars (EUR 198.99
million). The rest of the decrease (EUR 55.38
million) was due primarily to the movement of
the euro exchange rate against the US dollar
and the SDR.
— The increase in gains arising from price move-
ments (EUR 296.26 million) basically arose on
the sales of US-dollar-denominated fixed-in-
come securities due to the increase in their
market prices.
4. Write-downs on financial assets
and positions
This item includes that part of the loss arising
from exchange rate depreciation in the foreign cur-
rency position, as well as from the fall in the price
of gold and of securities denominated in foreign
currency, that cannot be netted against unrealised
gains arising from previous years.
The balance of this item at year-end was EUR
85.16 million (EUR 78.16 million higher than in
2000), of which 99.99% corresponded to the depre-
ciation recorded in US dollar-denominated fixed-in-
come securities since mid-November.
5. Net income from fees and commissions
This basically includes income and expenses aris-
ing from fees for banking services and the like
(transfers, negotiation of cheques, custody and ad-
ministration of securities, telephone service for se-
curities transactions, etc.). It may be broken down
as follows:
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Items December 2001
(EUR millions)
Monetary income contributions to the Eurosystem –1.67
Reallocation of monetary income to the Banco
de España 3.69
Net result of monetary income pooled 2.02
Description 2001 2000
(EUR millions)
Profit on the sale of book-entry
public debt — —
Pre-system profit on book-entry
public debt 30.59 17.69
Extraordinary profit 43.20 22.45
Sundry 1.23 1.09
TOTAL 75.02 41.23
As the ECB made a profit in 2001, it was not
necessary to apply monetary income to cover ECB
losses.
8. Other income
This includes the profits arising on book-en-
try public debt, as well as other diverse income of
an exceptional nature. It may be broken down as
follows:
The existence of a pre-system profit on book-
entry public debt is a result of the gains corre-
sponding to the debt repaid during the year.
Under the extraordinary net profit (EUR 43.20
million), the following items are notable:
— Profits of EUR 53.16 million, basically arising
from the receipt from the Social Security Sys-
tem of interest accrued in previous years (EUR
50.19 million).
— Losses arising from the withdrawal of banknotes
from circulation (EUR 4.44 million) and from
the increase in the provision to cover the assist-
ance for death and retirement established in Ar-
ticle 190 of the Bank’s employment rules (EUR
3.72 million).
The extraordinary profit was EUR 20.75 million
higher than in 2000 owing, above all, to the smaller
losses arising from special transfers (EUR 94.82 mil-
lion) (basically the extraordinary contribution to the
Bank’s employee pension scheme in respect of past
services and the establishment of the provision men-
tioned in the previous paragraph, in 2000 in both cas-
es), partly offset by the extraordinary income re-
ceived in 2000 from the IMF (EUR –34.78 million) and
the exchange of more banknotes withdrawn from cir-
culation in 2001 (EUR –42.11 million).
9. Staff costs
This item, which amounts to EUR 182.59 mil-
lion, includes the salaries and other emoluments of
the Bank’s staff (EUR 132.58 million), Social Security
contributions (EUR 31.56 million), expenses of a so-
cial nature (EUR 15.97 million) and contributions to
the pension scheme (EUR 2.48 million).
10. Administrative expenses (8)
This item includes expenditure arising from the
purchase of current assets, as well as diverse servic-
es received during the year. The most important
were office expenses (including IT costs), which
amounted to EUR 26.94 million, and costs relating
to premises (especially maintenance), which
amounted to EUR 13.65 million.
It breaks down as follows:
11. Depreciation of fixed assets
Included here is the cost of the estimated de-
preciation of the Bank’s fixed assets, which breaks
down as follows:
Description 2001 2000
(EUR millions)
Office expenses –26.94 –20.63
Property expenses –13.65 –12.66
Transport and communications –4.82 –4.65
Security –5.52 –5.18
Training and grants –1.68 –1.32
Sundry operating expenses –13.54 –6.73
Taxes –0.81 –0.80
TOTAL –66.96 –51.97
Description 2001 2000
(EUR millions)
Depreciation of property –8.78 –8.85
Depreciation of transport equipment –0.12 –0.09
Depreciation of furniture and office
equipment –7.30 –5.69
Depreciation of computer applications –2.28 –1.78
Other depreciable expenses –0.02 –0.19
 TOTAL –18.50 –16.60
(8)  Given that there is no explicit provision for taxes in the
harmonised ESCB profit and loss account format, these are in-
cluded in this item.
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(EUR millions)
1. Profit for the year 2001 4,793.49
2. Payments to the Treasury:
— on 2.11.2000, 70% of profits
as at 30.9.2001 2,258.36
— on 1.2.2001, the additional
amount necessary to reach
90% of the profit for the
year ending 31.12.2001 2,055.78 4,314.14
3. Profit pending payment to the
Treasury (9) 479.35
TOTAL (2 + 3) 4,793.49
Estimated
average
balance
in 2001
Title
Interest
rate
received
(%)
Reference
interest
rate
(%)
Estimated
loss of
profit
(EUR millions and %)
Net State debt 7,469.03 0.00 4.32 322.66
Loans to the Social
Security System 1,662.65 0.00 4.32 71.83
Home loans and
repayable advances
to employees 129.62 1.96 4.32 3.06
Home loans 110.58 2.30 4.32 2.24
Repayable advances 19.04 0.00 4.32 0.82
 TOTALS 9,261.30 0.03 4.32 397.55
Average balances on loans outstanding
in 2001 with interest rates below
the reference rates
(9) The remaining amount due shall be paid to the Treasury
when the annual accounts for 2001 have been approved by the
Government.
12. Banknote production services
This amount (EUR 166.97 million) corresponds to
payments made by the Banco de España to purchase
banknotes from the National Mint. The increase (EUR
98.84 million) was attributable to the larger volume of
euro-denominated banknotes supplied by the Nation-
al Mint, the higher unit cost of the EUR 10, 200 and
500 banknotes and the purchase of euro banknotes
for an amount of EUR 9.85 million from the contin-
gency reserve set up by the ECB.
13. Transfers and additions to other funds
and provisions
These totalled EUR 48.06 million and basically
included expenses arising from payment commit-
ments to the Banco de España Employee Social
Welfare Scheme (EUR 41.74 million), the decrease
in the country-risk provision to cover 100% of the
loans extended under the bilateral agreement with
Cuba (EUR –5.11 million) and the contribution to
the Beneficent-Social Fund (EUR 9.61 million).
14. Profit for the year
As detailed and explained in the preceding
notes, the net profit for 2001 amounted to EUR
4,793.49 million, 16.8% down on the previous year.
As detailed in the table below, of this amount,
pursuant to Royal Decree 1746/99, EUR 2,055.78
million was paid to the Treasury on 1.02.02. This
was the amount necessary, taking into account
the advance payment made on 2.11.01 of EUR
2,258.36 million, to make a total payment of 90%
of the Bank’s profit for the period ending
31.12.01.
III. SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIRED
BY ARTICLE 4 OF THE LAW
OF AUTONOMY OF THE BANCO
DE ESPAÑA
1. Contributions made by the Bank
to the Deposit Insurance Funds
(Article 4.2 of the Law of
Autonomy of the Banco de España
of 1 June 1994)
The contribution of the Banco de España to the
Deposit Insurance Funds is regulated by Article 3 of
Royal Decree 18/1982, according to the wording
established by additional provision seven of Royal
Legislative Decree 12/1995 of 28 December 1995
and Royal Decree 2606/1996 of 20 December
1996, which implemented the legal regime for such
funds.
The latter Royal Decree established that the
Deposit Insurance Funds may only exceptionally
be supplemented by contributions from the Ban-
co de España, the amount of which shall be fixed
by Law. In 2001 the Banco de España made no
contributions whatsoever to the Deposit Insur-
ance Funds.
2. Loss of profit
The table below shows the loans outstanding in
2001 with interest rates below the reference rates
used, in order to estimate the loss of profit for the
year pursuant to the provisions of Article 4.2 of
Law 13/1994 of 1 June 1994 of autonomy of the
Banco de España.
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Included under the heading “net State debt” is
the average balance during the year, on a daily basis,
of the special loans granted to the State before
1994 and the deposits held by the Treasury with
the Banco de España, when there is a net balance in
favour of the latter.
As regards the loans to the Social Security Sys-
tem, transitional provision six of Law 41/1994 of 30
December 1994 on the 1995 State budget, when
establishing the conditions for repayment of certain
loans to the Social Security System, provided that
no interest shall accrue on such loans as from 1 Jan-
uary 1995.
Finally, home loans and advances to employees
correspond to those granted under the collective
agreements with them signed by the Banco de España.
The reference rate used to estimate the loss of
profit is the monthly average of the interest rate on
main refinancing operations during the year.
152
ANNEX
1. REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITORS
AUDITORS’ REPORT ON THE ANNUAL ACCOUNTS
The Governor and Governing Council of the Banco de España
We have audited the annual accounts of the Banco de España, comprising the balance sheet as at
31 December 2001, the profit and loss account and the notes on the accounts for the year then end-
ed. The Governing Council of the Bank is responsible for the preparation of the accounts. It is our
responsibility to express an opinion on the annual accounts taken as a whole based on our audit con-
ducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, which require examination, by means
of selective tests, of the documentation supporting the annual accounts and evaluation of their presen-
tation, of the accounting principles applied and the estimates made.
For purposes of comparison, the attached annual accounts present, in addition to the 2001 figures,
those for the previous year for each balance sheet and profit and loss account item. Our opinion re-
fers solely to the 2001 annual accounts. Our unqualified audit report on the 2000 annual accounts was
issued on 31 May 2001.
In our opinion, the 2001 annual accounts present a true and fair view, in all material respects, of
the net worth and financial position of the Banco de España as at 31 December 2001, and of the net
profit from its operations in the year then ended, and contain the sufficient necessary information for
their proper interpretation and comprehension, in conformity with the accounting principles and
standards referred to in Section II.1 of the notes on the accounts, based on the accounting rules estab-
lished for the member central banks of the European System of Central Banks, which are consistent
with those applied the previous year.
Pricewaterhouse Coopers Auditores, S.L.
[signed]
José Wahnón Levy
Partner
3 June 2002
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JAIME REQUEIJO GONZÁLEZJOSÉ MANUEL GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMO
MARTÍNEZ-MURILLO
EDUARDO BUENO CAMPOS
2. REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTS
REVIEW COMMITTEE
We the undersigned, José Manuel González-
Páramo Martínez Murillo, Eduardo Bueno Campos
and Jaime Requeijo González, members of the Gov-
erning Council of the Banco de España and of the
Accounts Review Committee appointed by the
Governing Council, were given the task of review-
ing the accounts of the institution for the year
2001.
By virtue of this mandate, the Accounts Review
Committee has analysed the operations of the Ban-
co de España. This examination basically involved:
1) studying the Annual Accounts of the Banco de
España for the year 2001, prepared by the Internal
Affairs Department of the Banco de España; 2)
studying the audit of the balance sheet and profit
and loss account of the Banco de España for 2001,
conducted by the Internal Audit Department; 3)
studying the documentation requested by the mem-
bers of this Committee from the independent ex-
ternal auditors; 4) interviewing the senior managers
of the independent external audit firm; and 5) mak-
ing proposals for the modification, correction or
clarification of various matters, all of which have
been satisfactorily incorporated in the Annual Ac-
counts by the Control and Accounting Department.
The basic conclusion of our report is that from
the analysis carried out of the examination and ac-
counting procedures, of the accounting records and
of the internal controls carried out, it can be in-
ferred that the Annual Accounts for the year 2001
give a true and fair view of the net worth and finan-
cial position of the Banco de España.
31 May 2002
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